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Abstract 
Jennifer Moberly, „The Virtue of Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics: A Study of Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics in Relation to Virtue Ethics‟ (thesis submitted for PhD, December 
2009) 
 
This study first explores prima facie reasons for rejecting the possibility of seeing a 
close relationship between Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics and virtue ethics. However, a closer 
reading of his texts, and the examination of formulations of virtue ethics by Augustine, 
Thomas Aquinas, and Alasdair MacIntyre, lead to the conclusion that those grounds are 
insufficient for dismissing the possibility of such a relationship. Instead there is 
compelling evidence for the presence of virtue-ethical aspects in his treatment of 
justification and sanctification, his implicit anthropology and holistic conception of 
human life, and especially in the theme of „conformation‟ and the notion of „simplicity‟. 
Given the fact that there are some ways in which Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics appears to be 
positively related to virtue ethics, the study then examines how these aspects are related 
to elements of Barthian divine command ethics which are also present in Bonhoeffer‟s 
conception. The suggested conclusion is that the two forms of ethical thought were used 
throughout the writing periods in a dialectical integration within an overall vision of the 
agent participating (by grace) in the reality that Christ has reconciled all reality to God. 
Finally, the thesis considers how this understanding of Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics may be of 
use within contemporary debates, and advocates seeing it as a distinctive example of 
how virtue ethics may be articulated without compromising the role of grace. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The title of the thesis, „The Virtue of Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics’, is meant to suggest the 
inherent strengths of his work, one of which, I will claim, is the presence of both virtue 
ethical and divine command modes of ethical discourse. As the subtitle, however, 
makes clear, the central question of this study is how Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics is related to 
virtue ethics. Of course, the question presupposes the possibility of a variety of answers: 
that the two are utterly unrelated; that there was no intended relationship, even if a 
reader now may make correlations through her own perspectives which she brings to the 
reading; that there is an intentional relationship, even if the Ethics is not simply an 
example of virtue ethics; that Bonhoeffer was unwittingly so influenced by others that 
his account is one of virtue ethics; or that Bonhoeffer quite purposefully set out to offer 
a Protestant construal of virtue ethics. In the following thesis I shall endeavour to 
discover which of these possibilities accords best with the evidence, and to see what 
„virtue‟ this might entail for the current situation in theological ethics. 
1.1: Rationale for Study – Introduction 
A study such as this must necessarily face difficult questions at the outset: Why should 
it be undertaken? and, Why should it be read? Given that the aim of this thesis is to 
examine the relation of Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics to what is now called „virtue ethics‟, one 
might fairly consider that there are more than enough studies both of Bonhoeffer‟s 
works and of virtue ethics already. Yet although some scholars have seen the possibility 
of interpreting Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics with reference to virtue ethics or have at least 
identified „conformation‟ as one of the leitmotifs of the work (and have seen it as in 
some sense related to virtue ethics), no sustained attention has hitherto been given to the 
question of how Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics as a whole might be related to virtue ethics. Since 
the existence of this lacuna is not necessarily sufficient justification either to undertake 
or read such a study, what reason might there be? 
 
One reason, paradoxically, may be the reason mentioned already not to engage in such a 
project: the sheer number of studies already available about virtue ethics. The impact of 
Alasdair MacIntyre‟s (and others‟) work has been such that the central concerns 
articulated in virtue ethics (the character of the ethical agent, her continuity and 
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development over time, her motives for acting, etc.) have been widely recognised to be 
of real significance, even by those who do not include them in their primary account of 
the nature of ethics. To appreciate the impact the resurgence of virtue ethics has had, 
and the questions emerging from this development (and thereby the potential 
significance of this study), it may be helpful to consider more generally the theological 
background of this development.  
 
1.2: A Theological Backdrop  
The two actors taking the centre stage of this study will be Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics and 
virtue ethics, but before the reader‟s attention is focused solely on these two, it is good 
to observe the theological backdrop, which provides important clues as to the meaning 
of the action taking place, as well as parameters and perhaps even constraints for the 
play as a whole. As with any stage scenery, this is necessarily painted with broad 
brushstrokes, and should be taken as a general view of the landscape rather than a 
surveyor‟s map.1 
 
1.2.1: Justification by Faith 
On one side of the stage one of the key doctrines of the Reformation is represented, for 
the article of faith on which Martin Luther said the church stands or falls – namely 
justification only by faith, only by grace, and not by works – was to be one of the 
determining factors for how Christian ethics may be conceived.
2
 The early Luther 
followed the Augustinian and Thomist traditions in expecting that God truly makes the 
believer righteous, but from late 1518 he began to speak of her having an „alien‟ 
righteousness through being in Christ.
3
 She is righteous because God has declared her to 
be so and has imputed to her the righteousness which belongs to Christ. This came to be 
called a „forensic‟ notion of justification because of the courtroom language typically 
deployed of God as Judge, acquitting the believer. Moreover, the Christian was said to 
                                                          
1
 Among the myriad of offerings in this area, for a more detailed look at the theology of major figures of 
the Reformation, see Bernard M.G. Reardon, Religious Thought in the Reformation (New York and 
London: Longman, 1981). For a good overview to some of the issues here, see James M. Gustafson, 
Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). 
2
 I concentrate here on Luther and Lutheran positions because Bonhoeffer was a Lutheran. Of course 
there are differences within the Lutheran tradition, and between the Lutheran and Reformed traditions. I 
will, however, try to show in general terms where there are agreements or divergences. 
3
 Reardon, Religious Thought, 53-5. 
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be simultaneously a sinner and righteous, and Luther was unwilling to consider any of 
her actions as having „merit‟. Although Luther did speak of good works as a necessary 
consequence of faith, these were said to have nothing to do with a sinner being declared 
righteous, justification.
4
  
 
Turning to view the backdrop of the other side of the stage, the Roman Catholic 
understanding of justification as articulated in the Council of Trent was that it consists 
both of the remission of sins and sanctification. God‟s prevenient grace works in a 
person to dispose her towards conversion, and although she, of course, could not 
become righteous before God apart from God‟s grace, her will is nonetheless to be 
active so that she co-operates with that grace. Thus the council stated that justification is 
not by faith only, but faith accompanied by hope and love. Moreover, the believer was 
expected to grow in holiness (described both in terms of justification and sanctification), 
and eternal life is both a gift of grace and a reward for her life-long merit. Similarly, 
although Christ infuses virtue, that virtue can be said to be the believer‟s, as can the 
works (and their merit) which are thus enabled.
5
 A distinction was made between merit 
which is appropriate, de congruo, to a human, or genuinely „worthy‟, de condigno, 
which can only be granted by God‟s gracious act.6 Thus a Christian may be said not 
only to grow in holiness, but also in „merit‟ (even if that which is appropriate to a 
human is limited), and to become by degrees less sinful as she exercises the virtues. In 
this conception, then, Luther‟s language of receiving an „alien‟ righteousness was all 
but incomprehensible, and seemed to suggest that God, who is all truth, was party to 
some pretence or even deceit. Luther was thus seen to impugn God‟s character by 
suggesting that God was involved in some fiction by declaring the believer righteous 
when she was really a sinner. God, it was insisted, does not declare a person righteous 
without making her so. Grace is given by God, but must be used aright to do 
„meritorious‟ works, which would prove the believer worthy of the grace given.7 The 
contrast between this position and that espoused by Luther was such that many thought 
                                                          
4
 Freedom of a Christian, 1520. 
5
 Benjamin Drewery, „The Council of Trent‟, in Hubert Cunliffe-Jones (ed.), A History of Christian 
Doctrine (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1978, 401-9), 406-7. 
6
 Drewery, „Martin Luther‟, 327, in History of Christian Doctrine, 311-50. 
7
 Reardon, Religious Thought, 56. 
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of him as being „antinomian‟ or allowing for moral anarchy, and indeed the council‟s 
decree on justification concluded with 29 anathemas related to Protestant teachings.
8
 
 
Yet, returning to the first side of the scenery, Luther was horrified by being labelled an 
antinomian. In his preaching and teaching he emphasized the change of life that being in 
Christ certainly must make in the believer. He described faith as being  
a divine work in us which changes us and makes us to be born anew of God, 
John 1. It kills the old Adam and makes us altogether different men, in heart and 
spirit and mind and powers; and it brings with it the Holy Spirit. O, it is a living, 
busy, active, mighty thing, this faith. It is impossible for it not to be doing good 
works incessantly.
9
  
 
Yet talk of a supposed growth in holiness or merit in any form made him all the more 
polemical in his insistence that the believer remains a sinner, and that her only 
righteousness or merit is that which is given her in Christ. Although a careful distinction 
was made by Roman Catholic theologians between virtue that may be called salvific 
(which must be given, or „infused‟ by God) and that which a person may achieve 
through her own practice and habit, such accounts accorded more place to human effort 
(and less to God‟s sovereign act) than Luther and other Protestants would accept. It was 
asserted that Roman Catholics in fact believed in „justification by works‟, and that 
Roman moral theology did not take seriously enough the consequences of the Fall, both 
in terms of its damage to the believer‟s ability to choose the good and her capacity to do 
it. 
 
Naturally enough, on the Catholic side it was felt that Protestants emphasized too little 
the need for the believer‟s will to be aligned with God‟s and thus for her to participate 
by choosing to act well. Furthermore, Roman Catholic moral theology considered at 
least part of God‟s will to be accessible to anyone by rational thought through what is 
called the natural law.  
 
                                                          
8
 Not all of these anathemas related to Luther‟s teachings, but most did. 
9
 Luther, „Preface to the Commentary on Romans‟ (1546/1552), Works, vol. 3: Word and Sacrament I, ed. 
E. Theodore Bachman, trans. Charles M. Jacobs (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1960), 370. See also 371, 
where he says „it is impossible to separate works from faith, quite as impossible as to separate heat and 
light from fire.‟ 
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Against this, the Protestant front upheld not only Augustine‟s belief that as a result of 
the Fall the human will is not free to choose the good, but also that human reason itself 
is vitiated and incapable of discerning God‟s will apart from God‟s revelation. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the mutual misreadings, polemical discourse, and a papal bull 
excommunicating Luther did nothing to bring these two sides together to hear and 
appreciate how much they had in common.
10
 Instead a seemingly widening gulf opened 
between them, creating a sharp division between the two halves of the stage. 
 
1.2.2: The Basis for Ethical Discourse  
Yet even this sharp division in all its garish colours does not paint the full picture 
required for the backdrop. For these theological disagreements had important 
consequences for ethical discussion. The Roman Catholic perspective on justification, 
including both the remission of sins and sanctification, meant that moral theology in 
that context emphasized the role of acting well with the recognition that the Christian 
must grow in holiness. This process continued to be related in terms of her developing 
virtues and eradicating (or at least doing penance for) vices. 
 
Meanwhile, Luther and the other Reformers were clearly convinced that the Christian 
will do good works because they are the fruit of her being a new creation, and Christ in 
her will enable her to act well. Nonetheless, this was not anchored in that aspect of 
theology which is most central to Lutheran self-understanding, justification by faith 
alone. Moreover, the concern that there should be no hint of „works salvation‟ meant 
that justification and sanctification were treated separately. For these reasons ethical 
discourse seemed to become an optional extra.
11
 
 
                                                          
10
 The papal bull was Decet Romanum Pontificem of 3 January 1521; an earlier bull, Exsurge Domine in 
1520, had given him 60 days to recant. An attempt was made to mediate, and a group of three 
representatives each from the Catholic and Protestant sides reached an accord and produced an agreed 
document covering the disputed issues, Epistola de justificatione, 25 May 1541. Luther himself was not 
satisfied by the compromises made, and Rome repudiated the document, Reardon, Religious Thought, 
326, note 4. 
11
 It is interesting to note that this division led both to Kant‟s version of ethics without theology, and to 
others offering theology without ethics. Ritschl and other liberal theologians of the nineteenth century 
often seem, like Kant, more concerned with ethics than theology. 
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In this context (and for centuries to come) Protestants asked what abiding significance 
ethics might have, which, under the influence of nominalism, was often discussed in 
terms of „the law‟.12 For Lutherans there were two clear uses for the law: the first being 
to prevent sinful human beings from utterly destroying themselves and others. This had 
a civic function, in that enforcing such commands as „you shall not steal‟ or „you shall 
not commit murder‟ enabled a decent ordering for society. Thus for her own (as well as 
others‟) good, and though she may not know it, the sinner is preserved by the first use of 
the law from even more heinous sin than might otherwise have been the case. 
 
The second (spiritual or theological) use of the law pertains to Luther‟s reading of 
Paul
13
: because a person cannot possibly keep every part of the law perfectly, she 
realises her own sinfulness and therefore becomes aware of her need of God‟s grace and 
mercy. She cannot be justified by keeping the law, but through this very realisation the 
law leads her to discover the true means of her salvation: the grace of God. 
 
Melanchthon even spoke of a third (didactic) use of the law, namely in developing 
holiness (sanctification) in those who have been declared righteous through God‟s 
grace. Through the work of the Holy Spirit, the law of love is fulfilled by the believer in 
spontaneous self-giving.
14
 Despite the contentiousness of this notion, and the emphasis 
of subsequent Lutheranism being firmly on the second use of the law, some have noted 
that Luther himself insisted that God makes the believer righteous.
15
 The function of the 
law then becomes „to order that sort of new life which those who have become saints 
and new men ought to enter upon‟ and a „pattern for doing good works‟.16 Against later 
Lutheran orthodoxy, Bonhoeffer‟s own teacher on Luther, Karl Holl, interprets Luther‟s 
position as, „To declare righteous and to make righteous are inwardly connected as 
                                                          
12
 See Stephen J. Grabill‟s account of this development, Rediscovering the Natural Law in Reformed 
Theological Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006), 57-62. 
13
 Regarding Luther‟s reading of Paul, see e.g. E.P. Sanders Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A 
Comparison of Pattern of Religion (London: SCM, 1977), especially his claim that justification by faith 
alone is not central to Paul, 434; and James D.G. Dunn, ed., The Cambridge Companion to St Paul, 
(Cambridge UK: CUP, 2003), especially Graham Stanton, „Paul‟s Gospel‟, 179-81; and Robert Morgan, 
„Paul‟s Enduring Legacy‟, 249-53. 
14
 Calvin, among others, also acknowledged this third use of the law, Institutes of Christian Religion, 
2.7.12. 
15
 See Paul Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, trans. Robert C. Schultz (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1966), 226. 
16
 WA 39 I, 542; WA 39 II, 274. 
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means and end‟, suggesting that for Luther the sinner is justified precisely to make her 
holy.
17
  
 
For Roman Catholics, the theoretical understanding of virtue ethics, as early as the 
twelfth century, became a matter for theologians; the believer‟s awareness of her 
continuing viciousness and her growth in virtue, however, was focused on the 
confessional.
18
 In this context, the grille between priest and penitent creates the 
possibility for anonymity, and if every communicant is required to go to confession, the 
sheer numbers mean that the confessor can hardly hope to know – even without the 
grille – all the personal factors of each penitent which are significant according to virtue 
ethics. In such a context, the particularities of the agent which are so important for our 
current understanding of virtue ethics become invisible. Instead, the contours of the 
particular case came to the fore and provided the basis on which the priest was to offer 
godly counsel and require particular penance for offences. This focus on the given case 
is what is known as casuistry, and, taken together with the classification of certain sins 
as venal and others as mortal, was part of a codification which Protestants considered to 
be legalistic. 
 
Thus typically for Lutherans, ethical discourse occurred in the context of discussion of 
the law, and was treated separately from the doctrine of justification by faith alone, by 
grace alone.
19
 Meanwhile Roman Catholic moral theology handled justification and 
sanctification together, and ethical discourse relied to some extent on notions of 
receiving, acquiring and practising the virtues, but increasingly on the pastoral work of 
the confessional, with casuistry to offer the confessor guidelines for how to respond to 
                                                          
17
 Holl, Luther, 102. I have not seen any convincing evidence that Luther himself thought in terms of 
means and end. I am indebted to Dr Sibylle Rolf, who suggests that Holl is closer to Kant than Luther in 
speaking of means and end in this context. See also Adolf von Harnack, Lehrbuch der 
Dogmengeschichte, 825, 845. Both quoted in James M. Stayer, Martin Luther, German Saviour: German 
Evangelical Theological Factions and the Interpretation of Luther 1917-1933 (Montreal: McGill-Queen‟s 
University Press, 2000), 23, 5. 
18
 See Servais Pinckaers‟s account of how the effects of nominalism led to dependence on „manuals‟ 
which gave priests guidance for the confessional, The Sources of Christian Ethics, trans. Mary Thomas 
Noble (Edinburgh: T & T Clark: 1995), chapters 10 and 11. 
19
 Melanchthon, despite his notion of the third use of the law, discussed this separation in temporal terms 
as a second, distinct phase in salvation, Reardon, Religious Thought, 133. John Calvin also made a 
distinction between the two, but insisted that they are inseparable – as Anthony Lane nicely puts it, like 
trousers rather than socks, Justification by Faith in Catholic-Protestant Dialogue: An Evangelical 
Assessment (New York: Continuum, 2006), 18. 
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specific issues. So it was that the Lutheran position was perceived by Catholics as 
having nothing to do with ethics, and that Roman Catholic teaching was thought by 
Protestants to advocate „salvation by works‟. 
  
1.2.3: The Suspension of Disbelief  
The backdrop is in place, but now a word needs to be said about the suspension of 
disbelief. In a theatre, the audience is meant to forget the surroundings of the theatre 
(suspend the awareness that what is viewed is a play and not reality) and become 
engaged in what unfolds on stage. In the context of this thesis, there is a similar issue. 
While noting the gulf opening up between the two halves of the stage, the reader will no 
doubt be aware that the landscape the backdrop purports to depict has changed in 
remarkable ways since the time Bonhoeffer was writing. Although many of the old 
prejudices and caricatures have not yet passed from existence, it is significant that a 
process of theological dialogue continuing over several decades resulted in 1999 in the 
„Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification‟ between the Roman Catholic Church 
and the member churches of the Lutheran World Federation.
20
 In this agreed statement 
both churches recognised the misunderstandings involved in their division, and 
acknowledged that neither had intended to interpret justification in the ways their 
mutual distorted misreadings had suggested. Further, each church removed the existing 
condemnations which had continued to be in effect regarding the (false perceptions of) 
the other‟s teaching.21 This fact, taken together with lively interest in virtue ethics 
among many Protestants, means that the boundaries and contrasts are no longer as sharp 
as they were at the time Bonhoeffer was working. 
 
                                                          
20
 The Lutheran World Federation and the Roman Catholic Church, Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of 
Justification (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), especially 4.7. That some Lutheran churches refused 
to sign the document, and that many have expressed dissent from it, is proof that the gulf has not been 
eradicated, even if a bridge has been built. 
21
 However, the agreed statement was based on the Lutheran Church‟s stance of forensic justification. It is 
somewhat ironic that parallel with this agreement, many Lutheran scholars (especially of the Finnish 
School) have been saying that Luther himself did not advocate (simply) that position. See e.g. William 
Cavanaugh, „A Joint Declaration? Justification and Theosis in Aquinas and Luther‟, Heythrop Journal 41 
(2000), 265-80; Carl Braaten and Robert W. Jenson, eds., Union with Christ: The New Finnish 
Interpretation of Luther (Grand Rapids MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1998); Bruce Marshall, „Justification 
as Deification and Declaration‟, International Journal of Systematic Theology 4, no. 1 (2002), 1-17; Veli-
Matti Kärkkäinen, One with God: Salvation as Deification and Justification (Collegeville MA: Liturgical 
Press, 2004); and David S. Yeago, „Martin Luther on Grace, Law and Moral Life: Prolegomena to an 
Ecumenical Discussion of Veritatis Splendor, The Thomist 62 (1998), 163-91. 
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However, rather than suspending disbelief as such, it is important in this case to 
maintain awareness simultaneously of two levels. The first is the theological, social, and 
political world in which Bonhoeffer lived and worked, which influences the action on 
stage; the second is our current context. Although I shall only return to the discussion of 
how this study impinges on a contemporary understanding and articulation of ethics in 
the final chapter, this consideration figures significantly in my rationale for this thesis. 
 
1.3: Rationale for Study - Conclusion 
 
 As noted above, apart from wider theological agreement about the nature of 
justification (and sanctification) between Protestants and Catholics, the other significant 
change is the widespread interest in virtue ethics, including among Protestants. Despite 
the attention paid to this form of ethical thought, sharp questions as to how virtue ethics 
may be articulated while emphasising that justification is by faith in Jesus Christ and 
not through human works must still be asked, and satisfying answers sought.  
 
Just to speak of the work of contemporary Protestant ethicists, it is useful to contrast the 
positions of Oliver O‟Donovan and David Cunningham. Each represents an Anglican 
tradition, and each has seemingly felt the force of the claims made in favour of virtue 
ethics. O‟Donovan appears in many ways to be concerned about possible dangers of 
adopting virtue ethics as the main way of conceiving of ethics, and makes a case that it 
can be of use only in a secondary capacity related to the retrospective evaluation of an 
act, rather than in the process of deliberation.
22
 On the opposite end of the spectrum, 
Cunningham espouses virtue ethics almost to the exclusion of any other frame of 
reference for moral thought.
23
 
 
In the current context, then, there is a real need for discovering how Protestant ethics 
may give due attention to issues pertaining to the agent and her character without losing 
its emphasis on the primacy of grace. If the results of this study are at all correct, 
                                                          
22
 This is stated and argued in ongoing discussion, but for a succinct statement, see O‟Donovan, 
Resurrection and Moral Order: An Outline for Evangelical Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans, 1994), 224-5. 
23
 Christian Ethics: The End of the Law (London: Routlege, 2008), especially chapter 1. 
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Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics may, despite its fragmentary nature and the necessity of 
interpreting such unfinished writings with caution, offer an example of attending to the 
concerns of virtue within a Protestant account of ethics. If so this could have 
implications both for how Protestant ethics can incorporate the insights of virtue ethics, 
and for how virtue ethics may be articulated in relation to an understanding of 
justification by faith. 
 
Nonetheless, I wish to make no exaggerated claims. In my study I shall not attempt to 
give a detailed exegesis and interpretation of the manuscripts of Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics, 
nor will I seek to demonstrate my interpretation by appeals to his biography. There is 
too little space here for the former, and the latter must rely on a degree of speculation 
which is dangerous, if not unwarranted.
24
 My understanding of the manuscripts, 
however, should become apparent as various issues arise thematically. Similarly, 
although I do not treat separately any other of his works, I shall draw on them as they 
pertain to various points of discussion. Also for reasons of space I do not give a survey 
of the literature available either on Bonhoeffer or on virtue ethics; although this will be 
implicit, I shall endeavour to make my own position clear as regards various debates.  
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Future: The Ethics of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), 7-8; Gerhard Ebeling, 
Word and Faith, trans. James W. Leitsch (London: SCM Press, 1963), 282; Ernst Feil, The Theology of 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, trans. Martin Rumscheidt (Philadephia: Fortress Press, 1985); Christian Gremmels 
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further references); James Wm. McClendon, Jr., Systematic Theology: Ethics (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 
1986), ch. 7; Heinrich Ott, Reality and Faith: The Theological Legacy of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, trans. 
Alexander A. Morrison (London: Lutterworth, 1971), 269; H.E. Tödt, „Conscience in Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer‟s Ethical Theory and Practice‟, in Guy Carter et al (eds.), Bonhoeffer’s Ethics: Old Europe 
and New Frontiers (Kampen, The Netherlands: Kok Pharos, 1991), 46-58; Ernst Georg Wendl, Studien 
zur Homiletik Dietrich Bonhoeffers (Tübingen: JCB Mohr/Paul Siebeck, 1985), 3; Ralf K. Wüstenberg, A 
Theology of Life: Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Religionless Christianity, trans. Doug Stott (Grand Rapids, MI: 
William B. Eerdmans, 1998). See also Jean Bethke Elshtain‟s interesting inversion: „“the life” cannot be 
separated from… “the work”‟, „Freedom and Responsibility in a World Come of Age‟, in Wayne 
Whitson Floyd, Jr. and Charles Marsh (eds.), Theology and the Practice of Responsibility: Essays on 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press, 1994, 269-81), 273. See also David Ford‟s elegant 
and nuanced treatment, Self and Salvation: Being Transformed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), ch. 10. Despite the high quality of some of these treatments, and the level of cohesion of 
Bonhoeffer‟s life and work, it seems to me that theological arguments based on elements of his biography 
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Before I give a short overview of what I will be attempting to do, it may be helpful to 
make a few general remarks about how I have approached this work. 
1.4: Guide for the reader  
One aspect of this study to which I must draw the reader‟s attention is the translation of 
Bonhoeffer‟s works. Many others have commented over the years that Bonhoeffer is not 
always best served by his translators.
25
 In my estimation this remains so, despite the 
invaluable work of translating the Dietrich Bonhoeffer Werke into English. Fluency and 
beauty of English often seem to take precedence over strict adherence to Bonhoeffer‟s 
usage, and at times even to his meaning.
26
 For this reason I use my own translation of 
all his works throughout, which I keep as literal as possible while still providing 
intelligible English. This results in a somewhat angular translation, and often lengthy 
sentences, but I hope the effort required in reading will be repaid by a faithful rendering 
of Bonhoeffer‟s meaning.  
 
In translating Bonhoeffer I have chosen to retain also his gender usage. This is a vexing 
matter, since German is at all events a „gendered‟ language, which changes the nature of 
how it may be „inclusive‟ or „exclusive‟. For instance, it is the case that Bonhoeffer 
normally speaks of the „human‟ („der Mensch’) rather than „man‟ („der Mann’) or 
„person‟ („die Person’) or „individual‟ („das Individuum’). In meaning, then, Bonhoeffer 
uses a neutral term, yet it is grammatically masculine. Thus a case could be made for 
rendering „human‟ inclusively, as was done in the Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works series. I 
have, however, chosen to keep his masculine referents because I would not like to imply 
that Bonhoeffer shared our concern for gender inclusive language, which would at the 
                                                          
25
 See Paul Lehmann, „Bonhoeffer: Real and Counterfeit‟ Union Seminary Quarterly Review  21, no. 3 
(1966), 364-69; Martin Rumscheidt‟s preface to Ernst Feil, Theology, xiii; and John Godsey, „Reading 
Bonhoeffer in English Translation‟, Union Seminary Quarterly Review 23, no. 1 (Fall 1967), 79-90. 
26
 In my article on the translation of the Ethics for the critical edition, I cite many examples which 
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rendered unreliable for detailed study, Jennifer Moberly, „“Felicity to the Original Text”? The Translation 
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2009), 336-56. 
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very least be anachronistic.
27
 As a counterweight to this, when I speak in my own voice 
I shall use only feminine referents. This will, I hope, provide a balance in the overall 
thesis as well as marking a contrast between my citations of Bonhoeffer and my own 
commentary.  
 
Similarly, I have retained in translation Bonhoeffer‟s gendered language for God, not 
assuming that he imagined God to be anthropomorphically male, but realising that this 
is not one of his concerns. When writing in my own voice, I shall use non-gendered 
language for God. 
 
Finally, to provide some orientation to the study as a whole, I turn to an overview which 
notes the questions which will be asked in the following chapters, and the materials 
consulted in seeking their answers. 
1.5: Overview 
Chapter2: Bonhoeffer and ‘virtue ethics’ 
The prime question of the second chapter is whether Bonhoeffer himself would have 
seen himself as what we might now call a „virtue ethicist‟. My reason for starting with 
this question is the fact, as noted at the outset, that there are stronger and weaker forms 
of relationship which might be suggested between Bonhoeffer‟s account of ethics and 
virtue ethics, the strongest of which would be the claim that Bonhoeffer was engaged in 
virtue ethics and saw himself as an exponent of this form of moral theology. I do not 
wish to anticipate the answers that more careful examination within the chapter will 
find, but it is right to say that there are prima facie reasons for assuming that Bonhoeffer 
neither saw himself as a virtue ethicist nor was engaged in expounding an account of 
ethics based on virtue. One such reason is the fact that Bonhoeffer uses the word 
„virtue‟ in ambivalent and even negative ways; furthermore, Thomas Aquinas was 
almost the only exponent of virtue ethics who was well known in the early twentieth 
century, and Bonhoeffer‟s references to him are also largely negative; and finally, 
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 Moreover, many have been concerned that Bonhoeffer was, if anything, patriarchal. See DBW 8:213-
14, where Bonhoeffer hopes that his fiancée will be guided by his taste in literature. On Bonhoeffer and 
the role of women, see Renate Bethge, „Bonhoeffer‟s Picture of Women‟, in Carter et al (eds.), 
Bonhoeffer’s Ethics, 194-99; and her „Bonhoeffer and the Role of Women‟, in Geffrey B. Kelly and C. 
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Publications, 1999), 164-84; and Haynes, Bonhoeffer Phenomenon, 56-58. 
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though Bonhoeffer makes frequent allusions to a variety of classical sources, which 
might have offered a virtue-ethical slant to his thought, these refer mostly to figures 
from legends or plays rather than to philosophical forms of virtue ethics. Taken 
together, these facts would seem to suggest that not only must the chapter‟s main 
question be answered in the negative, but that the question of the whole thesis may be 
misguided.  
 
To ascertain whether these apparent reasons for such assumptions are valid or not, I 
shall attend carefully to the evidence internal to the Ethics manuscripts, as well as the 
opinions of those who have commented on the mode(s) of ethical thought in which 
Bonhoeffer worked. This evidence will enable me to refute some of the assumptions, 
while others will require further examination (either of the nature of virtue ethics or of 
particular issues within Bonhoeffer‟s thought) to be able to discover how valid they may 
be. 
 
Chapter 3: Virtue Ethics 
To explore the strength of certain possible objections which are raised in chapter 2 to 
seeing Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics as related to virtue ethics, it will be necessary to be more 
precise about what it might mean to speak of „virtue ethics‟ in the context of Christian 
moral theology. To address this question I shall look closely at the work of three 
influential thinkers from different eras: Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas, and 
Alasdair MacIntyre. Augustine and Thomas have been widely influential on the shape 
of Christian thinking and have become classics, as it were. It is much too soon to make 
such claims for MacIntyre, though his work has certainly changed the nature of ethical 
debate in the English-speaking world in the last twenty years or so. Focusing on 
Augustine‟s account of the cardinal virtues as forms of love, Thomas‟s Christian 
appropriation of Aristotle‟s understanding and his own addition of the theological 
virtues, and MacIntyre‟s emphasis on the communities and practices which enable the 
development of virtues should offer a broad perspective on how virtue ethics may be 
understood in a Christian context. The variation between their accounts will make it 
clear that to make definitive claims about what constitutes virtue ethics even simply in 
the context of Christian moral theology would be contentious. Instead of attempting 
this, I shall try to describe the kinds of concerns which seem to typify or underlie these 
various versions of virtue ethics. With this basic description of features necessary for 
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any account to be considered virtue-ethical, I shall return to a number of issues left 
unresolved in the second chapter. 
 
Chapter 4: Bonhoeffer’s Ethics  as Virtue Ethical 
Having thus addressed reasons one might not think of Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics as being 
virtue ethical, I shall turn to the evidence which is suggestive that such a construal may 
be possible. One theological reason for considering this possibility is Bonhoeffer‟s 
treatment of sanctification. This is important, since in theological terms becoming 
virtuous is in some ways analogous with being sanctified, and his handling of this 
doctrine may give clues as to how close his thought is to virtue ethics. For this I shall 
attend not only to sections of the ethics manuscripts which deal with sanctification, but 
also to other works as they refer to this topic. Then I shall look at Bonhoeffer‟s overall 
concerns in the Ethics (providing a Christian foundation for ethics; offering a concrete 
ethic; taking seriously the historical context; attending to the relation of the Church to 
the world; and articulating structures of ethical life) to see how they accord with virtue 
ethics. With this understanding of how the overarching concerns relate to virtue ethics, I 
shall look at how two more specific themes might be related, namely his (implicit) 
anthropology, and his holistic conception of human life.  
 
Having thus laid the groundwork for considering how Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics as a whole 
might be seen as related to virtue ethics, I shall turn my attention to particular themes 
which bear some resemblance: conformation, and „virtues‟ in Bonhoeffer‟s account.  
 
If my analysis is correct (and if Bonhoeffer‟s own work is relatively consistent and 
coherent), I would expect there to be further evidence of some virtue-ethical aspects in 
Bonhoeffer‟s method of arguing when he addresses concrete issues. Therefore at the 
end of this chapter I shall look at some examples of his treatment of specific topics to 
discover whether his way of engaging with them is indicative of a relation to virtue 
ethics. 
 
Chapter 5: Virtue-Ethical and Barthian Modes in Bonhoeffer’s Ethics  
If in the preceding chapters I have explored how Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics may be related to 
virtue ethics, in this chapter I am interested in how this strand relates to the other major 
(and more widely recognised) aspect within his Ethics, namely Barthian divine 
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command ethics. First I shall trace the language and motif of divine command in the 
manuscripts to see both how pervasive this theme is, and what its connections are with 
Bonhoeffer‟s principal concerns. Then I shall look at two recognised commentators who 
have discussed (not „virtue ethics‟ but) conformation and command as the two major 
ethical motifs in Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics, Larry Rasmussen and Stephen Plant. My view 
here is both to assess their understandings of the relationship between these themes, and 
to articulate my own. As I attempt this, I shall look particularly at the issues which 
Bonhoeffer treats both in virtue-ethical and command language to see what difference 
the mode in which he was working made to the handling of his concerns. An 
appreciation of how the virtue-ethical and command-based elements of Bonhoeffer‟s 
thought are related should make it possible to speak more definitively (or at least less 
tentatively) about the place of virtue ethics in Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics. 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusions 
In this final chapter I shall first summarise the discoveries from the whole thesis, and 
then ask about the relevance for moral theology today. In thinking about this I shall 
consider briefly some of the characteristics of our current context, and suggest ways in 
which my understanding of virtue (and command) in Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics might be 
helpful. 
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Chapter 2: Bonhoeffer and ‘Virtue 
Ethics’ 
2.1: Introduction 
In the first chapter, I noted that in looking at how Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics may be seen to be 
related to virtue ethics there are stronger and weaker claims that could be made. One 
strong positive claim would be to assert that Bonhoeffer was essentially engaged in 
what we now call virtue ethics, and that was his intention. At the other end of the 
spectrum of positive claims would be to suggest that, although one could not state that 
he intended to give a virtue-ethical account, there are elements which bear some 
resemblance to virtue ethics. Of course, it would also be possible to make a strong but 
negative claim, namely that Bonhoeffer did not see himself as a virtue ethicist, and that 
his Ethics does not contain any material which could be said to be related to virtue 
ethics.  
 
My starting point in attempting to discover which claim is best substantiated is to ask 
whether the strong positive claim might be seen to have merits, in other words, „Did 
Bonhoeffer see himself as a virtue ethicist?‟ In seeking an answer to this, I shall first 
look at one suggestion that there is a case to be made for seeing the connection between 
„formation‟ („Gestaltung’) and virtue ethics (2.2). However, as relating virtue ethics 
only to the theme of formation is not fully satisfying, I shall examine evidence from the 
manuscripts regarding his usage of the word „virtue‟ („Tugend’) (2.3.1), his attitude to 
Thomas Aquinas and other Roman Catholic sources (2.3.2), his use of themes from 
classical philosophy (2.3.3), and his own statements regarding modes of ethical thinking 
(2.3.4). Finally, I shall look at how other commentators have approached the question of 
what form Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics take (2.4).  
 
2.2: A Case for Connection 
At least one theologian has suggested the possibility of linking Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics with 
virtue ethics. Nick Sagovsky said: 
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Bonhoeffer discusses not only the theological ground for such [sc. responsible] 
action (focusing very much on Christology) but also such action as the outcome 
of the process of formation (Gestaltung). Bonhoeffer talks more in terms of 
character (cf Hauerwas) but his thought could be linked with the „virtue‟ ethics 
of MacIntyre and others at this point. „Responsible action‟ does not come out of 
nowhere. It comes from being „conformed to the image of Christ‟ through 
membership of the Church, reading Scriptures, meditation and committed 
action. It comes through formation of a Christian „conscience‟ (a knowledge and 
awareness of both God and reality). It is this which Bonhoeffer was seeking to 
teach and develop at Finkenwalde.
28
  
 
There is only a hint at how Sagovsky sees a possible link between Bonhoeffer and 
virtue ethics being made: through the emphasis in the Ethics on formation and 
conformation. Undoubtedly, Bonhoeffer‟s work on this theme shows the central 
hallmark of virtue ethics: an emphasis on the nature of the ethical agent. Thus it would 
seem to be a fruitful avenue to explore, and one which has been suggested by at least 
one other commentator, Frederick Carney.
29
  
 
Yet there are major drawbacks to a proposal for claiming a relationship to virtue ethics 
based on conformation: first, it would leave at least half of the manuscripts 
underrepresented; and secondly, it would be open to the possible charge that Bonhoeffer 
might have changed his mind about those concepts, since the later manuscripts feature 
ethics as formation less prominently.
30
 Some who knew Bonhoeffer have said that he 
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was an „impulsive thinker‟, taking ideas up only to discard them after a time.31 Thus if 
one were to make a case for a correlation of the predominant orientation of 
Bonhoeffer‟s ethics to virtue ethics on this basis, it might be difficult to defend, even if 
the theme of formation and conformation might be seen as related to character.  
 
2.3: The Evidence from Bonhoeffer 
A more important starting point is to ask how Bonhoeffer himself might have seen his 
ethics and virtue ethics. At all events it seems apparent that Bonhoeffer did not see 
himself as a virtue ethicist. At one level, this statement is patently obvious, so much so 
that it ought not even be made, since in Bonhoeffer‟s time one could hardly have 
spoken meaningfully of „virtue ethics‟ or a „virtue ethicist‟. Of course anyone 
acquainted with classical philosophy would have encountered a variety of forms of 
ethics which include an understanding of virtues and their centrality to the moral or 
good life. Nonetheless, the term would not have been used; it is anachronistic and as 
such it may seem improper for use in the context of this study. However, it is 
meaningful to anyone writing about this subject in the wake of Alasdair MacIntyre‟s 
After Virtue, and since it would be cumbersome and perhaps inaccurate (as one would 
need to make reference to classical philosophy as well as Roman Catholic moral 
theology if not specifically Thomism) to try to formulate this in ways Bonhoeffer and 
his contemporaries might have spoken, it is a convenient shorthand which I shall use 
without inverted commas. 
 
2.3.1: Bonhoeffer and Virtue (Tugend) 
Given that Bonhoeffer did not write (and could hardly have written) about virtue ethics, 
to discover his attitude towards an ethic which sees virtue(s) as having a large role to 
play, it is necessary to look at his usage of the concept of virtue (Tugend). In the first 
manuscript he wrote, „Christ, Reality and the Good: Christ, Church and World‟, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
2002), 6. My own view is that there are of course developments in his life and thought which result in 
changes in emphasis. However, there is a high degree of continuity in terms of themes which interest him 
and basic theological convictions.  
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Bonhoeffer refers only obliquely to virtue, but in such a way as to make it seem worthy 
almost of ridicule:  
Wanting to be good, so to speak, as an end in itself, a life-calling, succumbs to 
the irony of unreality; out of the striving towards the good comes the pushiness 
of the paragon of virtue [Tugendbold]. The good in itself is no independent 
theme of life; that as such would be the maddest Don Quixotry.
32
  
 
It is clear from Bonhoeffer‟s letters as well as the number of references in the Ethics to 
Don Quixote that Bonhoeffer does not think of the title character as a figure of fun.
33
 
Yet for him to speak of the „irony of unreality‟ and „pushiness‟ (Streberei) in relation to 
a paragon of virtue, makes it clear that he cannot take seriously an ethic which has as its 
starting point the desire to be good. Indeed, the opening words of the first manuscript he 
wrote demand a rethinking of the very questions which might lead one to consider 
Christian ethics: neither the question of being good nor of doing good will suffice, but 
only the question concerning the will of God (31). Or again, „Not that I should become 
good, nor that the condition of the world should be improved through me is of final 
importance, rather that the reality of God proves itself everywhere to be the ultimate 
reality‟ (32). 
 
A little further in this first manuscript Bonhoeffer states,  
All questioning about my own being good or the goodness of the world becomes 
impossible without first asking the question of the goodness of God. For what 
meaning could being good have for human or world without God? But since 
God as the ultimate reality is none other than the One who testifies, bears 
witness to himself and reveals himself as God in Jesus Christ, the question about 
the good can only find its answer in Christ (33).  
 
Thus, once again the starting point to be assumed for virtue ethics is discounted and we 
are directed towards the person of Christ. Moreover, since all of reality is also given a 
Christological definition, the desire to be good must become „a longing for that which is 
real in God‟ (35). In these passages it is clear that Bonhoeffer rejects what one might 
naturally assume to be foundational for virtue ethics, the questions of what the good is 
for humans, and of how a human can be or become good. This is no doubt part and 
parcel of his agreement with Karl Barth‟s rejection of „religion‟ as being a human 
method of trying to reach God, and discussing the Christian faith in terms of God‟s 
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initiative towards humanity through revelation in Christ.
34
 In the case of ethics, 
Bonhoeffer insists that the good is discovered by looking to Christ and seeing all reality 
in him. 
 
In the manuscript „Ethics as Formation‟, Bonhoeffer states, „The most shining virtues of 
the apostate are night-black compared to the darkest weaknesses of the faithful‟ (63).35 
It is notable that in this example „virtues‟ are not necessarily positive (and they are not 
contrasted with „vices‟ but rather „weaknesses‟). They obviously relate to things which 
would in other contexts be viewed positively, but when possessed by „the apostate‟ they 
are „night-black‟. That is to say, for Bonhoeffer it would seem that character traits are 
not in themselves meritorious (or worthy of censure) but can only be assessed in 
relation to Christ, since both „faithful‟ and „apostate‟ relate to the response of faith (or 
lack thereof), rather than moral character as such. 
 
Likewise, in the manuscript „The Love of God and the Decay of the World‟, written 
about two and a half years later, Bonhoeffer states, „The Pharisee himself can recognize 
himself only in his virtues and vices, but not in his being, his falling away from the 
Source‟ (318). Again in this passage, character traits are not seen as positive or negative 
in themselves, rather the focus on them is treated as symptomatic of a falling away from 
Christ, since Bonhoeffer considered the knowledge of good and evil to be a product of 
the Fall and part of the division of humans from our Creator. In a sense it would seem 
that for Bonhoeffer virtues and vices are superficial, merely human characteristics; the 
depth and reality of a person‟s being cannot be discussed in those terms, but only in her 
relationship to Christ. 
 
In a more oblique reference to the classical virtue of temperance, Bonhoeffer states,  
Whoever undertakes in his utterly own freedom to stand in the world, whoever 
values the necessary deed as greater than the purity of his own conscience and 
reputation, whoever is prepared to sacrifice an unfruitful principle to a fruitful 
compromise or an unfruitful wisdom of moderation to a fruitful radicalism, he 
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should take care that precisely his presumed freedom does not finally cause his 
fall (65, his emphasis).  
 
Bonhoeffer‟s concern here is obviously to address a mode of ethical thinking – namely, 
acting responsibly in one‟s own freedom, not relying on any form of justification or 
assurance of handling correctly, i.e. the position closest to that which seems to be 
Bonhoeffer‟s own – so it may be wise not to make too much of his treatment of 
„moderation‟, or temperance. (It is noteworthy that not even this understanding of how 
one might act ethically was deemed by Bonhoeffer to be able to stand the strains of the 
times.)  Yet it is also worth noticing that, like the purity of one‟s conscience or 
reputation and an unfruitful principle, moderation is something which the person acting 
in utter freedom (and responsibility) may have to abandon. It may be called „wisdom‟, 
but it could yet be „unfruitful‟ – an understanding of moderation which is at some 
remove from Thomas‟s, for example. 
 
In a more direct example from this manuscript, Bonhoeffer asserts,  
One or another will reach a refuge from the public debate by escaping into a 
private virtuosity. He doesn‟t steal, doesn‟t murder, doesn‟t commit adultery, he 
does good according to his ability. But in his voluntary renunciation of public 
life he knows how to keep precisely within the permissible boundaries which 
protect him from conflict. Thus he must close his eyes and ears to the injustice 
around him. Only at the cost of self-deception can he keep his private 
blamelessness pure from the defilement of responsible action in the world (66).
36
  
 
Like the previous citation, this comes within a long passage which describes a variety of 
ethical positions and how they failed to meet the challenges posed by the extreme 
situation in Nazi Germany. Only „private virtuosity‟ follows the responsible act in 
freedom, and it, like all that preceded it, is weighed and found wanting in the balance. 
For all the good things that can be said about private virtuosity, the „sins of omission‟ 
outweigh such that the one whose focus is on this cannot come to peace; she will be 
destroyed by the restlessness caused by what she has failed to do, or she will become 
the most hypocritical of all Pharisees (66). Thus it would seem that, again, Bonhoeffer 
utterly rejects an ethic based on the focus on the character of the agent, this time stating 
the concern that it allows, so to speak, a veneer of good to cover a refusal to address or 
prevent evil. 
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In a similar vein, in the manuscript „History and the Good‟, written some two years 
later, Bonhoeffer states,  
The world remains the world because it is the world which in Christ is loved, 
judged and reconciled. No one has the commission to bypass [überspringen, 
literally „to leap over‟, meaning to omit] the world to make of it the kingdom of 
God. Nonetheless, pious indolence is not thereby supported which leaves the 
wicked world to its fate and saves only its own virtue (266, his emphasis).  
 
Once again, „virtue‟ is used to denote something which seems to be good, but allows a 
multitude of evils to go unchecked. 
 
In one of the last manuscripts to be written, „The “Ethical” and the “Christian” as a 
Theme‟, written in early 1943 just before his arrest, Bonhoeffer mentions the Greek 
myth of Hercules at the crossroads, saying that before God‟s command the person is not 
like this, constantly wrestling with the decision about what is right (388).
37
 According to 
the editorial footnote, the legend by Prodicos, a contemporary of Socrates, actually 
concerns the decision for „virtue‟ and against „vice‟.38 Clearly what is most at stake in 
this passage is Bonhoeffer‟s rejection of any notion of permanent ethical conflict. Yet it 
is at least worth pondering that he is happy to exchange the concept of choosing the 
path of virtue with that of the right decision. It could be argued that the terms are 
synonymous for him; but equally it could be that he so rejects the language of virtue and 
vice that he reformulates the fable in the more acceptable term of decision.  
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Thus it can be seen in these examples that Bonhoeffer first of all rejects the standard 
starting points of virtue ethics, the question of the human good or of how one might 
be/become good. However, it is important to note that it is precisely the element of 
founding ethics on what is human rather than on God‟s revelation in Christ which 
Bonhoeffer rejects.
39
 Moreover, he does not use the word „virtue‟ positively, rather at 
times even pejoratively, such as when he speaks of private virtuosity. Yet virtue is 
mostly seen simply as irrelevant, since what matters is Christian faithfulness. It remains, 
however, a question whether Bonhoeffer‟s negative associations with „virtue‟ 
necessarily correspond to virtue ethics. For instance, is a virtue-based ethic necessarily a 
private one? Or, how do virtues and vices relate to the hypocrisy which he calls 
„Phariseeism‟? Or, is virtue ethics necessarily an example of humans trying to reach 
God? These are questions which must be explored in the next chapter.  
 
Another avenue internal to Bonhoeffer‟s thought for exploring the possibility that his 
ethics may be close to what is now called virtue ethics, is to consider how he responded 
to the form of virtue ethics which was propagated in his time, at least in some quarters: 
Thomism. 
 
2.3.2: Thomas Aquinas and other Roman Catholic sources  
As is common in Bonhoeffer‟s writing, in the Ethics he only rarely mentions the names 
of his „dialogue partners‟, those thinkers whose ideas he wishes to discuss, challenge, 
refine or even refute. Thus to gain a picture of how Bonhoeffer viewed Thomas Aquinas 
it will not suffice to look for his name in the text.
40
 In the first manuscript Bonhoeffer 
wrote, „Christ, Reality and the Good‟, he states,  
In high scholasticism the realm of the natural is subordinated to the realm of 
grace; in Pseudo-Lutheranism the autonomy of the orders of this world are 
proclaimed over against the law of Christ; in „enthusiasm‟, the church of the 
elect stands in battle against the enmity of the world to establish God‟s kingdom 
on earth (41-2).  
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Although the editorial footnote points to Thomas Aquinas as the foremost representative 
of high scholasticism, Bonhoeffer‟s comment at the start of this sentence may or may 
not be directed against him.
41
 If it was, it is plain that Bonhoeffer found Aquinas‟s 
thought inadequate to correct a fallacious understanding of the relationship of the 
Church to the world. However, it is also clear that he finds fault also in „Pseudo-
Lutheranism‟ and in „enthusiasm‟, traditions with which he was more closely 
connected. 
 
Another oblique reference, also from this earliest period of Bonhoeffer‟s work on the 
Ethics, is in „Inheritance and Decline‟, where he writes, „Luther‟s great discovery of the 
freedom of the Christian and the Catholic false doctrine of the essential goodness of the 
person both end in the divinisation of humans‟ (114).42 Again, this may well be an 
indirect reference to Thomas Aquinas and his view of humans after the Fall.
43
 As 
before, the question at hand is not whether Bonhoeffer is right in this characterization of 
Roman Catholic teaching, but whether the view he expresses gives any clue to his 
attitude to Thomist virtue ethics. The answer would seem to be that if virtue ethics 
depends on such an optimistic view of anthropology, Bonhoeffer would reject it. 
 
Even where one might assume Bonhoeffer to be more in accord with Thomas (in his 
discussion of „The Natural‟, written in the winter of 1940-41), he does not endorse 
Aquinas‟ views. At the outset of this manuscript, he states,  
The concept of the natural has fallen into disrepute in Protestant ethics. With 
some it was lost in the darkness of general sinfulness; with others it received 
conversely the shine of primeval creatureliness. Both were an evil abuse, which 
had the result that one cast the concept of the natural completely out of 
Protestant thinking and left it to Catholic ethics (163).  
 
In this example Bonhoeffer is not addressing Roman Catholic moral theology, but 
trends within Protestant theology. Nonetheless, it seems fair, given Bonhoeffer‟s 
comments above regarding the more optimistic view of human nature he found in 
Roman Catholic teaching, to suggest that he would hold that Aquinas was like those 
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„others‟, for whom the natural was confused to some degree with the original created 
state. Furthermore, as the editors suggest, if he had discussed the position commonly 
held in Roman Catholic teaching, he is most likely to have disliked the pairing of 
natural with supernatural, and the lack of explicit Christology in the treatment (163, 
note 4). 
 
In another reference to Roman Catholic teaching Bonhoeffer writes,  
Reason perceives the general in what is given, thus also the given natural, as 
reason perceives it, is a general one. It encompasses the whole of human nature. 
Reason recognizes the natural as of a general law, independent of whether there 
is possibility for empirical testing (167). 
 
Here Bonhoeffer inserts one of his rare footnotes:  
What has been said differs from the Catholic theory in that in our view 1) reason 
is seen as involved in its entirety with the Fall, whereas in Catholic dogmatics it 
has retained an essential integrity, 2) that reason according to Catholic teaching 
is able to grasp the formal determination of the natural, which relates again to 
the first point.  
 
This point might be seen as a subset of the point above, and at the very least it must be 
seen as related to the fact that Bonhoeffer sees the Roman Catholic view of human 
nature as less affected by the Fall than is the case in his own estimation. Yet how one 
perceives the human capacity for reasoning will affect to a large degree how one 
approaches any form of thinking, and it would seem that Bonhoeffer disagrees 
fundamentally with Aquinas on this point. 
 
One area where he does agree, even explicitly, with Aquinas is to be found in dealing 
with one of the issues treated as part of the natural life, namely slavery. Bonhoeffer 
notes that Thomas considered not the name of slavery but the reality as to be 
condemned, saying,  
There are historical forms of slavery which better protected the essential 
freedom of humanity than certain social institutions in which the term „slavery‟ 
is naturally disdained but in reality the total enslavement of so-called free 
persons exists (213).
44
 
 
The final example of a positive view of Thomas is to be found only in the brief 
introduction to a section Bonhoeffer began to write, „The natural rights of intellectual 
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life‟. Here he states, „There are three fundamental forms of relationship of intellectual 
life to reality: judging, acting, and enjoying. In these the person comes before reality, to 
which he himself belongs, in freedom, and proves thereby his humanity‟ (216-7). This 
tantalizing fragment would suggest that Bonhoeffer may well have been following Josef 
Pieper‟s treatment of temperance, in which he set out a Thomist notion of this cardinal 
virtue. Bonhoeffer possessed this volume and the relevant passage shows both 
underlining and an exclamation mark in the margin.
45
 If so, it is instructive that he 
intended to draw on a Thomist thinker for this planned section, the theme of which 
clearly remained important for him in prison when he wrote that only a Christian could 
enjoy music in such times.
46
 
 
This fact leads directly to Bonhoeffer‟s wide range of reading generally and, of specific 
interest here, within the domain of Roman Catholic theology, both traditional and 
contemporary sources.
47
 These include Jacques Maritain, Romano Guardini and, as 
mentioned above, Josef Pieper, which, as the editors say, „might have encouraged 
Bonhoeffer towards that “brave, powerful grasp of the old and new catholic wisdom”, 
which in the Protestant theology of those days was uncommon‟ (424).48 The editors go 
on to speak of Bonhoeffer‟s „critical honouring‟ of Roman Catholic moral theology in 
taking up the concept of the natural. Rightly they note that his work in this manuscript 
was „topically urgent‟, for example his comments regarding euthanasia.  
 
It is known from Bonhoeffer‟s letters that he was not only working in the Benedictine 
monastery at Ettal for the second period of his writing (17 November 1940 – February 
1941), but that he had access to their library, and had regular conversations with the 
abbot and others there.
49
 Notably, Bonhoeffer wrote to Bethge on 20 January 1941, „I 
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find Catholic ethics in many ways very instructive and more practical than ours. Until 
now one always chalked it up against them as „casuistry‟. Today one is thankful for 
much, especially concerning my current topic [sc. euthanasia]‟ (460).50 Just a few weeks 
later he wrote to Bethge again, „now I‟m working on the question of marriage [the 
choice of spouse, sterilization, contraception] – here the Catholic ethic is indeed almost 
unbearably legalistic‟ (460).51  
 
Comparing the comments from these two letters it is quite clear that Bonhoeffer was 
evaluating carefully whatever sources he consulted. Yet precisely because one cannot 
know which volumes in the monastic library he read, nor the content of his 
conversations with the brothers and abbot, the full extent of his familiarity with Roman 
Catholic sources will probably never be ascertained. What is quite clear is that 
Bonhoeffer had a broader familiarity with and respect for Roman Catholicism in general 
and moral theology in particular than most Protestants of his time.
52
 In places he 
disagrees strongly with what he perceives to be Thomas‟s teachings (optimism 
regarding human nature); and in other places he borrows freely (euthanasia, intellectual 
life). Thus one could not demonstrate any clear link between Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics and 
virtue ethics on the basis of Roman Catholic influence. 
 
Yet before summarily dismissing the possibility of Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics being seen in 
relation to virtue ethics, some questions must be explored. Some of those which must be 
pursued in the next chapter include: does virtue ethics demand a view of human nature 
in general and human reason in particular which Bonhoeffer would perceive to give too 
little account of the Fall? and is virtue ethics actually legalistic? 
 
2.3.3: Classical Philosophy 
However, as noted above, Roman Catholic moral theology is not the only source from 
which Bonhoeffer would have had contact with virtue ethics. Given his upbringing he 
will of course have had familiarity with Greek and Roman classics. Indeed, Bonhoeffer 
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shows such familiarity in writing about suicide in his treatment of „the natural life‟, 
where he notes that Aristotle considered its attempt to be a punishable offence (195).
53
 
Yet in the same sentence Bonhoeffer suggests that the one who would take her own life 
is hardly likely to be persuaded by that fact or by the arguments Aristotle offers. Thus it 
would appear that although Bonhoeffer is aware of Aristotle‟s views, he is not greatly 
swayed by them. 
 
Bonhoeffer quotes Aeschylus with more affirmation in his treatment of responsibility in 
„History and the Good‟:  
The action of a responsible person takes place in the bonds (which alone 
completely free one) to God and neighbours as they encounter me in Jesus 
Christ; it takes place thereby wholly in the region of relativities, wholly in the 
twilight which is spread by the historical situation over good and evil; it takes 
place amid the innumerable perspectives in which every given appears. It 
[responsible action] does not have simply to choose between right and wrong, 
good and evil, but between right and right, wrong and wrong. „Right wrestles 
with right,‟ said Aeschylus (284).54  
 
Here it is interesting that Bonhoeffer is developing a theme which some consider to be 
most central and original to his ethics, responsible action, and almost as a throw-away 
offers a supporting quote from classical literature.
55
 Yet it is not clear that this 
represents an influence on his thinking so much as a classical adornment to thoughts 
already formulated. 
 
Likewise, the theme of „suum cuique’ in „The Natural Life‟ is a concept which comes 
from classical philosophy, to be found in Plato and Cicero, among others.
56
 Here his 
treatment of the classical material is more positive, finding a „relative correctness‟ in the 
notion, seeing a particular importance in the fact that „to each his own‟ not only gives 
rights to one but insists that rights are given to all, to the collective and to the individual 
(175-6). The consideration of the rights of the individual and the rights of society was of 
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particular importance in Bonhoeffer‟s context because the National Socialist ideology 
recognised only those of the collective, whether the state or the German „race‟. From 
the time of the enactment of the emergency laws of 1933 individuals were no longer 
accorded any rights.   
 
So in all of these examples Bonhoeffer shows awareness of classical themes, but is not 
obviously influenced by them. Instead he critiques them all using biblical evidence and 
systematic theology.
57
 
 
Yet it must be noted that classical themes appear not only in the form of teachings but in 
the form of myths and plays. In a passage about whether it is appropriate to see human 
life in terms of tragedy, Bonhoeffer refers to the characters of Greek tragedy: Creon, 
Antigone, Jason, Medea, Agamemnon and Clytemnestra. Their lives, he claims, are 
tragic in the sense that they are subject to differing, irreconcilable laws and so will 
necessarily suffer for breaking the one or the other. This is a view of human life which 
he stoutly rejects, upholding rather the notions of simplicity and reconciliation rather 
than tragic conflict, and the teaching of election to become children of God rather than 
the notion of the demise of humans under the triumph of gods (265). 
 
In another reference to figures from classical mythology mentioned briefly above in 
discussing virtue (2.3.1), Bonhoeffer states,  
Before God‟s command, the human is not permanently Hercules at the 
crossroads, not the one eternally wrestling to reach the right decision, the one 
tearing himself apart in the conflict of duties, repeatedly failing and beginning 
anew; and God‟s command itself does not always appear only in those great, 
moving crisis moments of life, experienced in heightened awareness (388-9).  
 
This is another example which he uses negatively, to say that this picture does not 
convey accurately what he believes to be human life (including the ethical) before God. 
 
Thus it can be said that Bonhoeffer draws frequently on classical thinking, myths and 
dramas, but not in such a way as to suggest that they are formative or even especially 
influential in his conception of ethics. Such sources are scrutinized in the light of Christ 
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and at least as often as not found wanting. Indeed, it is probably fair to suggest of the 
figures from legends or tragedies that they occur no more frequently than Don Quixote, 
or characters from Goethe or Shakespeare – well known, evocative figures who can 
represent a variety of ethical situations or outlooks useful for illustrating Bonhoeffer‟s 
thought.
58
 At all events, they hardly represent a cryptic form of virtue ethics. What then, 
one must ask, was the form of ethics Bonhoeffer was expounding? 
 
2.3.4: Bonhoeffer and modes of ethical thinking  
Bonhoeffer does not set out a methodology for doing ethics, nor does he situate his 
account within any particular mode of envisaging theological ethics. In fact, he seems to 
reject any set form of conceiving the ethical life. The opening of the manuscript „Ethics 
as Formation‟, written sometime between summer and November 1940, thus one of the 
first manuscripts written, sets out a variety of types of ethical figures, some of which 
were noted above (2.3.1). One after another, they are all seen to be unable to cope with 
the complex and startling ethical demands of Nazi Germany. Neither the rational 
person, nor the one holding fanatically to principles, nor the person of conscience, nor 
of duty, not even the one acting in free responsibility, nor the one trying to rescue a 
private virtuosity is able to stand (64-6). Yet at the end of this passage he writes,  
Who could want to calumniate such failure and breakdown? Who wouldn‟t 
recognize himself here or there as complicit? Rationality, ethical fanaticism, 
conscience, duty, free responsibility, quiet virtue are goods and attitudes of high 
humanity. It is the best who are sunk with all that they can do and all that they 
are (66).  
 
It is clear that Bonhoeffer does not reject these modes of ethical thought and behaviour 
lightly, nor with a desire to set up some model of his own. He is doing nothing short of 
claiming that any system must be inadequate when tested in such an extreme situation. 
Thus one might not only say that Bonhoeffer did not see himself as a virtue ethicist, but 
that he also did not see himself as representing any other strand of ethical thinking. 
Nonetheless, it is important to consider such things as he did write about ethical theory 
before reaching any firm conclusions. 
 
2.3.4.a: Abstract Ethics  
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The first thing to note is that Bonhoeffer is insistent throughout the various manuscripts 
that ethics needs to be concrete, not abstract, or a matter of principle. Thus in the first 
manuscript he wrote, „Christ, Reality and the Good‟, he sees God in Christ as the 
ultimate reality such that, „[a]ll seeing and recognizing of things and laws without Him 
becomes an abstraction, a tearing away from the source and goal‟ (33, his 
capitalisation).
59
  
 
In the next manuscript he wrote, „Ethics as Formation‟, he takes up this theme again:  
Not that which could be good once for all can and should be said, but rather how 
Christ can win form among us today and here. The attempt to say what may be 
good once for all has always failed in itself. Either the statements became so 
general and formal that they no longer held any substantive meaning, or else, 
through the undertaking to consider and treat the breadth of all imaginable 
meanings, and thus to say in advance what might be good in every conceivable 
case, one slipped into such an unmanageable casuistry that neither the general 
nor the concrete receive their due. A concrete Christian ethic is beyond 
formalism and casuistry; for while formalism and casuistry proceed from the 
battle of the good with the real, the Christian ethic can take as its starting point 
the accomplished reconciliation of the world with God in the person Jesus 
Christ, the acceptance of the real humanity by God (86-7, Bonhoeffer‟s 
emphasis).  
 
Thus in these early manuscripts, Bonhoeffer consistently and repeatedly rejects abstract 
ethics and insists on concrete, and it is apparent that when he speaks of the abstract he 
means that not only in conceptual terms but theological as well: the abstract is not 
merely that which is general or notional, but that which is not understood in its relation 
to Jesus Christ. 
 
The issue of abstraction or concretion appears again in the following manuscript, „Guilt, 
Justification, Renewal‟, written in 1941: „Since [the time] God became human in Christ, 
all thinking about humanity without Christ is unfruitful abstraction‟ (125). While 
Bonhoeffer is clearly more interested in the Christological dimension of anthropology 
than the notion of abstraction or concretion, this is nevertheless of interest in 
considering how he believed one should engage in ethical thinking. For ethical thinking 
must have some sort of anthropology at its foundation, whether elucidated or implicit, 
and according to Bonhoeffer, humanity is to be understood with reference to Christ, the 
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model of what humanity is intended to be. Other forms of anthropology would be 
abstract rather than concrete. 
 
More complex is his treatment of how the general might be distinguished from the 
abstract in the section on „suum cuique’ in „The Natural Life‟:  
His „own‟, that which belongs to each, is at the same time always different, 
unequal (but precisely not arbitrary!) and nevertheless objectively grounded in 
the naturally given and therefore general (but precisely not abstract/formal) 
(175).  
Again, Bonhoeffer‟s direct concern is not to deal with the issue of the particular mode 
of ethical thought, but to show how his treatment of „to each his own‟, while general, 
does not violate his stated concern that ethics must be concrete rather than abstract, and 
he does this by distinguishing between the general and the abstract. 
 
He does treat the question of methodological presuppositions more explicitly in „History 
and the Good‟: 
We have left behind us (with all that has been said already) the abstraction, 
largely dominating ethical thinking, of an isolated single person who has 
continually and exclusively to choose according to an absolute measuring rod 
between the clearly recognized, in and of itself good and the equally clearly 
recognized evil. There is neither such an isolated individual, nor is that absolute 
measuring rod of an in-and-of-itself good available to us, nor do the good and 
the evil in history present themselves in their pure form. Moreover, the basic 
scheme of this abstraction misses in each of its parts precisely the specifically 
ethical problem. Whether an isolated individual, separated from his historical 
situation and his historical ties, can even been seen as ethically relevant is at the 
least very questionable, and in view of its lack of reality it is at all events an 
uninteresting theoretical borderline case; the absolute measuring rod of an in-
and-of-itself good – assuming that such a thing even could be thought without 
contradiction – makes of the good a dead law, a Moloch, to whom all life and all 
freedom is sacrificed and which itself loses the obligation of a genuine „should‟ 
precisely because it is a metaphysical in-and-of-itself-being construction which 
is without any essential relationship to life; the decision between the clearly 
recognized good and the clearly recognized evil excludes human perception 
itself from the decision, transplants the ethical into the battle between perception 
which is already oriented toward the good and the rebellious will, and it misses 
thereby that genuine decision in which the whole person, with perception and 
will, seeks and finds, only in the risk of action itself, the good in the ambiguity 
of an historical situation. The ethical is in this abstraction from life reduced to a 
static basic formula which tears the person out of historicity of his existence so 
as to place him in the vacuum of the purely private and the purely ideal. (246-7). 
 
J. Moberly The Virtue of Bonhoeffer’s Ethics 40 
I quote this passage at length because it seems to represent a programmatic statement 
about the dangers of abstraction and the necessity of concrete thinking for ethics. It is 
telling that Bonhoeffer does not merely claim that an isolated individual does not exist; 
he questions whether such a person, if she did exist, could be seen as ethically relevant, 
with the implicit message that the person‟s „historical ties and situation‟ are important in 
any consideration of ethics. Another note of interest is his claim that, not only do good 
and evil not normally appear in their pure form, but also that there lies behind ethics 
which presume such to be the case an assumption that the ethical agent‟s perception is 
already focused on the good and that the ethical battle is then between her perception 
and her will. This division of the person he rejects, saying it is the whole person who 
must seek the good, though it will be ambiguous, and though she might only discover 
the good in acting. This account has some affinity with a Thomist understanding that a 
person requires prudence to perceive reality aright and to recognise what the salient 
features of any context are. Moreover, Bonhoeffer says that this abstraction leads either 
to a retreat into the private sphere (as expressed by his notion of „private virtuosity‟) or 
a kind of radical fanaticism of ideologies, both of which must finally and utterly fail 
because they are unreal. Thus he sees abstraction as ultimately in conflict with life, 
which the abstraction reduces to a negligible quantity. (247-8).
60
 
 
Furthermore, in „The “Ethical” and the “Christian” as a Theme‟, Bonhoeffer asserts 
that, „A timeless and placeless ethical discussion is lacking the concrete authorisation 
which every genuine ethical discussion requires‟ (373, his emphasis). No one may claim 
such authorisation for herself; it must be received through her objective place in the 
world: 
Thus it is the old and not the young, the father and not the child, the lord and not 
the knave, the teacher and not the pupil, the judge and not the accused, the 
governor and not the subject, the preacher and not the member of the 
congregation to whom the authorisation for ethical discussion is given (375).
61
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A few pages later he adds that when the ethical is understood as timeless and placeless, 
life falls apart into „an infinite number of unconnected time-atoms, just as human 
community dissolves into single reason-atoms.‟ In this he asserts that both the 
formal/universal and existential approach to ethics are similar – both destroy 
connections and the concrete determinations of the ethical (376).
62
 
 
In summary, it is clear that in rejecting abstraction Bonhoeffer was both affirming the 
centrality of Jesus Christ in moral theology, and insisting on the importance of the 
specific, the contingent, the particular, the historical in discussing ethics. It would seem 
that it was his intention to write an ethic that would be appropriate for Germany in the 
Nazi era, and in the time he hoped would come after, rather than an abstract account of 
the good, of human nature, of how humans are to choose the good, etc. Most of his 
arguments are essentially philosophical (broadly understood) in nature, though time and 
again he shows through biblical passages or systematic theology that this is a Christian 
viewpoint.
63
 It is another question altogether in how far he was able to write such an 
ethic, a question which is not uninteresting, but is also not germane to this exploration.
64
 
It is, however, important to look carefully at what Bonhoeffer wrote about abstract, 
theoretical ethics and his own insistence on the concrete for at least two reasons. First, 
given the number of times he deals with the subject, it is clearly deeply important to 
him, and if one is to understand his ethics it is necessary attend to his concerns. 
Secondly, the question must be explored, whether Bonhoeffer‟s arguments against 
abstract ethics should be seen as a reason to reject the possibility that there might be a 
close link between his ethics and virtue ethics. This is a question to which I shall return 
in the next chapter. 
 
2.3.4.b: Systems 
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Another issue regarding modes of envisaging ethics, and not perhaps unrelated to the 
concern for concrete ethics, is Bonhoeffer‟s stated dislike of systems: „The academic 
question of an ethical system appears to be the most superfluous of all questions‟ (62). 
Indeed in the various manuscripts, one of the leitmotifs is that the concern of Christian 
ethics is to ask, „what is the will of God?‟, and this, he says, „is no system of rules 
firmly established in advance, but is always new and different in different life 
situations‟ (323).65 The fact that Bonhoeffer is quite determined and consistent in 
rejecting any system for ethics may be used to suggest that it is wrong to see 
Bonhoeffer‟s conception of ethics as belonging to any „form‟ or „system‟ of ethics, 
whether virtue ethics, deontology or some other. Certainly his critique would make it 
implausible to link his ethics with the most systematic versions of any form of ethics, 
but as above, the question must be asked whether indeed virtue ethics need necessarily 
be construed as a type of system, another question to which I shall need to return in the 
next chapter. 
 
2.3.4.c: Natural Law 
And finally, in terms of modes of ethical thinking, Bonhoeffer mentions natural law a 
few times, a subject to which he had been giving some thought in early 1940, when he 
wrote that the „doctrine of the lex natura which forms a basis for Catholicism 
presupposes several constructions of rights sui generis (family, economy, etc.), which 
all have their source in the Creator of the world‟.66 This he contrasts with Barth‟s 
conception in which „all orders of the created world are related strictly to Christ‟.  
 
Bonhoeffer only rarely mentions natural law in the ethics manuscripts, but where he 
does, he rejects it firmly:  
God‟s relationship to the world is determined in Jesus Christ; a different 
relationship of God to the world except through Jesus Christ is unknown to us. 
Therefore there is also for the church no other relationship to the world but 
through Jesus Christ; that means the right relationship of the church to the world 
does not arise by proceeding from a natural law, rational law, universal human 
right, but only from the gospel of Jesus Christ (358, Bonhoeffer‟s emphasis).  
 
In the following passage he concludes,  
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Therefore it is denied that the church could speak to the world on the basis of 
any perceptions shared with the world through rational or natural law, and thus 
temporarily excluding the gospel. The church of the Reformation, in distinction 
to the Catholic Church, can not do that (359, Bonhoeffer‟s emphasis). 
 
These quotes come from notes which Bonhoeffer was preparing, „Regarding the 
possibility of a word of the church to the world‟, which were probably not intended for 
the book he was writing.
67
 Yet it seems clear enough that they represent his thinking 
about natural law: the insights thus derived may be correct, but this is not the basis on 
which he believes the Protestant church should try to speak to the world.
68
 Of course, 
the concept of natural law was present in construals of virtue ethics Bonhoeffer knew 
from Roman Catholic moral teaching. Yet it is possible to propose a form of virtue 
ethics which is not dependent on natural law, and I shall address this further in the next 
chapter. However, before I turn to the many questions which have been raised here, it is 
important to examine what others have made of the mode of Bonhoeffer‟s ethical 
thinking. 
 
2.4: The Analysis of Bonhoeffer’s Commentators69 
Perhaps it is well in keeping with Bonhoeffer‟s scepticism about the role of forms of 
ethics, but at all events it is the case that many of his commentators do not discuss this 
question of his mode of ethical thought explicitly.
70
 Ernst Feil, for instance, does not 
discuss the mode of Bonhoeffer‟s ethical thought, but examines the theological content 
of the Ethics in terms of Christology, and explores a connection via Christology with 
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Discipleship.
71
 Similarly, Ann Nickson also does not deal with the issue of the form of 
Bonhoeffer‟s ethics, but speaks of his „ethic of Christ-shaped living‟.72 Likewise, John 
Godsey does not address the question of mode or form of ethical thought, but notes the 
issue of the relationship between justification and sanctification, and the themes of 
obedience to the will of God, and what he calls an „imitatio Christi theology‟.73  
 
However, some others do discuss the form Bonhoeffer‟s ethical thought takes, and I 
turn now to four different positions of such commentators: that he does not expound 
virtue ethics (2.4.1); that he handled things in terms of situation ethics (2.4.2); that he 
formulated a kind of „kingdom of God‟ ethics (2.4.3); and finally that conformation and 
command are the two modes of his ethical thought (2.4.4). 
 
2.4.1: Not Virtue 
2.4.1.a: Hans van Hoogstraten 
Few commentators have spoken directly about virtue ethics in relation to Bonhoeffer, 
which makes the comments of Hans van Hoogstraten interesting for this study. In an 
article about ethics and metaphysics, he looks at Bonhoeffer‟s poem written in prison, 
„Who am I?‟ and claims that,  
[a]ccording to Bonhoeffer, we have to get rid of metaphysical ideas, including 
abstract catalogues of virtues. For even morality, coming to light in a doctrine of 
virtues, can be used as means to power. In Bonhoeffer‟s thought, justice is the 
most central biblical virtue, but it can only be practiced by representing Christ‟s 
powerlessness, not by the representation of his heavenly power! If we don‟t 
engage ourselves in the messianic movement, we play roles – like those 
indicated in the poem Who Am I? These kinds of roles are supported by a moral 
and metaphysical approach to reality.
74
  
 
Here van Hoogstraten makes use of MacIntyre‟s „types‟ from After Virtue, the rich 
aesthete, manager and therapist, to show examples of roles to correspond with 
Bonhoeffer‟s musings in the poem, in which Bonhoeffer contemplates the images of 
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himself which others note and contrasts these with his own impressions of himself.
75
 
Van Hoogstraten states, „Ultimately, MacIntyre pleads for a return to virtue. What he 
has in mind are principles like honesty and justice…. Here we encounter a problem: in 
order to perform virtues and to make them acceptable, we need a concept of 
community.‟76 In this van Hoogstraten sees MacIntyre as pretending to make the world 
come of age, arguing for „a dominating structure, which neglects the development of 
modern time.
77
 Against this, van Hoogstraten finds it more promising to accept a 
concept of the autonomous subject which ‘is decentered inasmuch as there no longer 
exists metaphysical foundations,’ and if we do accept this premise, ‘then we have to 
give up the claim of (all kinds of metaphysical) representation,‟ such as truth, justice 
and God.
78
 Here he notes that Hitler made claims to represent the German people, the 
nation, even God. So instead of allowing for any metaphysical representation, van 
Hoogstraten advocates the political practice of following Christ in being there for 
others, thus not representing Christ as heavenly King, Son of God, etc.  
Existing for others, however, still contains a certain kind of representation – but in a 
different sense from the above criticized one. It means the representation of those 
people who are the victims of the system, speaking in the context of their narrative. 
This might be the most profound understanding of Bonhoeffer‟s decentering himself 
as a subject. I‟m thine, O God.79 
 
This article potentially raises serious objections to the intention of reading Bonhoeffer‟s 
Ethics as related in some way to virtue ethics. Are the virtues „metaphysical‟ constructs, 
dependent on highly problematic philosophical notions? If so, the whole enterprise 
would be dubious. 
 
Yet there are important questions which need to be asked of van Hoogstraten. It seems 
doubtful that Bonhoeffer had MacIntyre-like types in mind in writing his poem, in 
which he is attributed with such characteristics as cheerfulness and calm, or restlessness 
and fearfulness, rather than any types, such as a manager or therapist. It may be that van 
Hoogstraten sees the reference to Bonhoeffer seeming like a squire stepping out of his 
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country home as a kind of „character‟, in MacIntyre‟s terms, though this would be 
misreading both MacIntrye and Bonhoeffer. Furthermore, if that is the case, it would 
suggest that van Hoogstraten was not reading the German, where the text does not refer 
to a „squire‟, but to Bonhoeffer‟s speaking to his warders freely, congenially and 
clearly, „as if it were his to command‟.80 Yet he does not argue this. And Bonhoeffer 
himself makes nothing further of the notion that he seems to have the power to 
command. The contrast drawn is between the attributes of cheerfulness and anger, 
freedom and being caged, calm and fearfulness.
81
 Thus, it is surely mistaken to use the 
notion of roles, let alone „playing roles‟ in looking at Bonhoeffer‟s poem. Although 
Bonhoeffer wonders whether there is something hypocritical about the discrepancy he 
discerns between how others perceive him and how he sees himself, there is no 
suggestion that he accuses himself of „playing a role‟.82  
 
Likewise, it is not clear that Bonhoeffer is actually saying anything here about 
„metaphysical ideas, including abstract catalogues of virtues‟. We have already seen that 
Bonhoeffer was concerned about abstraction and any attempt to construct a theoretical 
system of ethics valid for all times and places (2.3.4.a). Yet that is hardly the same thing 
as rejecting all „metaphysical ideas‟. We have also seen that he rejected theoretical 
definitions of the good which were metaphysical constructs of things in and of 
themselves (246-7, cited in 2.3.4.a), yet it is highly questionable to see the virtues as 
such constructs. Surely, for all his emphasis on the concrete, Bonhoeffer‟s theology and 
ethics would be impossible without any „metaphysical ideas‟ if these are understood to 
be things presumed to exist, albeit not tangibly. Indeed, there is no suggestion within the 
poem that Bonhoeffer sees the cheerfulness and calm which others saw in him, or the 
restlessness and fearfulness he found in himself to be invalid because of being 
„metaphysical ideas‟. It would seem to the contrary, that although van Hoogstraten 
would like to rid us of such notions as truth, justice or God, Bonhoeffer plainly expects 
that there is a „truth‟ about him, whether one thing or the other, or perhaps some 
complex of „both‟, and he equally believes that there is „God‟, who knows that truth and 
to whom he belongs. It can be argued that Bonhoeffer would reject a „metaphysical‟ 
definition of any of these terms, if „metaphysical‟ means abstracted from Jesus Christ. 
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Yet, can any definition be given to these terms which is not „metaphysical‟ if that is 
understood in terms of non-physical existence? For if not, it seems clear that Bonhoeffer 
was not saying that we had to get rid of them, and indeed, he seems happy enough to 
use many of them in his Ethics. 
 
Another question which must be posed to van Hoogstraten is how he distinguishes 
between the „metaphysical representation‟ he obviously found dangerous in Hitler, and 
the representation (Stellvertretung) he recognizes as important in Bonhoeffer. He tells 
us that the latter „contains a certain kind of representation – but in a different sense…‟, 
yet the difference he observes seems to have to do not with metaphysics, the thing he 
says he is criticizing, but with the intent behind the representation, i.e. whether the 
representation is used for one‟s own benefit or for others‟. Thus it would seem that it is 
not metaphysical representation as such which he really critiques, but the unjust uses to 
which it might be (and has been) put. 
 
A more trivial question, perhaps, is how van Hoogstraten can assert both that 
Bonhoeffer demands that we get rid of abstract catalogues of virtues, and that justice is 
for Bonhoeffer the most central biblical virtue. This could be an indication that van 
Hoogstraten himself would not necessarily conceive of virtues as abstract or 
metaphysical constructs. 
 
Finally, it is important to ask the question how valid any of van Hoogstraten‟s 
comments can be for Bonhoeffer‟s thought more generally, given that they are premised 
on his reading of a single poem. If his reading of the poem were defective, all that 
follows would have no basis.
83
 If Bonhoeffer‟s poem itself were unrepresentative of his 
thought in general – and it may be that this poem, while it is clearly a profound 
reflection on his prison experiences, should not be taken to be definitive for his 
perceptions on his own identity let alone ethical thought – it would again make any 
claims made on the basis of that poem insubstantial. Indeed, I have queried his reading 
of Bonhoeffer‟s poem, on the grounds that I cannot see that Bonhoeffer is dealing with 
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types or playing roles. I have queried it too, since he suggests that Bonhoeffer wants to 
do away with metaphysical constructs such as truth, justice or God, and this does not 
accord either with the poem or the evidence we have seen in the Ethics.  
Yet even if van Hoogstraten‟s method of argument is weak or flawed, it is worth asking 
whether he might not yet be right about Bonhoeffer‟s rejection of an „abstract catalogue 
of virtues‟. From what we have seen of Bonhoeffer‟s thoughts on abstract ethics, it 
seems plain that his critique would apply to any form, including abstract catalogues of 
virtues, if by this were meant one list of what is good for all times and places, or of 
attributes lacking any reference to Christ. It may well be that he would have seen 
Thomist virtues as expounded in his own times as being just that. Yet it remains to ask, 
in the next chapter, whether virtue ethics must necessarily mean abstract catalogues of 
virtues. For if not, van Hoogstraten‟s statements will not hold. 
 
2.4.1.b: Larry Rasmussen – Early   
Another commentator who rejects the notion that Bonhoeffer‟s ethics may in some way 
be connected with virtue ethics is Larry Rasmussen, at least in an early article. He 
insists that for Bonhoeffer as well as for Luther, ethics begins and ends with 
justification by faith; it is not a way from vice to virtue, but from vices and virtues to 
grace.
84
 In no way could one, or would I wish to, dispute Rasmussen‟s claim about the 
centrality of grace and justification by faith in Bonhoeffer‟s theology and ethics. Yet his 
statement begs the question: is virtue ethics opposed in some way to grace such that one 
must categorize Bonhoeffer‟s thought as not one but the other? If this were the case, 
then older Protestant notions of Roman Catholic theology (and ethics) as being based on 
„works righteousness‟ would be upheld, and no argument could possibly be made for 
seeing Bonhoeffer‟s ethics as being related in some way to virtue ethics. This is a 
question which must be explored in the next chapter. 
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2.4.2: Situation Ethics 
2.4.2.a: Heinrich Ott 
Unlike those discussed thus far, who either did not discuss the form of ethics 
Bonhoeffer used or rejected the possibility that his ethics could be linked with virtue, 
Heinrich Ott sees in Bonhoeffer a kind of situation ethicist:  
What happens to ethics at the collapse of „natural law‟ or „natural morality‟, as a 
system of pronouncements to be applied to each case as it arises? … Instead, 
then of what is called a casuistic one, do we reach what is called a „pure 
situation ethic‟?85  
 
Yet it is not a „pure‟ situation ethic which he perceives in Bonhoeffer, but one „that is 
non-casuistic but not formal, that has a concrete, namely a Christological, content‟, and 
one which he believes has „a strong biographical determination‟, to wit, Bonhoeffer‟s 
participation in the assassination plot against Hitler, which put him beyond every norm 
or rule.
86
 In short, he sees here a situation ethic with content, thus preventing an 
amorphous arrangement in which anything could be seen as ethically justified.
87
 
Moreover, it is a Christological content: „From the concrete situations of his life man 
receives the light of Jesus Christ the real. When he sees him he knows what he should 
do, and, on the other side, it is in activity that he sees him. Seeing and action become 
one.‟88  
 
The question arises whether what Ott is perceiving is simply that Bonhoeffer‟s ethics 
cannot be classed either as deontology or as utilitarian, the major types of ethical 
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thought under discussion at the time. It would be thinkable to explore, for instance, how 
the unity of vision and action to which Ott refers might relate to themes in virtue ethics, 
and I shall want to do so in chapter four. Yet, perhaps because of the conjuncture of an 
almost invisibility of virtue ethics, and the rise at this time of situation ethics (which, it 
was hoped, would transcend the perceived limitations of each of the other types), Ott 
sees in Bonhoeffer a situation ethicist with Christological content. It may therefore be 
that Ott was classing Bonhoeffer with situation ethics simply because his proposals do 
not fit neatly with deontology or utilitarianism.
89
 
 
2.4.2.b: Harold Lockley 
Harold Lockley sees Bonhoeffer as engaged in a „search for a concrete ethic which is 
capable of incorporating the advantages of a situationist ethic on the one hand and a 
normative ethic on the other.‟90 Lockley also contends that  
Bonhoeffer was looking for a middle way between the catholic treatment of the 
natural, which required the supernatural to perfect it, and the protestant attitude 
which tended to deprecate the natural when confronted with supernatural grace. 
The catholic way seemed to lead inevitably to naturalism, and the protestant to 
pietism – both of which Bonhoeffer rejected – so another way had to be found.91  
 
The distinctive features of Bonhoeffer‟s ethics, so Lockley, include „occupying the 
middle ground between opposing positions‟ using a dialectical method and arriving at 
often paradoxical conclusions.
92
 Indeed, following Ott, he considers it one of the 
strengths of Bonhoeffer‟s ethics that he gave content and the concretion of human 
experience and responsibility to situation ethics.
93
 Sadly, Lockley does not argue the 
case for seeing Bonhoeffer‟s ethics as being a form of situation(ist) ethics, but merely 
asserts this. 
 
2.4.2.c: Karsten Lehmkühler 
Yet Ott and Lockley are not alone in perceiving Bonhoeffer‟s ethics in this way. 
Karsten Lehmkühler points to the extremity of Bonhoeffer‟s situation, where necessity 
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might demand breaking commandments in the form of participating in the murder of a 
tyrant: „Bonhoeffer votes here most clearly for a situation ethic in the sense that the 
good is not established in advance, but rather proves itself only in concrete action.‟94  
This is, of course, a broad definition of situation ethics, and one obviously not 
dependent on Joseph Fletcher‟s conception, but on the basic foundation that the good, or 
right action is to be found only at the moment of action. Lehmkühler describes the 
process in this way:  
the concrete judgement about one‟s action is laid in the hand of God because the 
responsible person lives „through God‟s grace and judgement‟. The foundation 
here is always the participation in Christ, such that one can well say: Christ 
himself shows the Christian in a concrete situation the good action.
95
  
 
Yet whether it is more helpful to call this a „situation ethic‟, or to call it by the more 
Barthian designation of „divine command ethics‟ is at least debatable, since Bonhoeffer 
insists not on the primacy of one‟s reading of the situation, nor on a principle decided 
(such as love, in Fletcher‟s situation ethics) in advance, but on the question of the will 
of God.  
 
Moreover, Lehmkühler‟s discussion of how God‟s will might become known does not 
ring true to Bonhoeffer‟s thought when he states that in every situation of ethical 
decision one may rely on the Holy Spirit to show what must be done, just as Jesus 
taught in Matthew 10:19f that at the time needed it will be given to one what one should 
say. Lehmkühler does not show how Jesus‟ words about testimony when under the 
threat of persecution might relate to „every situation of ethical decision‟; nor does he 
show how this passage relates to Bonhoeffer‟s own conception of discovering the will 
of God, since Bonhoeffer himself does not cite this passage. All this makes his 
suggestion that Bonhoeffer‟s ethics is situationist unpersuasive. 
 
2.4.2.d: James Burtness 
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Against this construal of Bonhoeffer‟s ethics, James Burtness sees it not only as 
situationist, but also as consequentialist because of his repeated emphasis on taking 
responsibility for the future:  
The emphasis upon the future places Bonhoeffer with those ethicists who 
concentrate on the consequences of actions rather than the motives out of which 
the actions are done. It is not the rightness of an action but the result of an action 
which commends it.
96
  
 
Nickson rightly criticises this assessment by noting that Bonhoeffer quite clearly does 
not equate „success‟ with the will of God.97 In fact, the first mention of „success‟ (or 
indeed, „result‟, since „Erfolg’ could be translated with either word, and consequentialist 
ethics may be called Erfolgethik), is when Bonhoeffer states:  
The old conflict of whether the will, the intellectual act, the person could be 
good, or whether also the accomplishment, the work, the result, the condition 
could be called good, and which of them precedes the other, to which should be 
accorded the greater importance – this conflict, which has penetrated theology 
and which has brought about confusion here and elsewhere, is the product of a 
fundamentally reversed way of questioning. It tears apart what is originally and 
essentially one, namely the good and the real, the person and his work (35).  
 
Later in the same passage he says,  
The question of the good must not be narrowed to the examination of actions in 
terms of motives or consequences through the application of an already prepared 
ethical measuring rod. An ethic of intentions remains as much on the surface as 
an ethic of consequences (36-7).  
 
Moreover, Bonhoeffer also warns against an idolization of success in a thinly veiled 
reference to Hitler and the Nazi regime (76-8). „Success‟, like all of human life, stands 
under the „Yes‟ and „No‟ of God‟s judgement (251).98 Bonhoeffer‟s concern here was 
surely to counter the stance of many theologians in Germany who supposed that Hitler‟s 
success must be seen as proof that the course of events being played out was God‟s will. 
Against this Bonhoeffer is clear that success is neither proof of the validity of an ethical 
act, nor can its validity be demonstrated through what the agent intends, nor through the 
outcome of her act. Thus it must be seen as impossible to speak of a „consequentialist 
ethic‟ in the sense of an emphasis on the outcome of one‟s action. Nor would it be 
possible to make a case for Bonhoeffer‟s thought to be seen as consequentialist on the 
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basis of his treatment of the ultimate and the penultimate because Bonhoeffer is clear 
that the penultimate can in no way be seen as a precondition or cause of the ultimate.
99
  
 
Burtness, however, does not treat Bonhoeffer consistently as a consequentialist, but 
speaks also of situation ethics: „He often sounds like a pure situationist. But his own 
position becomes increasingly interesting as one notices the persistent drive towards 
some way of acknowledging and even creating structures.‟100 It is Bonhoeffer‟s 
willingness to work with or create structures which prevents Burtness from classing him 
simply as a situation ethicist.  
Like other ethicists on the situationist side of the ethics spectrum, Bonhoeffer‟s 
position may seem elusive, but it is neither contentless nor arbitrary. He is 
constantly working at the intersection of situations and structures… The 
structures that Bonhoeffer constructs are built on his commitment to time and 
history as ethical constituents, and to the shaping of the future as the heart of the 
ethical task.
101
  
Later he adds,  
Bonhoeffer is certainly an ethical „situationist‟ in that he opposes ethical 
absolutes of all kinds and emphasizes concrete times and places. Yet to label 
him a situationist without qualifying that term is to misconstrue him completely. 
The Jesus Christ of time and history is also the one in whom the reality of God 
and the reality of the world come together. Reality, always on the move, is 
structured by Jesus Christ… Bonhoeffer was as interested in structures as he was 
in situations, and worked his entire life at the intersection of the two.
102
 
 
It would seem from all this that Burtness sees Bonhoeffer as a situation ethicist, insofar 
as he develops a position which is not based on the timeless absolutes of deontology, 
and insofar as he insists that the particularities of life are ethically relevant. Yet 
Burtness himself is aware that simply to call Bonhoeffer a situation ethicist would be a 
misconstrual of his thought because it is apparent that Bonhoeffer works both with 
structures and content which would be foreign to the formulations of Joseph Fletcher or 
John Robinson. It is undoubted that Bonhoeffer insisted on the necessity of considering 
the contingencies of historical and geographical placement seriously. Yet that on its 
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own is hardly enough to deem his ethics to be situation ethics. Thus, neither Burtness‟s 
comments about consequentialism nor situation ethics are ultimately persuasive. 
 
2.4.2.e: Mary Glazener 
An interesting interpretation of Bonhoeffer‟s ethical thinking appears in a novel based 
on his life and death, The Cup of Wrath. Here the author, Mary Glazener, imputes to 
Bonhoeffer relativist notions of ethics. Thus she imagines Bonhoeffer as considering 
something right for one person, but not necessarily another, and as speaking in terms of 
„being true‟ to oneself.103 This obviously tells us more about Glazener‟s imagination 
than Bonhoeffer‟s actual way of thinking about what is the right course of action, but I 
think it is suggestive of the limitations in many minds about how to understand an ethic 
that is not a straightforward deontology. It seems that for many people it is difficult to 
see searching for God‟s will afresh in each moment or situation without falling into 
assumptions about situation ethics or relativist notions. It is at least possible that this 
would go further towards explaining how commentators have come to speak of 
situation, relativist, or consequentialist ethics in connection with Bonhoeffer than 
anything internal to his ethics.  
 
Despite the fact that so many commentators have placed Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics in the 
realm of situation ethics, this is not adequate for at least two reasons. First, Bonhoeffer 
does not speak about the situation as such, nor about the salient features of the situation. 
Secondly, he does not offer a guiding principle such as Fletcher does with love. 
Therefore I shall turn to other possible construals offered by commentators.  
 
2.4.3: Kingdom of God Ethics: Hans Pfeifer  
Unlike the commentators seen thus far, who either did not discuss the mode of ethical 
thought expressed in Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics, or who saw him as a sort of situation ethicist, 
Hans Pfeifer is of the opinion that Bonhoeffer‟s ethics  
aims ultimately beyond the question of command, of [creation] orders, of natural 
theology, and also beyond the possibilities of a situation ethic. Formally he is 
approaching the kingdom-of-God ethics of Albrecht Ritschl; in content he 
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differs fundamentally because he sees the real future of Christ as valid and 
virtually makes it the foundation of his ethic.
104
  
That the kingdom of God is not the most prominent theme in Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics does 
not invalidate this view, Pfeifer believes, because he sees „reality‟ as taking the place of 
the kingdom of God in Albrecht Ritschl‟s ethics.105 The major categories in 
Bonhoeffer‟s ethical thought, according to Pfeifer are: „first, discipleship, then 
conformation with the acting Christ, and then above all representative action‟.106 All 
these themes he sees as being determined by their relationship to another person, 
namely Christ, and foundational to them all is the concept of obedience, not to a law but 
to Christ.
107
  
 
One problem in this account is that, like others writing in this era, Pfeifer relies on the 
Ansatz theory, assuming that Bonhoeffer „had the theme [sc. Christian ethics] in his 
sights time and again with new approaches without reaching a definitive clarity for 
himself.‟108  He sees some parts as being virtually situation ethics, and others as relating 
to given structures, the mandates; „the final higher unity is not achieved.‟109 This is 
patently true, if he means simply that Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics was never completed, and 
that we cannot extrapolate how he might have sought to bring his various themes into a 
unity. Yet it is perhaps claiming too much to say that he never achieved clarity for 
himself, even as he continued to read and work in prison. Certainly one or two letters to 
Bethge would suggest that he felt he had communicated the major outlines of his 
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thought to him.
110
 It seems questionable to assume that because the work was 
unfinished that Bonhoeffer had not reached a high degree of, or perhaps even definitive, 
clarity for himself.  
 
However, the more important question is whether Pfeifer might be justified in 
describing the structure (the formal aspects) of Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics as being like 
Ritschl‟s, though centring on reality rather than the kingdom of God. There can be no 
doubt that reality is an extremely important concept in Bonhoeffer‟s ethics; the question 
is whether it acts in the same way as the „kingdom of God‟ in Ritschl‟s. For the 
nineteenth century theologian the most important aspects of Christianity were the 
salvation (of the individual) and ethics (in the community), and ethics was understood 
in terms of the realisation (through work in the world, prayer, and submission to the will 
of God) of the kingdom of God. Moreover, the goal of salvation is that the Christian 
should work in and for the kingdom of God.
 111
 
 
It seems to me that there are complex and related issues here. One is unnamed by 
Pfeifer or Ritschl but is central to Bonhoeffer, namely the will of God. It is perhaps the 
case that Ritschl‟s understanding of the kingdom of God could have been articulated in 
terms of God‟s will, for instance that God‟s will is that a human should be saved (or 
justified), or that it is God‟s will that she should work in and for the kingdom of God, or 
even that it is God‟s will that through her work and prayer God‟s kingdom should be 
realised. Such a formulation might have made the link with Bonhoeffer more obvious. 
Yet even had Ritschl written in this manner, it is not clear that his ethics and 
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Bonhoeffer‟s would share the same „formal‟ aspects. I say this for three reasons. First, 
Ritschl‟s understanding is built on the notion of something that is to be realised; 
whereas Bonhoeffer is insistent that what is at stake is not an idea which must be 
realised, but the reality that the world has been reconciled to God in Christ, and that the 
reality of God and the reality of the world are both known in Christ (34-5; 60-1).  
 
Secondly, in Ritschl‟s view the Christian is to work for (the coming of) the kingdom 
and in the kingdom of God. In Bonhoeffer‟s understanding, the Christian participates in 
reality by grace,
112
 and though she is attentive to and obeys the will of God, this is not 
seen as a form of realisation: 
The will of God, however, is nothing other than the becoming real of the reality 
of Christ among us and in our world. The will of God is thus neither an idea 
which demands first to be realised; it is much more itself already reality in the 
self-revelation of God in Jesus Christ. The will of God is, however, also not 
simply identical with what exists, such that submission to that which exists 
would be its fulfilment; it is much more a reality which wants to become real 
ever anew, in what exists and contrary to what exists. The will of God is already 
fulfilled by God himself in that he reconciled the world with himself in Christ… 
Following the appearance of Christ, ethics can only be concerned with one 
thing, namely receiving a part of the reality of the fulfilled will of God (60-1). 
 
Thirdly, there is a problem with Pfeifer‟s notion that Bonhoeffer is speaking about some 
future reality of Christ. The above quote should make it clear that even if in some sense 
the reality of Christ is still „becoming real‟, it is quite wrong to speak of it therefore as a 
„future reality‟, it is „already fulfilled‟. Bonhoeffer may have been able to give greater 
clarity to this aspect had he discussed the relation of time and eternity, but it is clear that 
the reality of reconciliation is not something he considered to belong to the future. 
 
For these reasons it seems to me a mistake to categorise Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics as having 
the same form as Ritschl‟s though with a focus on reality instead of the kingdom of 
God. However, other commentators have pointed to two themes as being the most 
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important in Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics, and have discussed them in terms of his mode of 
ethical thought. I turn now to these accounts. 
 
2.4.4: Conformation and Command 
2.4.4.a: Hanfried Müller 
Hanfried Müller was one of the earlier commentators (writing before Bethge reordered 
the manuscripts in the sixth edition of the German text according to the Ansatz theory) 
on Bonhoeffer‟s theology, and, as mentioned above, he helped to shape the view which 
dominated interpretations of Bonhoeffer‟s work for several decades, namely that 
Bonhoeffer‟s concerns shifted from the church to the world.113  
 
In speaking specifically of the Ethics, Müller refers to two introductions (Einführungen) 
to ethics, form (Gestalt) and command (Gebot).
114
 Müller identifies a number of 
similarities in these two introductions: both approach ethics from praxis (as concrete 
ethics addressing the problems of his time); both assume not an individualistic ethic but 
a „social‟ ethic; both attempt an historical ethic rather than a timeless one; and  
[b]oth approaches, the first [sc. Gestalt] more obviously, the second [sc. Gebot] 
more subtly, come to grief precisely over this difficulty which Bonhoeffer 
himself raises practically to a theme in another of the fragments through the 
thesis „that it is questionable whether it is meaningful to speak at all about a 
Christian ethic‟.115 
 
The differences Müller identifies in these two „introductions‟ are that ethics as 
formation „shows in context a not inconsiderable affinity to Catholicism‟, while 
command is more Protestant.
116
 
 
The two „introductions‟ to ethics are complemented, in Müller‟s view, by considerations 
of the theological foundation of ethics (defining the good, and drawing on justification, 
incarnation and resurrection) and the content of Bonhoeffer‟s ethics (the mandates, 
responsible living, and the natural).
117
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While this analysis has much to commend it, there are questionable aspects.
118
 One 
small query I have is what Müller means by „introduction‟. Given that the other 
categories in which he analyses the material are „theological foundation‟ and „content‟, I 
am inclined to think that he sees Gestalt and Gebot as the prime metaphors through 
which Bonhoeffer envisages ethics, much as I have hitherto spoken of „modes‟ or 
„forms‟ of ethical thought. 
 
If I am correct in interpreting Müller thus, he identifies the most important of 
Bonhoeffer‟s ways of conceiving ethics. I am concerned, however, that in comparing 
them, there seems to be much more emphasis placed on the ways in which they are 
similar than on the distinctive character each of them may be said to have. I don‟t 
believe it will suffice merely to speak in terms of their affinity respectively with Roman 
Catholic or Protestant moral theology, even if this assertion is correct. Surely it makes 
some difference to a Christian‟s ethics as a whole if she conceives of ethics in terms of 
her being formed to become like Christ, or if she considers the dominant metaphor to be 
responding to God‟s command. I shall examine this more fully in chapter five, but 
Müller‟s assessment may prove to be too facile or reductive for understanding these 
aspects of Bonhoeffer‟s thought. 
 
2.4.4.b: Larry Rasmussen – Later  
Müller is not alone in identifying form (or „formation‟) and command as the most 
important ways in which Bonhoeffer envisaged ethics, nor in looking for their 
similaries. Larry Rasmussen raised „A Question of Method‟ at the Fifth International 
Bonhoeffer Society Conference in Amsterdam in 1988, where he, like Müller, 
recognized these two themes in Bonhoeffer‟s ethics.119 Rasmussen traces each motif 
through Bonhoeffer‟s overall work, showing that each is important in his thought.120 
 
In comparing the two, like Müller, he finds a number of similarities and identifies only 
one difference, the Roman Catholic or Protestant „tone‟.121 Although Rasmussen states 
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that it remains „an open question‟ whether formation and command are really two 
„methods‟ or just one: „“ethics as formation” is both the more original and the more 
enduring theme.‟122 Thus he treats command ethics as a subordinate motif, even if it is 
also „genuine‟.123  
 
As with Müller, I have misgivings about Rasmussen‟s reducing the differences to 
proximity of thought to Roman Catholic or Protestant ethics. Again, I shall return to this 
in chapter five. 
 
2.4.4.c: Stephen Plant 
Stephen Plant, meanwhile, sees Bonhoeffer as working on ethics in two, as it were, 
grammatical moods: the subjunctive of ethics as formation, and the imperative of 
command ethics.
124
 Only in the manuscripts „Ethics as Formation‟ and „The “Ethical” 
and the “Christian” as a Theme‟ does Plant see „what can be called an explicit 
method‟.125  
Setting Bonhoeffer‟s command based ethics alongside his ethics as formation, 
enables us to see these ethical „methods‟ as two sides of a dialectic: the one 
concerned with being in Christ (conformation to the Gestalt of Jesus), the other 
concerned to emphasize God‟s freedom to command particular things to particular 
people (God‟s freedom to act).126  
 
With such a view, it is unsurprising that Plant insists that the two „moods‟ must not be 
in any way conflated, or either one subsumed under the other.
127
 This understanding 
seems both robust and more faithful to what is actually present in the manuscripts than 
Müller‟s or Rasmussen‟s, though I shall return to the whole question of how the two 
ways of conceiving of ethics may be related in chapter five. 
 
For now, it is sufficient to comment that Plant‟s analogy of grammatical moods is in 
some ways evocative: there is no doubt that the command mode of conceiving of ethics 
                                                                                                                                                                          
it), Kirche zur Welt, 289-92. Rasmussen suggests that this „underestimates the dialectic of the natural and 
the unnatural,… the ultimate and the penultimate, and the yes and no to the world‟, Significance, 110. 
Rasmussen‟s claim is correct, but it does require real nuance to avoid the risk of falling into a dualism 
which Bonhoeffer rejects, even when he employs these notions.  
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 Rasmussen, Significance, 110. 
123
 Rasmussen, Significance, 110. 
124
 Plant, Bonhoeffer, 118-24. 
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 Plant, Bonhoeffer, 119. 
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 Plant, Bonhoeffer, 122. 
127
 Plant, Bonhoeffer, 118-9. 
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is analogous to the grammatical imperative. Yet how ethics as formation might 
correspond to the subjunctive seems more enigmatic. The subjunctive typically 
expresses that which is not (and perhaps even cannot be), as in „If I were you…‟, yet 
ethics in a subjunctive mood is then reduced to reflection on what is not, and it is not 
clear if or how it could come to pass. The other use of the subjunctive mood is to state a 
wish, as in „may the rain fall softly on your back,‟ which again seems a problematic 
analogy for ethics. In either case, it seems unclear how ethics so conceived relates to 
Bonhoeffer‟s emphasis on how reality becomes real among us. However, such a quibble 
over an analogy does not answer the substance of Plant‟s point: if command and 
formation are the two modes in which Bonhoeffer does ethics, how might these relate to 
virtue ethics; and if the two modes are conceived as forming a dialectic, could one still 
imagine Bonhoeffer‟s ethics as related to virtue ethics? These are questions which must 
be addressed in chapters four and five. 
 
2.4.5: Summary of Commentary on Bonhoeffer’s Mode of Ethical 
Thought 
We have seen that some commentators have rejected the possibility that Bonhoeffer‟s 
ethics might be related to virtue ethics, though their grounds for arguing this seem less 
than convincing. More commentators have placed his ethics within the realm of 
situation ethics, a move which seems to be more suggestive of the time of their writing, 
given the popularity of situation ethics at that time, than of any real engagement with 
the structures of Bonhoeffer‟s thought, since he does not emphasize the specifics of 
situations nor suggest any principle (such as love) which is to guide. One commentator 
even suggested his ethics was consequentialist, though it is hard to make a case for that. 
One has put forward the notion that the structure is a Ritschlian „kingdom of God‟ ethic 
in which reality is substituted for the kingdom of God. None of these ways of analyzing 
the form of Bonhoeffer‟s ethics is convincing.  
 
Some, however, have noted two different forms of ethical thinking, but are not agreed 
as to how they may be related to one another, whether one strand might be seen as 
somehow subordinate to the other, or whether they are irreducibly plural. Either way, 
addressing both the themes of conformation and command shows greater faithfulness to 
Bonhoeffer‟s work than the other construals mentioned above, and it is worthy of more 
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prolonged attention to discover how the two themes might be related to one another. I 
shall return to this in the fifth chapter. 
 
2.5: Conclusions 
To return to the question of this chapter, it is possible to say with some certainty that 
Bonhoeffer did not see himself as a virtue ethicist. Moreover, his use of the term 
„virtue‟, his references to the Thomist tradition, and his allusions to classical philosophy 
and myths are all such as to preclude an easy assumption that Bonhoeffer could in any 
way be seen to be advocating a form of virtue ethics. Such evidence internal to his 
Ethics as seen above (2.3), however, is also not sufficient to rule out the possibility of 
the reality of some correlation. Therefore, it will be necessary to consider both the 
nature of Christian virtue ethics (in chapter three) and the substance of Bonhoeffer‟s 
thought (in chapter four) before attempting to articulate what relationship there may be 
between Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics and virtue ethics. 
 
Moreover, the interpretations offered by other commentators have been widely 
divergent and can offer no definitive guide. Some have treated the issue of how 
Bonhoeffer envisages ethical thought, and others not; and among those who do there is 
no widespread agreement. Of all these construals, however, those which take seriously 
the themes of ethics as formation and ethics as command seem most faithful to 
Bonhoeffer‟s thought. Thus on the basis of the analyses of other commentators no case 
could be made for Bonhoeffer‟s ethics to be seen as related to virtue ethics, but neither 
could such a case be conclusively refuted.  
 
To discover what relationship Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics may bear to virtue ethics, a number 
of questions need to be addressed regarding how Christian virtue ethics should be 
conceived. These I shall take in groups of related issues: 
 Is a virtue-based ethic necessarily a private one? Is virtue ethics actually 
legalistic? How do virtues and vices relate to the hypocrisy which he calls 
„Phariseeism‟? 
 Is virtue ethics necessarily an example of humans trying to reach God?  
 Is virtue ethics necessarily based on natural law? 
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 How might virtue ethics relate to the question of how Christ takes form among 
us here and today? Is virtue ethics necessarily abstract? Is virtue ethics 
necessarily a form of system? Is virtue ethics necessarily based on an abstract 
catalogue of virtues? 
 Does virtue ethics demand a view of human nature in general and human reason 
in particular which Bonhoeffer would perceive to give too little account of the 
Fall? Is virtue ethics opposed to grace such that one must categorize 
Bonhoeffer‟s thought as not one but the other? 
 
These are questions which I shall address in the next chapter once I have looked in more 
detail at some accounts of Christian virtue ethics and have considered the features 
which seem to be necessary for an ethic to be considered virtue ethics. 
 
Finally, there are questions arising which will only be appropriate to consider after 
taking a closer look at the nature of virtue ethics: If command and formation are the two 
modes in which Bonhoeffer does ethics, how might these relate to virtue ethics? This 
will require a more concentrated consideration of both of these themes and how they 
might be related to one another. I shall return to this in chapter five. 
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Chapter 3: Virtue Ethics in the 
Christian Tradition 
 
To answer questions raised in the previous chapter, it is necessary to explore what might 
be meant, at least in Christian theology, by virtue ethics. This is not a question with only 
one possible answer, since various conceptions of ethics based on virtues have been 
offered in the almost two thousand years of Christian history.
128
 While it would be 
possible to sketch the various versions of virtue-based ethics proposed by Christian 
thinkers through the ages, it is my hope that by looking in greater depth at the thought 
of Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas, as two of the most influential Christian 
theologians in the area, and then at more contemporary developments focusing on the 
work of Alasdair MacIntyre, a clearer view of the commonalities and differences of the 
major strands of Christian virtue ethics will begin to emerge.
129
 Then, with this picture 
in mind, it should be possible to consider what elements may be necessary for an ethic 
to be rightly called „virtue ethics‟ or „virtue-based ethics‟.130 Finally, in the light of 
these considerations, I shall attend to the questions raised in chapter two. 
 
3.1: Augustine and Virtue Ethics 
Christian (re-)formulations of the strand of ethical thinking now called virtue ethics 
exist from as early as the Patristic period and there were many such examples, but it 
seems appropriate to start with St Augustine because of his stature in the Western 
church, his influence on the Lutheran tradition, and because of his important 
redefinitions of key aspects of virtue ethics in the light of Christian doctrine, especially 
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that of grace.
131
 As John Rist put it, „Augustine was the most radical and the most 
influential‟ of those who sought to transform Greco-Roman thought in Christian 
terms.
132
 It is important to notice at the outset, however, that Augustine did not treat 
ethics in the way which has since become standard: a systematic treatment of the rather 
narrow subject of morality. There are at least two reasons for this: first, the ethical 
framework in common use at this time was broader by nature, considering what makes 
for a good life in total, rather than the more limited questions we might ask regarding 
good and bad behaviours, choices, character traits, or outcomes;
133
 secondly, 
Augustine‟s mode of discourse and writing was not what is now called systematic, but 
„occasional‟ or „discursive‟134 and so Augustine‟s writings which address ethical 
concerns comprise a variety of genres including letters, commentaries on the Bible, 
teachings on doctrine to combat current heresies, and even an autobiography. 
 
3.1.1: De moribus ecclesiae catholicae  
The closest Augustine comes to a systematic treatment of ethics is in his De moribus 
ecclesiae catholicae, written in AD388, and so it seems appropriate to look at this work 
in some detail. As he states at the opening, his methodology includes both argument 
from reason, and appeals to authority in the form of New Testament texts, which were 
regarded by his intended readers, the Manichees, uncontroversially as scripture,
135
 and 
thus it could be claimed that Augustine‟s use of philosophy is determined in part by his 
attempt to argue from grounds which they could accept.  
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J. Moberly The Virtue of Bonhoeffer’s Ethics 66 
St Augustine‟s starting point in this early work is a consideration of how humans ought 
to live, assuming that everyone wishes to be happy or blessed or to flourish (beata vita) 
and that this good life can be found when the highest good is both loved and possessed 
(which also means enjoyed) (3.4). This eudaemonist way of construing ethics, based on 
what makes for human flourishing, clearly has its roots in the philosophical way of life 
which Augustine had embraced before he became a Christian. Indeed, John Burnaby in 
writing about Augustine‟s theology said, „No understanding of his religion is possible 
without regard to the Platonist foundation upon which all his thinking is built.‟136 Carol 
Harrison gives some insight into why that might be when she states,  
Augustine‟s education, his acquaintance with the various schools, and the fact 
that Christian authors were already articulating their understanding of God and 
the Christian life in this way, meant that he too inevitably approached questions 
which we would categorize under the general heading of „ethical‟, within this 
very clearly defined intellectual context. Moreover, it was a context which he 
evidently found congenial: he retains its basic structure into his mature works 
even though he was to discard its fundamental assumptions.
137
  
 
Certainly, this early work shows not only a general reliance on Greco-Roman 
philosophy, but more specifically on a form of eudaemonism which had its origins in 
that philosophy, though Augustine had less familiarity especially with Plato, Aristotle, 
and Plotinus than is possible for scholars to enjoy now.
138
 Augustine‟s starting point and 
framework are borrowed from philosophy: the assumption that everyone seeks 
„happiness‟, and the supreme good is that which is sought not as a means to an end, but 
for its own sake.
139
  
 
The supreme good for humans he defines as something greater than humanity which 
cannot be lost against a person‟s will, though in what sense or to what degree that 
happiness is obtainable in this life is less clear (3.5).
140
 It would not be unfair to state 
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that Augustine sometimes relies on (pagan) philosophy, even to the detriment of a fully 
Christian understanding, especially as regards human bodily nature.
141
 Whether he was 
consciously using such arguments as would hold the most sway with his intended 
audience, or perhaps his own thinking was not fully developed in terms of Christian 
theology, this is one area in which Augustine later changed his stance as his Christian 
faith and awareness of scriptures deepened.
142
   
 
Having set out this framework, he begins to give it more content via revelation through 
scripture („authority‟) instead of philosophy („reason‟), though his thoughts are almost 
always framed in relationship to philosophical concerns. Thus he states that human 
happiness is to be found in seeking God. Moreover, to follow God authoritative 
teachings are needed, which he takes to include the Old Testament patriarchs, law and 
prophets as well as the teachings of the New Testament concerning Christ‟s incarnation 
and the witness of the apostles and martyrs (6.10-7.12). Having given this general list of 
what counts as authoritative, he is more specific: the good that Jesus prescribes is that 
we should „love God with all our heart, all our soul and all our mind‟.143 Augustine 
complements this with a quote from Paul: nothing can separate us from the love of God 
in Christ Jesus.
144
  
 
 Augustine‟s choice of scriptures to use in De moribus ecclesiae is of interest in itself. 
145
 While most Christians would accept Jesus‟ use of the Shema along with the second 
greatest command, „which is like it‟, as being central to Christian faith (and of course 
the Shema itself is central to Judaism), Augustine‟s use of the verse from Romans is 
more surprising. However, it is congruent with classical philosophy at least in its Stoic 
form, with its concern that happiness must be something internal, such that outside 
forces and changes of fortune cannot determine one‟s happiness. 
 
If human happiness is found in God as our supreme good, it makes sense that St 
Augustine turns his attention to addressing who he believes God is. „We do not worship 
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a God who repents, or is jealous, or needy, or cruel, or who seeks pleasure in the blood 
of men and beasts, or is pleased with depravity and crime, or whose possession of the 
earth is limited to some small part,‟ he says (10.16). Catholic teaching is that God is not 
contained in any space, nor does God change, a teaching which Augustine states 
requires true maturity and wisdom to understand (10.17). Although Augustine relies 
here on the church‟s doctrine, his use of philosophy is apparent in the concerns he 
chooses to address, and the mode of defining his concepts. For he asserts, without any 
exegetical or theological exposition of the Old Testament texts which claim or suggest 
that God repents, is jealous or wrathful, etc., that these things are not true of God. Paul 
Kuntz in speaking about similar concerns within the Confessions asks, „Is it that passion 
is too particular, or too possessive, or too sensual to be ascribed to God? Probably all 
three.‟146 Kuntz misses the mark in these conjectures: Augustine‟s chief aim is to 
uphold the philosophical notion of immutability, that God‟s nature must not be subject 
to any changes, and emotions were understood (whether rightly or not) as mutability. 
Thus it would seem that even his choice of scripture („authority‟) is to some degree 
dependent on, or in service of, philosophy or „reason‟. Certainly in this discussion of the 
nature of God, St Augustine‟s purpose would seem to be to show that Christian teaching 
is reconcilable with philosophical understanding: God is not contained within the 
boundaries of any place; God‟s nature never changes (10.17).  
 
Having made clear how he understands God, who must be sought for true human 
happiness, he then states that reaching God does not mean becoming altogether what 
God is, but coming close to God, being pervaded by divine truth and holiness, precisely 
through loving God wholly, as Jesus taught. Here Augustine warns of the dangers of 
presumption and pride (for example, imagining oneself to have become like God), 
insisting on the necessity of submission to God to receive enlightenment, a submission 
which paradoxically leads not only to happiness but also to freedom (12.20-21). This is 
a notable departure from classical philosophy, which assumes not only that a truly wise 
person becomes god-like through her own effort, but also that such a sage would be 
aware of the greatness thus attained.
147
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Because Paul calls Christ the virtue and wisdom of God and Jesus says he is truth, 
Augustine states that living rightly (striving for happiness) must mean loving virtue, 
wisdom and truth.
148
 Thus, just as Augustine seems to speak of God‟s nature in 
philosophy‟s terms, in discussing Christ‟s nature, he does not draw on the narratives of 
the gospels to speak of Jesus, but on teachings which relate to the concerns of 
philosophy – virtue, wisdom and truth (13.22). It is this love of Christ as virtue, wisdom 
and truth which allows the Christian to see the Father, and through sanctification by the 
Holy Spirit she can cling to this love and be conformed to God rather than the world 
(13.22-23). This discussion, so heavily informed by and dependent on philosophy, is 
Augustine‟s means of introducing the doctrine of the Trinity (14.24).  
 
Unsurprisingly in this framework, Augustine now turns to define the cardinal virtues, 
but in a new way, namely as forms of love.
149
 Thus temperance he defines as giving 
oneself whole-heartedly to the beloved and preserving oneself unblemished for God, 
fortitude as enduring all things for the sake of the beloved, justice as serving God alone, 
and prudence as choosing wisely between those things which are helpful in reaching 
God and those things which are harmful in this endeavour (15.25, 19.35). Prudence he 
considers to be required in the operation of the other virtues (24.45). 
 
Intriguingly, although Augustine states that prudence is the virtue needed for the 
operation of the other virtues, it is in fact love, not a „cardinal virtue‟ from classic 
philosophy at all, which is actually pivotal.
150
 Augustine‟s change is an important 
departure from anything in philosophy. In this sense Burnaby is right in noting that 
Augustine is moving away from the assumption that knowledge and reason are of 
primary importance such that to know the good is to do it: love takes that place in his 
thinking.
151
 Even so, Augustine‟s very conception of what love is and its power to 
inspire action are dependent on Platonic thought and changed little as his thought 
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developed.
152
 It might even be said that he no longer speaks of cardinal virtues but 
cardinal loves, so central is the theme in his thinking, even at this early stage.  
 
Even if there are questions regarding Augustine‟s integration of philosophy and 
scripture, this is an attempt to reformulate what constitutes a good life in the light of his 
new Christian faith, and it is remarkable that St Augustine, even at this early stage in his 
Christian understanding, was able to redefine much of the philosophy which had 
fascinated him for some years, offering a new construal of the supreme good, and new 
definitions of the cardinal virtues.
153
 Kuntz sees his reformulations of these virtues as 
„at the very least, a remarkable formula of reconciliation between pagan and Biblical 
cultures.
154
 Burnaby is surely right in asserting that such strongly Neo-Platonist 
emphases in this work are not nearly so surprising as is Augustine‟s use of scripture, 
which he considers „anticipates the future Augustine.‟155 
 
Augustine also considers some of the things which could hinder a person from reaching 
God: covetousness, which he sees as Adam‟s first sin (19.36); being deceived through 
false philosophies (though the love of wisdom itself is excellent) (21.38); being 
conformed to the world in deception and vanity (21.39); and fear of physical hardship, 
pain, and death (22.40). In these discussions, which might be seen as analogous to the 
consideration of vices in more philosophical treatments, he shows the cardinal virtues as 
overcoming such hindrances: temperance averts covetousness, deception and vanity; 
and fortitude will preserve a person from fear and help her not only to disdain death but 
to desire it. As a kind of summary, he later states that human love and God‟s revelation 
so work that „such ardent charity is engendered, and such a flame of divine love bursts 
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forth that all vices are burned away and man is purged and sanctified (30.64).‟156 Such 
awareness of sanctification and grace is another area in which St Augustine makes 
substantial changes to the virtue ethics of the philosophers. The fact that he could speak 
of submission to God and sanctification by the work of the Holy Spirit rather than 
ascent through human effort to become like God shows that he had already moved some 
distance from the views of Plotinus at the time of writing De moribus ecclesiae.
157
 
 
At this point he recapitulates his thesis thus far:  
For if God is the supreme good of man, which you cannot deny, it most 
assuredly follows, since to seek the supreme good is to live rightly, that to live 
rightly is nothing other than to love God with one‟s whole heart, with one‟s 
whole soul, and with one‟s whole mind. This means that our love for Him must 
be preserved whole and unblemished, which is the work of temperance; that it 
must not give way before misfortune, which is the work of fortitude, that it must 
serve no one but Him, which is the work of justice; and finally, that it be vigilant 
in its discernment of things so as not to be undermined gradually by trickery or 
deceit, and this is the work of prudence. Such love is the one human perfection 
by which alone man can come to enjoy the purity of truth (25.46).  
 
This summary shows clearly the eudaemonism and virtue framework from classical 
philosophy with the new Christian content given by Augustine. 
 
After all this he comes to the second commandment, which Jesus says is like the first, to 
love our neighbours as ourselves, which Augustine sees as the duties we have to human 
society: to cause no harm, and to do good (26.48-50). It is startling that Augustine can 
speak for some twenty-five chapters about the supreme good and loving God before 
finally turning to the commandment which Jesus gives in tandem with loving God. This 
seems no less – and perhaps all the more – puzzling, given that he states that love of 
God and love of neighbour must go together (26.51). This delay may be caused, as Rist 
suggests, by Augustine‟s dependence on Platonic concepts – that pure love is for God 
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alone.
158
 If so, this prolonged attention to the love of God before turning to its parallel 
commandment would be in keeping with his philosophical emphases. Moreover, when 
he finally does address love of neighbour, this too has resonances with Platonism – for 
love of neighbour is a participation in God‟s love for her.159  
 
Loving neighbour (and self is included) he defines as caring both for physical needs and 
the health of the soul via instruction (27.52; 28.55-56). He discusses here the role 
played by human kindness or compassion or mercy in motivating a person to help her 
neighbours, though this he describes as being impelled by duty rather than any painful 
feeling, so that she does not suffer any „anguish of the soul‟ (27.53). In this discussion 
he attempts to show the possibility of being compassionate without losing that serenity 
and tranquillity which, according to philosophy, a wise person possesses (27.53-54).
160
 
Yet it must be conceded that these concerns adopted from philosophy are not in full 
accord with those of the biblical witness. A fully Christian anthropology should have 
Jesus as exemplar of true humanity and faithful living, and that would include the 
expression of a wide variety of emotions, including some that must be seen as „losing 
serenity and tranquillity‟, not least in the Garden of Gethsemane.161 So in this area 
Augustine‟s notion of what human flourishing is does not sit well with Christian 
revelation. 
 
In this early work, St Augustine speaks of love of self as the rational prerequisite 
(26.48) (if a person is to love her neighbour as herself), which is expressed not least in 
the fact, as he saw it, that everyone seeks happiness. However, love of God in his view 
necessarily entails not only self-love, but love of others; and love of others is here 
depicted in terms of duty, and is shown in benevolence: doing no malice, neglecting no 
good (26.49-50).
162
 In all, his manner of approaching the love of others seems to be the 
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fulfilling of an obligation. Nowhere does he speak of others as created in God‟s image, 
or as worthy of love (perhaps a lesser love, in his scheme of ordering love) in their own 
right. 
 
Thus we have seen that in De moribus ecclesiae catholicae Augustine spoke of the 
moral life in terms of eudaemonism, what happiness is for human beings, and in the 
language of virtues, which he substantially redefined. In looking at this early work, it 
seemed that he relied on Greco-Roman philosophy not only for this framework, but also 
in relation to the concerns he chose to address. At times his emphasis on philosophical 
themes seemed to come at the expense of faithfulness to biblical and doctrinal concerns. 
Now, however, the question must be asked whether this early work can be taken to be 
representative of Augustine‟s thought as a whole. For the fact that it is his only full 
treatment of virtue ethics could seem suggestive that in his mature thought it played 
little role, or even that he may have changed his views. 
 
3.1.2: Later Developments 
One thing that seems to have changed only marginally is his use of philosophy. 
Burnaby, for instance, considers that there is great continuity in his thought, and that 
continuity is shaped by his dependence on Neo-Platonism.
163
 Augustine famously 
claimed that Plato thought that to be a philosopher necessarily entailed being a lover of 
God. It may well be, as Bonnie Kent claims, that the „affinities between Neoplatonism 
and Christianity were especially striking [in terms of metaphysics], so that Augustine‟s 
praise of “the Platonists” would not have been surprising at the time.‟164 However that 
may be, as time went on Augustine redefined certain aspects of philosophy, kept others 
and struggled sometimes to articulate his new thoughts within the old framework, yet 
many of the themes most important to this discussion of ethics remain of fundamental 
importance, such as aspects of love, knowledge and human happiness. This is a far cry 
from Kent‟s suggestion that philosophy became for the later Augustine merely an 
influence and a willingness „to meet [pagan thinkers] on their own ground‟.165  
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One of the areas of moral thought with which St Augustine is most famously associated 
is his notion of the will. Perhaps his departure from other accounts is related to his own 
experience related in the Confessions of not being able to will (and therefore to do) what 
he knew was good,
166
 though it may rather be that he framed his previous experience in 
the light of the theories he had by now formulated. At all events his discussion of the 
will is striking in its differences both from classical philosophy
167
 and from popular 
usage of voluntas: because of the fall of Adam, human nature has been distorted such 
that humans cannot simply allow desires to point to the way of happiness.
168
 Even if a 
person rightly perceives what her supreme good is (and how lesser goods relate to this), 
she is not capable of willing (and doing) what is right. The human will is now „blinded, 
fettered and hampered‟.169 Rist likens this perception to Aristotle‟s acrasia in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, except that the incontinence is suffered by all people always.
170
  
As a consequence, human actions cannot properly be described as free, but as subject to 
the wrong desires and loves which after the fall prevail. James Wetzel states, „Not to 
know the good, or to refuse to acknowledge the good we know, is to compromise our 
autonomy by having to act, by default or by perversity, on the wrong sorts of desires.‟171 
 
Yet just as Augustine had earlier redefined the virtues in terms of love, so here he gives 
new meaning to the notion of willing. Markus states, „Augustine refers collectively to 
the driving forces of human nature, the inclinations, desires and drives behind human 
action, by the name “love” or “loves”.‟172 He likens them to physical weights which pull 
a person in various directions in activity, whether towards good (usually caritas) or 
towards evil (usually cupiditas).
173
 Moreover, Augustine now sees the emotions as 
related to the will, such that if „the will is wrongly directed, the emotions will be wrong; 
if the will is right, the emotions will be not only blameless but praiseworthy.‟174 He has 
changed from his earlier notion that the ideal of virtue is a Stoic apatheia, and adopted a 
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more Christian understanding, namely that this „ideal‟ is neither desirable nor attainable 
in this life or in the life to come, and emotions may even be called praiseworthy.
175
 
 
If then the will is to be seen as crippled because of original sin, and to will something is 
to be motivated by love to act, how can a person ever hope to love the good and will it? 
Wetzel claims that from the time St Augustine wrote his second reply to Simplicius, he 
never again defined human freedom over against grace.
176
 Freedom is now precisely 
that which is restored and given by grace – namely the freedom to act in accordance 
with the good. As noted above, Augustine spoke even in his early work De moribus 
ecclesiae catholicae of grace and the necessity of receiving infused virtues if one is to 
attain the supreme good. Even when he wrote De beata vita in AD 386 he spoke more 
explicitly about dependence on grace, the need of the gift of God for a person to enjoy 
the happy life.
177
 In his later works, with his much more severe stress on human 
inability to will and do the good, his emphasis on grace becomes ever more central. A 
person needs grace to be enabled to love what is truly good, to order her loves aright, 
and for her will to be prepared to obey God‟s commands.178 As Harrison says, „There is 
no room for merit, for antecedent efforts or the choice of faith; all is of grace.‟179 
 
This being the case, Augustine‟s famous maxim, „love and do as you will‟ seems less 
surprising, for the love here envisaged is the (infused) love which moves a person 
towards God. What one might „will‟ when grace enables right love can only be in 
accordance with God‟s will, with the good. Thus here too Augustine‟s focus is on God‟s 
grace as enabling right action. 
 
With such effects of the Fall, the question arises whether the mature Augustine still 
could speak of ethics in terms of eudaemonism and virtues, or whether there entered 
some discrepancy between his understanding of human nature and virtue ethics. In fact, 
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Augustine continued to speak of the virtues and eudaemonism in his mature thought. In 
the context of his argument against Pelagius, for example, Augustine speaks of the 
virtues and how „human beings are able to turn to God and hold fast to the good‟.180  
 
Another example of his continuing use of the virtues appears in John Langan‟s study of 
Augustine‟s views on the unity of the virtues as discussed in a letter to Jerome in 415 
AD. In a careful reading of that letter he shows that Augustine uses his assumptions 
regarding the unity of the virtues in considering how to expound James 2:10 – „whoever 
keeps the whole law but offends in one point becomes guilty of all.‟ The problem 
Augustine is trying to avoid is the suggestion that all sins are equal in their evil, a belief 
of the Stoics.
181
 Throughout this discussion, Augustine seems to equate sin with vicious 
habit (rather than a vicious act). However, he disagrees with the Stoics about the virtues 
and vices: while the Stoics would argue that one does not possess any virtue unless one 
possesses them all, and that one only possesses the virtues if they are fully and perfectly 
developed,
182
 Augustine allows that gradual progress can be made from vice to virtue, 
allowing for the presence of some things contrary to virtue while still possessing the 
virtue, albeit imperfectly.
183
 Augustine assumes his earlier position seen in De moribus 
ecclesiae regarding the definition of virtue as love as expressed in love of God and love 
of neighbour.
184
 He then uses this reasoning to explain the verse from James: the love of 
God and neighbour fulfils all the law; any sin offends against love and therefore against 
all the law, though sins are not all equal in their evil.
185
 Thus Augustine even at this late 
date continues to use his eudaemonist framework and definition of virtue, even in the 
interpretation of scripture, as well as his emphasis on the dual commands of love of God 
and neighbour. In addition, in his mature thought St Augustine had, as Wetzel puts is, a 
„dual aspect of virtue‟, which includes „virtue as vision‟, which „transforms human 
desires to align them with the object of vision, the good‟, and human autonomy, which 
means being conformed to the good. Thus what would in classical philosophy have 
been described as problems of knowing the good are seen as problems related to the 
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will, or difficulties appropriating knowledge of the good.
186
 Whatever has changed in 
Augustine‟s moral thought, it is not at the basic level of eudaemonism and virtues as the 
categories for his ethical thought. 
 
3.1.3: Habits and Intentions 
However, there are related areas which must also be examined before claiming that 
Augustine continued to work with something like virtue ethics in his mature writings, 
such as habit and intentions. Markus quotes from another letter that „what we are bidden 
is to take away from the weight of unlawful desire (cupiditatis) and to add to the weight 
of charity (caritatis), until the former vanish and the latter be perfected.‟187 Here again 
Augustine is using the language of weight, as we have already seen, to describe the pull 
of loves, whether „unlawful desires‟ or the pure love called „charity‟. It is interesting 
that he speaks of gradual growth in right love (right willing) towards perfection. 
Likewise, in another mature work, he speaks of the need to be „progressively … formed 
from his eternity, truth and charity‟. In speaking of this passage, Robert Innes writes 
that „the form of spiritual progress demonstrated in a central work such as de Trinitate is 
one in which understanding, piety and virtue are positively related to one another.‟188 In 
The City of God he also speaks about transformation in Christ as a continual process of 
„daily advances whereby the soul is made anew.‟189  
 
However, it must also be noted that in speaking more directly of habits, Augustine 
states that because of fallen nature a person‟s habits are more likely to be vicious than 
virtuous. A Christian needs grace to have the right will (love) to move away from sinful 
habits.
190
 
 
Just as the forming of right habits is usually a part of virtue ethics, so is a consideration 
of the agent‟s motives when assessing any action. In the companion work to De moribus 
ecclesiae catholicae, called De moribus manichaeorum (also of AD 388), Augustine 
states that the praise- or blame-worthiness of any action is determined by the end or 
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intention.
191
 This is again a position which Augustine maintained throughout his 
writing. Thus in refuting Julian of Eclanum he defines virtue in terms not only of 
performing the right action, but also acting for the right reason.
192
 
 
Given that in his mature works Augustine still spoke of seeking the supreme good, still 
used his redefinition of virtues as forms of love (though latterly speaking more often of 
„order of love‟), still addressed the moral life in terms of graced progress in unlearning 
vicious habits and acquiring virtuous habits, and still stressed the importance of 
intentions in judging an action, his moral thought can surely best be described as a form 
of virtue ethics, even if it is one that has been notably changed from its Neo-Platonist 
origins. 
 
3.1.4: What kind of ethics? 
Nonetheless, there is some nervousness about speaking of Augustine and virtue ethics. 
Oliver O‟Donovan describes his ethics as a eudaemonistic and teleological ethic, which, 
he says, „serves to give intelligibility to ethics that are in substance command-based.‟193 
Harrison notes that he uses the  
language of obligation, of responsibility, of social duties, of love of authority, 
expressed in the Decalogue, the teaching of the New Testament, and most 
especially the commandment of love of God and neighbour. Conformity to God 
is therefore not only described by Scripture as man‟s good, but, in order to attain 
it, as his duty or moral obligation.
194
  
 
Rist goes further, asserting, on the basis on God‟s unchanging nature and Augustine‟s 
understanding that the eternal law is based on that nature, that he held absolute moral 
rules.
195
 Kuntz meanwhile sees Augustine‟s ethics as „aretaic‟ but also based on divine 
command.
196
 Such notions of deontology, divine command, obligation, and absolute 
moral rules centre on the fact that Augustine placed the „greatest commandment‟ and 
the „second which is like it‟ at the heart of his ethical thinking, which gives focus and 
content to his eudaemonism. Yet, as already mentioned, Augustine is quite clear that 
what matters is not only the right action (whether or not this is discovered through rules, 
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commands, etc.), but acting with the right intentions. He is happy to speak of good 
deeds done apart from love as vicious rather than virtuous.
197
 Furthermore, Rist‟s talk of 
absolute moral rules is not borne out by the passages he quotes,
198
 let alone when 
compared with passages about the necessity of right motives. Indeed, Augustine used 
the language of „obligation‟ more in the early De moribus ecclesiae in relation to love 
of neighbour than he does in the mature works, where he speaks of love more in terms 
of enjoyment. So however one weights Augustine‟s use of command, it is not his 
determining framework, nor is it used in an absolute sense, and it may even be that he 
used it less in later years. More problematic for those who want to claim Augustine as a 
deontologist is the fact that, as Burnaby notes, there is a paradox about the 
commandment to love God and neighbour: „if it is obeyed because it is commanded, it 
is not obeyed.‟199  
 
Thus the question remains regarding how to categorize a formulation of ethics which 
has as its starting point a teleology of human flourishing or happiness, and a discussion 
of virtues, but the double commandment of loving God and neighbour in a central place. 
To call his ethics command-based seems too strong a statement for an ethic which 
rarely speaks of any commandment other than love and regards the fulfilment of that 
commandment as dependent on grace. Kent comments that in respect of his treatment of 
the supreme good which provides human happiness, „his moral thought comes closer to 
the eudaimonistic virtue ethics of the classical Western tradition than to the ethics of 
duty and law associated with Christianity in the modern period.‟200 She suggests that 
Augustine holds a middle way regarding virtue, namely that it is neither a means to an 
end nor is it something to be valued for it own sake, because only God is to be loved 
purely for his own sake, everything else is to be loved in relationship to God.
201
 
Burnaby likewise is aware of some tension between the biblical and the philosophical 
elements in Augustine‟s ethics when he writes, „it was not possible to make an honest 
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attempt to set forth an ethic based on the two great commandments, without introducing 
confusion into the Neo-Platonist pattern.‟202  
 
However, that Augustine worked with a eudaemonist construction does not clarify how 
it should be assessed in Christian terms. Some have claimed that  
Augustine should not have taken the quest for happiness as the model for 
Christian ethical thought. He should not have accepted the classical legacy of a 
teleological analysis of human action and will. Eudaemonism elides the 
distinction between the way of God‟s requiring and all other ways which man 
may devise.
203
  
 
These critics see eudaemonism as essentially compromised by selfishness, such that 
truly Christian ethics cannot be formulated in this way. Is this position to be endorsed? 
Certainly in St Augustine‟s efforts to pour the new wine of Christian teaching into the 
old wineskin of virtue ethics, there is a sense that the old cannot entirely hold the new. 
Yet in answering the charges against Augustine, O‟Donovan does not choose to respond 
to the basic complaint against eudaemonism. Instead he concentrates on the 
particularities of Augustine‟s thought and endorses these:  
When Augustine, in a famous section of City of God XIX, contrasts the Christian 
understanding of happiness with all the possibilities of classicism, it is clear that 
he intends not to elide the distinction between Christianity and classicism but to 
throw it into the sharpest relief. Such considerations should suffice to vindicate 
the Christian use of eudaemonist categories at least as an occasional possibility, 
and although a critic may object to an unguarded or unqualified eudaemonism, 
Augustine, a great deal of whose ethical reflection is in fact cast in a 
deontological form, cannot be accused of that.
204
  
 
Further to that, O‟Donovan rightly makes a distinction between the virtue ethics 
framework for organizing thought and epistemology: we cannot discover „the whole of 
our Christian duty by consulting our self-interest, even though the whole of our 
Christian duty does serve our self-interest.‟205  Finally, O‟Donovan recognizes that, 
„When Augustine says that true self-love is love of God, he is saying something not 
unlike what he means by the claim that God is man‟s happiness. Both express the 
principle that duty and self-interest ultimately coincide.‟206 
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Another tension Burnaby notes is between grace and ethics: „In fact, it was not easy for 
the doctrine of grace to find accommodation in a frame of ethical thought which 
persistently assumed that man‟s destiny hereafter will depend upon his deserts.‟207 In 
classical virtue ethics happiness is defined as the end and virtue as the means of 
attaining or as constitutive of that end. However, when that end is defined as „the 
enjoyment of God‟, which is almost coterminous with „salvation‟, speaking of virtue as 
constituting or as the means to obtain this end becomes problematic. There may be 
moments when Augustine seems to speak of „blessedness in heaven‟ as the reward for a 
virtuous life,
208
 but his emphasis on the need for the virtues thus rewarded to be given 
by God makes clear that he does not mean what philosophers might mean when using 
the same words. Even if, as Burnaby says, Augustine‟s emphasis on grace „was far from 
being a disguised equivalent of the Lutheran denial of all human merit,‟209 he is not 
advocating virtue as achieved by human effort as the means to the supreme end. His 
view of a human‟s ability to will and do the good should make that abundantly clear. 
Much later, Augustine resolved a similar tension, according to Burnaby, by attributing 
the act of will both to God‟s calling and to human response, at least before he was 
embroiled in the Pelagian controversy. Against the backdrop of that debate, however, he 
began to emphasize grace further in the famous formulation extra nos, without us.
210
 
Yet in Burnaby‟s view, Augustine saw life as a pilgrimage to become fit for the 
enjoyment of God, and on this pilgrimage the person needs to grow in grace and in 
merit, though these will only be perfected in heaven.
211
  
 
The fact that so many commentators speak of such tensions within Augustine‟s ethics 
reflects, I believe, the unique contribution he made to Christian ethics. His framework is 
indeed teleological, both in the sense that there is a goal to the moral life, happiness in 
loving God, and in the sense that it is, at least in his mature thought, an eschatological 
goal – human fulfilment is only complete or perfect in the face-to-face vision of God. 
Strictly speaking, Augustine‟s ethics is not only eudaemonistic but based on virtues, 
though these are redefined in terms of love. To call his ethics „command-based‟ is 
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surely mistaken, since commandment and obedience are not the prime categories of his 
thought. Yet within his form of virtue ethics, St Augustine takes with utter seriousness 
the effects of the Fall, and the Christian‟s absolute dependence on grace for her will to 
be freed to recognise, will, and do the good, which, as we shall see, makes his form of 
virtue ethics interesting in relation to Bonhoeffer‟s concerns (3.5.5). 
 
3.2: Thomas Aquinas’s Virtue Ethics 
In the sense that they both sought to integrate Christian theology and classical 
philosophy, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas had much in common. Yet, as divergent 
Christian traditions attest, their thought is different in many ways. If in St Augustine 
there are difficulties collating his thought on ethics from various genres of writing, there 
is little difficulty doing so in St Thomas‟s works. His writing, it would seem, is nothing 
if not systematic, at least in his Summa Theologiae, where his greatest sustained 
exposition of virtue ethics is found. 
 
3.2.1: Setting 
The setting for Thomas Aquinas‟s most extensive discussion of ethics is in his great 
work of systematic theology, which may seem both an obvious and an insignificant 
statement.
212
 Yet the importance of the context for his discussion is a subject of some 
contention. Thus such a noted scholar as Anthony Kenny could state, „Take it out of its 
context and this treatise on habitus is a work of philosophy, not of theology‟.213 Of 
course, as Kenny points out, in the questions St Thomas addresses in this section, 
Aristotle is quoted on every page, while the Bible is quoted only three times. These bare 
facts, however, will not settle the debate as to whether Aquinas‟s virtue ethics is really a 
philosophical construct (with a superficial Christian gloss) or whether it is an integral 
part of his theology, and if so, if Christian theology is a necessary part of his ethics. If 
there are some who would read him apart from Christian theology
214
, others contend 
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that this cannot do justice to Thomas‟s own treatment.215 Of course it is possible to 
extract his discussion of dispositions and the cardinal virtues as acquired dispositions in 
a non-theological treatment. However, this is tantamount to borrowing elements of his 
work, but using them apart from his meaning. Outside of the context of his theology, 
any construal of his ethics must become significantly different. My first reason for 
claiming this is that his ethics stands in a careful and systematic treatment of Christian 
faith. Secondly, and more importantly, his understanding of God dictates his 
understanding of human life, both in what it means to be human (chiefly, being created 
in God‟s own image) and in the meaning, goal and purpose of human life (to know God 
now and enjoy the face-to-face vision of God after this life which constitutes 
beatitude).
216
 Thus to use his ethics non-theologically would demand the alteration of 
the meaning of key concepts, such that even if his words were quoted verbatim, they 
would, so interpreted, no longer express his meaning. Thirdly and finally, it seems from 
his comments in the prologue to the Summa Theologiae that Aquinas was writing for 
students of theology and that he presupposes a high level of theological acumen (even if 
he calls it an introductory work!). Thus I believe his virtue ethics is theological both in 
its setting and in its content.
217
  
 
It is important also to consider Thomas‟s historical setting, which predates a modern 
approach which seeks to derive moral norms from first principles.
218
 Yet beyond this, it 
is salient that he embraced both the mendicant movement (as a Dominican) and natural 
philosophy at a time when these were seen to be opposing forces, and that to such an 
extent that shortly after his death there was a papal condemnation of teachings which 
prefer philosophy to theology.
219
  
 
Another significant aspect of Thomas‟s historical setting is that the heresy which was 
most common and which he therefore is most often addressing is not Pelagianism or 
                                                          
215
 See e.g. Kerr, After Aquinas, 65, and especially his discussion of virtue ethics, 115-9. See also 
Pinckaers, Sources, chapter 7. 
216
 See e.g. Stephen J. Pope, „Overview of the Ethics of Thomas Aquinas‟, The Ethics of Aquinas (30-53), 
30; and Leonard E. Boyle, „Setting – Revisited‟, 7. 
217
 See e.g. Boyle, „Setting – Revisited‟, 8-9.  
218
 See Jean Porter, Moral Action and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
107. 
219
 Josef Pieper, Introduction to Thomas Aquinas, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1962), 30-1; Kerr, After Aquinas, 12. 
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Manichaeism (as with Augustine), but the dualism of the Cathars.
220
 His insistence on 
the intrinsic goodness of all created things (everything that is) must be seen in this 
context rather than as an argument with later Protestants. 
 
3.2.2: Methods and Influences 
It is, however, also necessary to consider at least briefly St Thomas‟s mode of 
theological discourse and influences on his work before turning to an account of his 
ethics. Although his discussion of ethics is situated in and dependent for meaning on his 
theology, he does not simply use scripture or the Fathers as proof texts, but argues 
carefully, subjecting any material he uses to the scrutiny of reason.
221
 This is equally 
true in his use of Aristotle and other philosophers, though unlike with scripture, he is at 
times at odds with Aristotle.
222
 His format and mode of argument, in the Summa 
Theologiae is dialectical rather than arguing a thesis. In his treatment he takes opposing 
views with great seriousness and courtesy, sometimes altering his own stated position in 
some way so as to include those elements which he finds correct. As Josef Pieper puts 
it, this dialectical method is indicative of the conviction that arriving at truth requires 
more power than an individual possesses, and that it necessitates working together with 
others.
 223
  
 
It may be that this dialectic method itself was a product of philosophical influence on 
Thomas. Of the classical philosophers, Aristotle was certainly a major influence on St 
Thomas‟s work, though perhaps not as great as has often been assumed. Such influences 
are wide ranging, including not only, as one would expect of a theologian, the 
Scriptures and the Fathers, but also a Muslim philosopher (Ibn Sina), Plato and 
others.
224
 He was involved in the debates of his day, as is seen in his Disputations, but 
also in the ecumenical dialogue (the Council of Lyons) of East and West.
225
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With this historical and theological setting in mind, I turn now to a brief account of his 
virtue ethics in the Summa Theologiae. 
 
3.2.3: Thomas Aquinas’s Virtue Ethics 
3.2.3.a: Framework 
Following on from his discussion of the nature of God in the Prima Pars, the Prima 
Secundae begins to consider questions related to ethics. The link between these sections 
for Thomas is integral: because a human is made in God‟s image, her end is also in 
God, she has real freedom to act, as well as responsibility and control.
226
 Throughout his 
discussion of ethics, these are his basic assumptions about humanity. The human telos, 
the end, or purpose, is of vital importance in his ethics. Time and again in later 
questions he bases his answer on the relationship of the question at hand to the human‟s 
proper end of receiving the face-to-face vision of God. This is the ultimate end (I-
II.3.8); there can be many other ends motivating human behaviour, though secondary 
goods in some sense anticipate the consummate perfection (I-II.1.6). True happiness 
does not exist in riches, honours, fame and glory, power, health, pleasures, or indeed in 
any created good (I-II.2), but in union with God (I-II.3.8). All human beings desire this 
happiness, but not everyone knows where to seek it (I-II.5.8). Yet importantly, a person 
is not capable through her own resources of attaining this end, but she is created with 
the capacity to receive this beatitude. Nonetheless, she is required to do something 
herself, namely to show the motion of activity towards happiness. Thus the framework 
is in place for considering ethics: the purpose is not salvation by works (humans are 
only created with the [passive] capacity to receive salvation/beatitude), but to move 
through actions towards this beatitude. Thus Thomas‟s work includes a eudaemonist 
and teleological framework which incorporates philosophical concerns and Christian 
revelation. 
 
3.2.3.b: Volition 
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It is St Thomas‟s contention that some acts open the way to happiness (though without 
being able to attain it), while others block the way.
227
 For acts to be fully human they 
must be voluntary (I-II.6.1). Duress renders an act involuntary (I-II.6.5), though 
emotions and passions such as fear and lust do not (I-II.6.6-7). Ignorance is a special 
case because it renders an act involuntary (because to be fully human, an act must be 
based on knowledge and reason), but does not necessarily remove culpability; for there 
are things which a person is capable of knowing and has a responsibility to know (I-
II.6.8). Furthermore, to assess any act it is necessary to consider the circumstances, 
those things which border on an act without being a necessary part of the act itself (I-
II.7.1-2). Such things include the answers to the interrogatives who, what, where, by 
what aids, why and when, but the most important circumstance which must be 
considered is the „why‟ of motive (I-II.7.3-4). In this consideration of voluntariness, it is 
plain that Thomas has in mind the complex nature of the circumstances of human life 
and activity.
228
 Here he is drawing on reason more than revelation, but not at the 
expense of revealed truth.  
 
Since volition is required for an act to be human, he further elucidates his premise that 
every act is for an end (I-II.8). He then considers whether the will is set in motion by 
mind, emotions, heavenly bodies (which he rejects in article 5, whilst accepting the 
others) and God (I-II.9), and the mode of volition (I-II.10). Aquinas also gives place to 
the role of enjoyment, not only of our ultimate end (which we can enjoy even now in 
anticipation) but also of other, earthly ends and goods (I-II.11). He then turns to the 
intricate process he sees at work in coming to action: the will formulating an intention, 
making a choice of what to do now, consenting to the means chosen for reaching an 
end, applying the means, and commanding the action (I-II.12-17). In all this discussion, 
Aquinas‟s view of the human person is both complex, recognizing a whole host of 
forces at work within her (and even God working on her), and highly nuanced, fully 
aware that although he sometimes treats the will or reason, for instance, as if they were 
subjects in their own right, that they are nonetheless actually properties of the person.  
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3.2.3.c: Good and Evil Acts  
From the aspects of volition in human acts, St Thomas turns to the consideration of 
moral good and evil in human acts. First he sets out that some acts are good and others 
evil, but the evaluation is complex, taking into account the objective, the circumstances 
and the end intended (I-II.18.1-6). Furthermore, it is possible for acts to be neutral, or 
for acts, which generally speaking are neutral, to be made good or bad by the 
circumstances, etc. (I-II.18.8-10). In addition there is the potential for good and evil in 
the will‟s inner activity, not just in the external act, depending again on the objective, 
the circumstances, the mode of reasoning and on its relation to the eternal law (divine 
reason) (I-II.19.1-4;7-10). Thomas considers that even when the conscience is mistaken, 
its dictates are binding on the person (I-II.19.5), though, analogous to what was said of 
ignorance, whether the act based on the mistaken conscience is culpable or not will 
depend on whether the ignorance in question was of something that could and should 
have been known by the person (I-II.19.6). The good or evil of an outward act depends 
to a large degree on the aspects of the will discussed in question 19, but the reasoning 
by which the will is set in motion must also be considered (I-II.20.1-2). Because the 
same outward act can be good or bad depending on the individual case, aspects of the 
act itself need to be addressed also – such as the consequences, if they were foreseen or 
foreseeable – as well as the internal aspects, such as intention (I-II.20.5-6). From here 
Thomas moves to the category of „sinful‟, stating that an act will be good or bad 
dependent on whether or not it is sinful (I-II.21.1), and from that questions of praise-
worthiness or blame-worthiness, merit or demerit are decided (I-II.21.2-4). Again, it is 
noteworthy that he begins with more philosophical terminology (good/bad) and moves 
towards integration with religious language (sin), which he then gives prime 
importance. 
 
3.2.3.d: Habitus  
Only when he has laid such foundations does Aquinas come to speak more specifically 
of the virtues, first in a general discussion of „dispositions‟ or „habits‟ (habitus), those 
qualities which are good or bad for the possessor according to how they enable action 
(in accordance with reason, and therefore with the final end, or not), and which are a 
necessary part of how humans move from potentiality, which may be expressed in a 
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wide variety of ways, to actuality (I-II.49).
229
 A human has various dispositions (and 
even disposition-like states of the body) of the faculties of the soul, of the senses 
(insofar as these are controlled by reason), of the intellect, and of the will – in short, 
there are dispositions which enable her through rational means to move from 
potentiality to actuality in any sphere of action (I-II.50.1-5). Certain of these 
dispositions may be to some limited degree innate, but generally speaking they are 
acquired through repeated actions, or may be infused by God (I-II.51.1-4; I-II.63.1-3). 
They may grow in strength by being possessed more perfectly, or they may decay or 
even be destroyed by being possessed less perfectly. Such growth or decay is caused 
again by action, and whether actions are according to the disposition or not (I-II.52-53). 
Moreover it is possible to distinguish between good and bad dispositions, depending on 
whether they are in accordance with human nature or not (I-II.54.3). These he considers 
more fully as virtues (and vices).  
 
3.2.3.e: Virtues 
If Thomas‟s general discussion of dispositions owes much to Aristotle, his closer look 
at the virtues draws more heavily on the scriptures and the teachings of the Fathers. As 
W.D. Hughes puts it, „The influence of Aristotle is evident, indeed so apparent in the 
framework that its importance can be over-estimated.‟230 Thomas begins by noting that 
human virtue is a good disposition which relates to acts (I-II.55.1-3). Here he draws his 
definition for virtue from a compilation of Augustine‟s writings: „Virtue is a good 
quality of mind by which one lives righteously, of which no one can make bad use, 
which God works in us without us.‟231 As ever, Thomas does not use the Augustinian 
definition as a proof-text, but defends it on the basis of logic: formal, material, final and 
efficient causes (I-II.55.4). He then considers the „seat‟ of virtues as being in the „power 
of the soul‟, such as the intellect or even such natural aspects as the „appetitive part‟, 
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which pertains to resistance of obstacles and seeking good and avoiding harm, but most 
especially in the will (I-II.56).  
 
The intellectual virtues he considers to be both speculative (the ability to seek the truth 
through wisdom, science and understanding) and practical in the form of prudence, 
which includes taking good counsel, judging well according to general laws, and 
judging well in exceptional cases (I-II.57).
232
 The difference between these intellectual 
virtues and the moral virtues is in the powers which they perfect: the intellectual virtues 
perfect an agent‟s capacity to seek the truth and judge well and wisely; the moral virtues 
perfect her ability to act well with regard to her appetitive powers, such as seeking good 
and avoiding harm, overcoming obstacles, etc. (I-II.58.2). However, prudence provides 
a special case, being both an intellectual and a moral virtue since it both perfects a 
person‟s intellect regarding right judgement and helps her to act (I-II.58.3). The moral 
virtues and prudence operate interdependently, meaning that they must all be present for 
any to be fully possessed (and therefore to exist fully as virtues in a person), though the 
other intellectual virtues need not be present, or can be present independently of the 
moral virtues (I-II.59.4-5). 
 
The relationship between the moral virtues and emotions is complex. While moral 
virtue is not itself a passion, it occurs together with passions, and can be seen as a mean 
between two passions.
233
 Human beings by nature have emotions, therefore perfect 
virtue does not consist in any notion of rising above emotions, even sorrow: despite St 
Thomas‟s dependence on philosophy, his understanding of emotion is both Christian 
and plausible according to the insights of psychology. Because the moral virtues perfect 
the appetitive aspect they often have to do with the emotions, though justice relates to 
the will, not the passions (I-II.59). After some further discussion of the relationship 
between the moral virtues, acts and emotions (question 60), Thomas turns his attention 
to the cardinal virtues. 
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Aquinas defends the position held by prudence, fortitude, temperance and justice in 
philosophical ethics, even against the notion that the theological virtues should be given 
a higher place on the grounds that faith, hope and charity are superhuman, whereas the 
cardinal virtues (at least as acquired) are human. Among the cardinal virtues, prudence 
is principal because of its central position as both an intellectual and a moral virtue.
234
 
The four virtues are to be distinguished because of their different objects, but 
nonetheless there is an overflow – perfect courage must also be temperate, etc. (I-II.61). 
This overflow can also be called the reciprocity of the virtues, and means that a person 
may differ in the strength of her natural inclinations towards different virtues, but 
cannot actually possess the virtues properly in differing degrees (I-II.66.2). 
 
The theological virtues of faith, hope and charity are needed, says Thomas, because a 
human‟s final end is ultimately beyond human reach. Only God can give these virtues 
such that a person may receive the face-to-face vision of God and partake of God‟s 
divine nature. Thus Thomas‟s virtue ethics is not, as stated before, „salvation by works‟. 
The theological virtues are to be distinguished from the other virtues because their 
object is God himself, while the other virtues have objects comprehensible to reason. 
The principal of the theological virtues is charity because through it faith and hope also 
come alive, and because of its central place in God‟s nature.235 Furthermore, God can 
also infuse other virtues (I-II.63.3). Following on from his assertion of the reciprocity of 
the virtues, Thomas states that acquired human virtues can exist without charity, but for 
our acts to be directed towards our „supernatural‟ last end, charity is required, and can 
only be received from God. Yet charity does not exist without the moral virtues, at least 
in their infused state if not as acquired; however, it is more difficult for the infused 
moral virtues to lead to virtuous acts than for the acquired virtues, because the opposing 
dispositions (vices) may remain, whereas the acquisition of virtues necessarily means 
the decay of their opposing vices.
236
 Likewise, he says, faith and hope may exist in 
some incomplete state without charity, but charity does not exist without faith and hope 
(I-II. 65).
237
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Since Aquinas discusses the virtues in relation to how a person might attain her final 
end, it is not surprising that he is also interested in whether these virtues also remain 
eternally. The moral and intellectual virtues remain as regards human reason, though 
without the potential for vice. Faith and hope he sees as imperfect and will no longer be 
required when face to face with God, though certain desires may remain, such as for the 
salvation of a wayfarer. Charity, however, remains, and will then be possessed perfectly 
(I-II.67).  
 
3.2.4: What kind of theology? 
In looking at Augustine it was necessary to ask what kind of ethics he was writing; that 
question does not arise in relationship to Thomas, rather what kind of theology. There 
can be no doubt of the philosophical framework behind Aquinas‟s work, the rigorous 
attention to reason in setting out the order of his questions, the use of Aristotle‟s 
categories and frame of reference. What is disputed is whether this is pagan philosophy 
(which St Paul might warn against, as perhaps taking us captive – Colossians 2:8) which 
has only been superficially touched up, or whether this is Christian theology of a 
philosophically rigorous nature. One point which should carry some weight in this 
discussion is what Fergus Kerr refers to as „the anguish of philosophy‟, namely that St 
Thomas imagined the state of natural philosophers to be one of anguish, because apart 
from revelation the most cogent natural reason could not allow them to reach their true 
fulfilment of beatitude.
238
 Moreover Kerr claims that for Thomas it would have been 
impossible to imagine philosophy or natural reasoning apart from theology because they 
investigate only those things which God has created and using only those means which 
God has given.
239
 Evidence that Kerr is correct may be found, for instance, in the fact 
that Thomas is careful to distinguish those (earthly) goods which a person may attain by 
her own effort and through her natural resources from the final good (the face-to-face 
vision of God), which she may only receive through grace (I-II.65.2). Furthermore, 
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behind anything which might be called „natural‟ St Thomas always means (and often 
makes explicit) „God-given‟. For these reasons, I believe that he did not expound a 
heathenish philosophy with a thin veneer of theology, but an intellectually rigorous and 
robustly Christian theology. 
 
More important, however, for this study is to ask how St Thomas‟s virtue ethics is to be 
described theologically. There is a clear eudaemonist, teleological framework, similar to 
Augustine‟s. Yet unlike the patristic bishop, Thomas is content to appropriate the 
cardinal virtues as defined in classical philosophy, though adding both the notion of 
these virtues being infused by God in the believer as well as the theological virtues 
which must be infused. While accepting the possibility of acquiring virtues through 
practice and human effort may be seen to presuppose that postlapsarian human nature 
still has a high degree of integrity (the potential to recognise earthly good, to will it and 
to do it through human strength), the addition of theological virtues and discussion of 
infused virtues nonetheless shows reliance on grace for anything which could be termed 
salvific. 
 
3.3: Alasdair MacIntyre 
Having looked at virtue ethics through the lens of one of the most influential 
theologians of the patristic era, and of the middle ages, I turn now to look at a more 
contemporary treatment. Following the Reformation, virtue ethics was largely the 
domain of Roman Catholic ethicists, and often was neglected even there.
240
 In the 
twentieth century proponents from the Catholic tradition such as Pieper and Peter Geach 
advocated Thomist ethics.
241
 Only since the publication of Alasdair MacIntyre‟s After 
Virtue has it gained a central place in the wider debates both in philosophical ethics and 
in Protestant theological ethics.
242
 The sheer volume of writing on virtue ethics seen in 
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the last twenty years would have been unimaginable before this watershed. Thus it is 
right to look more carefully at MacIntyre‟s work, even if he did not set out to expound 
virtue ethics in a Christian theological context.
243
 
 
3.3.1: His Analysis 
In After Virtue, MacIntyre offers the following analysis. Contemporary moral 
philosophy consisted of remnants of earlier systems. These remnants had lost their 
meaning because the frameworks of which they were once a part were no longer 
understood or commonly assumed. He then tried to show from a philosophical and 
historical perspective indebted to Hegel and Collingwood how this state of affairs came 
into being.
244
 His analysis was not in itself new, for Elizabeth Anscombe had sketched 
out such a proposition in 1958.
245
 Yet MacIntyre pursued this at a time in which the 
ground had been somewhat prepared for him – not least by Anscombe, Iris Murdoch, 
Stanley Hauerwas and Philippa Foot, among others – and in such a way that it seemed 
to be forceful and cogent, and to demand consideration and response.
246
 He began by 
presenting an evocative parable which he used to introduce the notion that through 
historical events the language of morality was in a „state of grave disorder‟ which could 
not be apprehended through analytical philosophy (which is descriptive of what is) or 
other academic disciplines, since they had been affected by the same historical events 
which caused the disorder, and since their „value-neutral‟ stance did not allow them to 
see decline and fall or disorder as such.
247
 Moreover, MacIntyre admitted that he saw 
„no large remedies‟ for the disorder (2-5). 
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To illustrate the difficulties in using the language of morality, he presented examples of 
debates in which the arguments were conceptually incommensurable – each argument 
was coherent in its own terms, and no rational means existed for proving one argument 
right and the others wrong, thus causing the debates to disintegrate into assertion and 
counter-assertion (6-7). He characterized these debates as incommensurable, but also as 
inconsistent, in that they were nonetheless carried out with a claim of „impersonal 
rational arguments‟ (7-10).248 Where once these various arguments were at home in 
contexts of „larger totalities of theory and practice‟ (the traditions now facing 
epistemological crisis), these contexts are now largely lost, and the words used in 
current debates have changed meaning over the years (10-1).
249
 
 
A significant part of his thesis concerned what MacIntyre described as the 
Enlightenment‟s project of providing ethics with an „independent rational justification‟ 
divorced from any discussion of theology, law or aesthetics.
250
 He traced this project 
back in time through the work of Søren Kierkegaard, Immanuel Kant, Denis Diderot, 
and David Hume (chapter 4) –considering the work of great thinkers whom one could 
not suppose to have failed because they were not equal to the task. Nonetheless, fail 
they did, according to MacIntyre, and moreover, he claimed they had to fail. The reason 
for this had to do with the nature of the framework these thinkers had inherited, a 
teleological framework which was based on a) some notion of what a human actually is, 
contrasted with b) an understanding of what she could be if she realized her potential, 
and c) ethics supplying the function of helping her to move from a) to b). In this 
conception there was a rational coherence in that any duty was shown to be part of her 
true end (and consonant or coterminous with divine law) (52-3). However, in the 
Enlightenment there were two independent concepts: one of what humanity as it 
happens to be is, and one of ethics. Without the teleological concept of what a person 
should become (with the help of ethics), these two concepts were now free-floating (54-
5). The newly enshrined principle that one cannot derive an „ought‟ from an „is‟ makes 
sense only when the subject of the factual statement is not seen to be of a functional 
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nature (such as clock or farmer), which gives awareness of what it is for (its telos) and 
the possibility of evaluation. MacIntyre insisted that within the teleological framework 
of the earlier virtue ethics there was an understanding of function or purpose of 
humanity such that ethics in that context was indeed a fully rational enterprise. From a 
Christian perspective there may be unease regarding his notion of teleology: so 
construed, ethics appears to be works salvation, since a human‟s proper end is loving 
God and enjoying God for ever. Yet if ethics is seen to be not the means to that end, but 
as constitutive of that end, his criticisms of non-teleological ethics are still valid. 
 
Crucially, MacIntyre‟s analysis of the situation of moral philosophy (and theological 
ethics) was both vivid and representative enough of debates to be compelling, even if 
many have differed sharply on a variety of points and offered robust criticism.
251
 
However, his analysis of the state of moral philosophy is of lesser interest to this study 
than his positive suggestions for reinvigorating or reformulating virtue ethics. 
 
3.3.2: His Proposals 
While MacIntyre saw the results of the failure of the Enlightenment project not merely 
in ethical discourse, but in the very fabric of Western society,
252
 it is sufficient to note 
that he considered one major result to be the „Weberian‟ character of society in terms of 
its irreducible plurality (109).
253
 The only alternatives he saw to this were a form of 
Aristotelian ethics, such as had preceded modernity, and the reaction against the 
Enlightenment typified by Nietzsche (111).  
 
In After Virtue MacIntyre‟s positive proposals for resolution of the difficulties of 
incommensurable debates focused on a form of Aristotelian virtue ethics in which 
„practices‟ would play a central role. A „practice‟ he defined as a  
coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity 
through which goals internal to the form of activity are realized in the course of 
trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and 
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partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to 
achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are 
systematically extended (187).  
 
Among the examples of „practices‟, he cites chess, farming, music, football, and 
enquiries such as physics and chemistry (187).
254
 When writing After Virtue, he was 
content with a notion of individual virtues as separate from one another, and of 
„practices‟ which themselves may be neutral (or even morally wrong) in their content, 
but which have internal goods which may only be enjoyed through developing moral 
and intellectual virtues.
255
 Naturally, there are problems inherent in this account. Cricket 
as a practice may indeed teach many virtues (including justice) to the extent that the 
game has become synonymous with fairness, but will a person learn justice adequately 
if cricket is the only mode in which she learns it?
256
  
 
Moreover, he proposed that a narrative construal of human life is necessary to his 
proposal, with its sense of life in its unity, with its structure which includes a beginning 
and an end, and with its capacity to make sense of the variety of roles a person inhabits 
(in family, profession, people, nation, etc.).
257
 Not surprisingly, there are those who 
reject the form of virtue ethics which he proposes, and see hubris in his attempt to 
formulate a scheme of virtues „more compelling than the rival versions he has 
discussed‟, which include Homeric, Aristotelian and medieval schemes.258 
 
MacIntyre later came to revise this appropriation of Aristotelianism, embracing instead 
a form of Thomism which meant accepting the notion of the unity of the virtues. He 
describes this change: „In After Virtue I did not as yet recognize how Aquinas had 
enriched and reconstituted the tradition and given it its definitive form.‟259 Even with 
his revisions, he has been criticised as not having been faithful either to Aristotle or 
Thomas Aquinas.
260
 As we have already seen, there are difficulties related to how 
Aquinas (and perhaps similarly, to how Aristotle) is read, since, as MacIntyre notes and 
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Kerr demonstrates at length, Thomas Aquinas has had rival and incommensurable 
interpretations.
261
  
 
Yet MacIntyre proposes that what is needful is not the details of Aquinas‟s thought, but 
the „overall specific mode of enquiry‟, namely a dialectical approach.262 The happiness 
at stake in this eudaemonism is dependent on the very nature of human beings. There is 
interrelationship between rules and virtues such that rules can only be formulated (not 
as abstract or categorical commands) in terms of a telos which can be articulated and 
understood: negative rules set boundaries in which the good can be found.
263
 
Furthermore, progress in moral enquiry must go in tandem with progress in moral life – 
one cannot adequately learn about virtues without acquiring them. Integral to his vision 
of moral enquiry is the integration of theological, political and philosophical dimensions 
of thought. „The virtues which conjointly inform the actions of an integrated self are 
also the virtues of a well-integrated political community.‟264 
 
3.3.3: Some implications 
Whether or not MacIntyre‟s account does justice to the Thomist tradition he seeks to 
inhabit in Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry is somewhat peripheral to the question 
I hope to address.
265
 Yet an important part of his trilogy is the awareness that Thomist 
virtue ethics is not a monolithic, self-enclosed system, but has had a variety of 
formulations at various times and in various places. Indeed, given Thomas‟s dialectical 
approach, perhaps it is not unreasonable to claim that Thomist virtue ethics must always 
be in the process of being formulated and in the process of being changed. If so, to 
engage in Thomist ethics demands a dynamic approach which may commit the 
researcher to fewer certainties of outcome than many might desire.  
 
However that may be, the difficulty raised by John Haldane as to how one should 
respond to MacIntyre, given that his stance has changed quite considerably in the course 
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of the three books discussed here is one which needs to be addressed.
266
 Yet for three 
reasons I think it is appropriate to engage with MacIntyre‟s early proposal to define 
virtues in relationship to „practices‟. First, one could hardly engage in debate at all if 
such emerging and provisional positions cannot be assumed to be fixed enough to merit 
discussion. Secondly, and therefore, it cannot be unreasonable to interact with ideas 
MacIntyre put forward, as ideas in their own right and not utterly discredited by the fact 
that he himself has since focused on other matters. Thirdly, I consider it at least 
possible, if not likely, that MacIntyre‟s later emphasis on Aquinas‟s dialectical 
approach, rather than the content of Thomist virtue ethics, reflects MacIntyre‟s 
overarching concern to seek ways of bringing what he sees as an impasse to resolution, 
more than any move away from virtue ethics. If I am right in this assumption, it would 
lend increased support for considering more carefully his own form of virtue ethics put 
forward in After Virtue. This I propose to do, not least because, if I read him rightly, his 
stance by the time of writing Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry had moved close 
enough to a Thomist position that discussing it here would add but little to what has 
been said in relation to Aquinas himself.
267
 
 
It is MacIntyre‟s suggestion that a certain core within the variety of conceptions of 
virtue ethics (from Homer and Aristotle, to Benjamin Franklin and Jane Austen) is 
discernible. He assumes that in all of the construals he discusses there must be a prior 
acceptance of some account of social and moral life, of a narrative conception of life, 
and of an account of what constitutes „practices‟ which train a person in virtues (186-7). 
In this account of virtue ethics, it would seem that such „practices‟ come to the fore, 
with an emphasis on the social nature which they presuppose. For whether practices are 
forms of the arts, sciences, games or politics, these „practices‟ and the virtues they instil 
can only be learnt within a social construct and tradition. He claims moreover that these 
„practices‟ not only have benefits for the individual but for the whole community and 
how persons relate to one another within the community (188-92). MacIntyre‟s 
emphasis is much more on the practical question of how a person develops virtues, 
rather than the theoretical issue of defining individual virtues and considering their 
relationship to one another. Problems arise, however, in his account pertaining to the 
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question of the relationship of the virtues one to another precisely because at the time of 
writing After Virtue he rejected the notion of the unity of the virtues. Thus he refers to 
Peter Geach‟s example of a „courageous‟ Nazi and his insistence that „either it was not 
courage that he possessed or that in that kind of case courage is not a virtue‟, and states 
that it is indeed courage and a virtue, which might be the point of moral contact which 
would enable the process of moral re-education to begin (179-80).
268
 Many would agree 
with MacIntyre that any notion of the „unity of the virtues‟ seems unempirical, and no 
doubt all could cite along with him instances of „vicious violinists and mean-spirited 
chess players‟ – people who seemingly possess both strong virtues associated with their 
„practices‟ and strong vices (178-9, 193).269 Yet the question remains, is the „courage‟ 
of someone so patently vicious a virtue, as MacIntyre here claims, or does it only have 
the semblance of courage, a counterfeit, a simulacrum, as Thomas Aquinas would have 
it? The question was not merely abstract for Bonhoeffer, who, as we have seen (2.3.1), 
wrote, „The most shining virtues of the apostate are night-black compared to the darkest 
weakness of the faithful.‟270 Surely, the „courage‟ of the Nazi would be included here. It 
is a pity that in writing After Virtue MacIntyre did not apply to this question the 
criterion of teleology which he otherwise so often invoked; had he asked towards what 
this „courage‟ tended, it might have prompted a different stance regarding the 
relationship of the virtues. MacIntyre‟s account of the virtues in relationship to the 
practices fails to convince particularly when placed in the context of Nazi Germany. 
The love of music and art, of sciences, a highly developed sense of aesthetics, as well as 
industry, discipline and other positive traits are almost legendary among many of the 
leading Nazis who were involved in or responsible for a whole host of atrocities. Yet 
history does not suggest that they learned from the „practices‟ of music and the arts, etc. 
what might be called „moral virtues‟, or that the „practices‟ were points of moral contact 
which enabled re-education. Thus, at least in this respect, MacIntyre‟s account seems to 
be inadequate, even if the „practices‟ can offer training in virtue(s). 
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Beyond MacIntyre‟s notion of defining virtues in relationship to practices, his statement 
that a society is dependent on prior acceptance of some account of social and moral life 
is worth consideration. At the present time, with questions regarding corporate identity 
in the setting of a pluralist society, it seems improbable that widespread agreement on 
any such account might be achieved. Yet precisely because these are real challenges 
today, it would seem that there is an increasing awareness of the problems attending the 
lack of a shared account of what it means to be human, let alone how to depict society, 
or how to understand the moral life. In this setting, MacIntyre‟s words may seem almost 
a utopian dream, but they may yet provide an attractive, even evocative, and visionary 
statement of hope.
271
 
 
Another major strand of MacIntyre‟s account is the presupposition of a narrative 
construal of human life. This resonates widely in our culture, not least in theology with 
renewed interest both in how God‟s people are formed by the telling and retelling of 
God‟s story, as well as in how narrative passages in the Bible may be used appropriately 
to develop theology, and indeed in narrative forms of preaching and teaching. Whether 
such interest has come precisely in reaction to (or against) the increasing fragmentation 
of contemporary life, or from postmodern discontent with didactic and atomistic modes, 
the awareness is acute that a person is formed by the stories she has been told and tells 
about God, herself and the world. In the context of a number of current ethical 
discussions, gaining a sense of how the beginning and end of human life belong to the 
middle may be something which is best seen and articulated with the help of a sense of 
narrative unity. These issues are tangential to this study, although interesting, since 
Bonhoeffer concerned himself with such issues as abortion and euthanasia as they arose 
in the Nazi context in his discussion of the natural life. Thus even if it seems necessary 
to set to one side MacIntyre‟s proposal in After Virtue of defining the virtues in 
relationship to „practices‟, his emphases on the need for a shared account of the social 
and moral life and on the importance of a narrative construal on human life bear further 
consideration, in comparison and contrast with the accounts of Augustine and Thomas 
Aquinas. 
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3.4: Three Rival Versions of Virtue Ethics? 
The accounts of virtue ethics found in Augustine, Thomas Aquinas and MacIntyre differ 
not only in their specifics, but in some of their major assumptions. Augustine‟s 
redefinition of the cardinal virtues as forms (order) of love is distinct from Thomas‟s 
adoption of the classical conception with the addition of infused (and) theological 
virtues. MacIntyre‟s account is different again, even if both he and Aquinas are indebted 
to Aristotle. Are these then, borrowing from MacIntyre, three rival versions of virtue 
ethics, or are there commonalities which make them compatible or even complementary 
rather than rival versions? 
 
While all three have as their framework some form of teleological eudaemonism, with 
emphasis on the nature of human flourishing and how it is achieved, there are 
differences in their notions of the human good. MacIntyre‟s account is, at heart, 
communal; he is concerned with society as a whole, and traditions and cultures. At the 
time of writing After Virtue, his teleology seemed focused on this life, and his 
discussion of the good for humans was, like Aristotle‟s, rooted in what a person can 
become here and now. This is very different from Augustine and Thomas, with their 
insistence that God is the supreme good which is only realised in the eschaton when a 
believer receives the face-to-face (or beatific) vision of God. 
 
Similarly, how human beings may attain the supreme good is different in the three 
accounts. For Augustine, a person is utterly dependent on grace to be able to will or do 
such good as she knows. She is to exercise virtues, but she is dependent on grace to be 
able to do so, and they must to some degree be infused by God. For Thomas the 
theological virtues must be infused, and a person cannot attain the supreme good 
without them, but she is capable to a large degree of acquiring the cardinal virtues. This 
is an issue which carries little weight in MacIntyre. He is concerned in After Virtue with 
how a society promotes, values, teaches and learns virtues, and seems to assume that 
there is no difficulty doing so. By the time he has adopted a Thomist view, he 
emphasizes the potential of a dialectical approach to overcome differences in ethical 
theory and does not deal directly with these issues in virtue theory. 
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The differences and similarities in these accounts are of particular interest in the context 
of this study, since some basic definition is required before it is possible to explore how 
Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics may be related to virtue ethics. What, then, can one say is 
necessary for a construal of ethics to be rightly classed as virtue ethics in the Christian 
tradition? No doubt certain issues which pertain to the person are essential: character, 
character formation, what it means to be human, and what the (supreme) human good 
is.
272
 This perspective will include development, which necessitates a view over time, so 
a narrative account may be useful, even if it is not strictly necessary. An approach 
which sees life in its entirety may also be helpful, though like Thomas one must accept 
that only God truly has that view. Teleology is also an integral part, both in the sense of 
looking towards what/who a person is becoming, and in the sense of recognising that a 
human‟s goal is one which can only be fully attained/granted beyond this life, being 
formed in the likeness of Christ.
273
  
 
An important consideration is whether it is necessary for virtue ethics to have aretaic 
notions, good or excellent traits, at its heart. This may be generally assumed, yet 
Hauerwas‟ distinction between virtue (or character) and virtues (character traits) and his 
proposal to base ethics on the former rather than the latter makes it possible to speak of 
„virtue ethics‟ without sustained focus on particular virtues.   
 
Furthermore, there is the question of the purpose of an ethic. If a theory is to help 
analyse behaviour, the discussion of issues internal to the agent, such as motives, is 
important.
274
 Yet according to Aristotle and Aquinas, the point of moral enquiry is 
living rather than merely understanding the moral life; thus progress in enquiry is 
dependent on growth in virtue. In this case attention should be paid to how such growth 
occurs and may be fostered. 
 
As well as having different starting points in philosophy (Augustine with Neo-
Platonism, Aquinas with Averroist/Aristotelian philosophy and MacIntyre with 
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awareness of all of those as well as numerous others), there is a complex relationship 
between their starting points in Christian doctrine. Thus Thomas built on what he knew 
of Augustine, and MacIntyre, latterly, has adopted a Thomist tradition. All of this makes 
for complex relationships between them, as well as wide areas of overlap in thought. 
 
Another important area to consider is how to define the complex relationship between 
law and virtue. One broad area of real difference is the consideration of how law relates 
to virtue. In Augustine the two greatest commandments have such a central place that he 
is often seen as a kind of deontologist. Thomas treats law as it relates to the eternal law, 
with which human laws may or may not be in accordance, and whether or not they are 
binding will depend on this relationship. One often speaks of „natural law‟ in Thomas, 
but, as mentioned before, „nature‟ is that which is God-given and is never seen 
separately from God or „supernature‟.  Meanwhile, MacIntyre does not speak at length 
about the role of law in his own proposals.
275
 This may be due to his more prominent 
concerns about learning virtues (After Virtue), rationality (Whose Justice?) and 
overcoming incommensurability (Three Rival Versions), but the interplay between law 
and virtue is discussed only generally in terms of MacIntyre‟s approval of Aristotle‟s 
notion that communities require both lists of virtues and laws prohibiting certain actions 
(because virtues alone do not ensure a well-ordered society) (151-2, 200). There seems 
little doubt that some account is necessary, yet proposals vary widely, not just among 
the three thinkers I‟ve treated in some detail, but among others as well. 276  
  
3.5: Questions from Bonhoeffer 
Having considered virtue ethics in three distinct construals, it is now necessary to see if 
the questions raised in the last chapter when looking at Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics can be 
addressed. 
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3.5.1: Is a virtue-based ethic necessarily a private one? Is it 
necessarily legalistic? How is it related to the hypocrisy Bonhoeffer 
calls ‘Phariseeism’?  
To answer whether virtue ethics is necessarily private, some brief observations about 
what Bonhoeffer meant by „private‟ must suffice. Bonhoeffer‟s concern is that a 
„virtuous‟ person would seek to do good according to her ability and opportunity, and 
avoid doing anything evil; yet in the context of Nazi Germany he sees such a person as 
turning a blind eye and a deaf ear to the injustices perpetrated all around.
277
 So I take it 
that the „private‟ virtue here would exclude anything involving the public arena, 
political action or speech, or involvement in others‟ affairs. Insofar such a distinction 
between „private‟ and „public‟ would seem to be not wholly unrelated to the kind of 
two-sphere thinking common in Lutheranism at that time, which separated the church 
and from the world, and which Bonhoeffer utterly rejected.
278
 If this is right, perhaps 
Bonhoeffer‟s comments about private virtuosity are aimed as much against the „private‟ 
aspect as the „virtuosity‟. Surely any such discrepancy or dualism between one area of 
life and another would receive similar treatment from Bonhoeffer. Yet, even if this 
surmise is correct, is virtue ethics necessarily private?  
 
From what we have seen regarding the centrality of the dual commandments to love 
God and neighbour in Augustine‟s understanding of ethics, it seems clear that such 
virtue ethics could not be accused of supporting the kind of virtuosity which could 
happily ignore others‟ distress. The love of neighbour which God commands is defined 
by Augustine as both doing no malice (which might be true of Bonhoeffer‟s privately 
virtuous person) and as neglecting no good, which is far removed from stopping one‟s 
ears and closing one‟s eyes to horrors all around. 
 
Similarly, in Thomas‟s careful treatment of act, it is clear that the omission of a good 
action is not simply a „neutral‟ act, but would require the full range of considerations 
regarding the objective, the circumstances, the motives, and so on, before one could 
speak of it as good, neutral or evil. Doubtless, ignoring the needs of others out of a 
desire to keep out of trouble with the authorities, which is at least one reading of the 
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motives of Bonhoeffer‟s privately virtuous person, would not be classed as good or 
neutral by Thomas any more than it was by Bonhoeffer.
279
 
 
The account offered in After Virtue is quite nuanced in this regard, for he is aware of the 
possibility of „virtues‟ being employed to evil ends.280 It is partially with this in mind 
that he speaks of the need for the virtues to be related to some conception of moral law, 
though of course there is no law to forbid the omission of help.
281
 More tellingly, he 
insists that it is the whole of a person‟s life which must be considered.282 With this 
holistic view, it would be difficult to speak of „virtue‟ if the whole of the person‟s life is 
marked by inaction in the face of injustice, or if that inaction could rightly be described 
as collusion with injustice. 
 
Thus Christian virtue ethics is certainly not necessarily private, and it may even be that 
the opposite could be claimed: ethics conceived in terms of virtue addresses omissions 
as much as commissions; the whole of a person and the totality of life is involved such 
that divisions of „private‟ and „public‟ cannot be allowed to stand.283 
 
Moving to the second question, to ask whether virtue ethics is legalistic involves some 
irony, given that the recent resurgence of virtue ethics has been fuelled in part by a 
desire to overcome certain forms of legalism.
284
 However, Bonhoeffer‟s critique of 
Roman Catholic moral theology as being „almost unbearably legalistic‟ is in reference 
to that church‟s teachings regarding the issues he was addressing in his section on 
marriage, including sterilization and contraception.
285
 Clearly he regarded the positions 
endorsed by Roman Catholic teaching not only as legalistic but also casuistic, but the 
question here is whether virtue ethics necessarily ends in legalism and/or casuistry.
286
 
Certainly, although Augustine worked with a form of virtue ethics, he at no point seems 
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to work casuistically, let alone legalistically. Similarly, many more contemporary virtue 
ethicists would even say that different virtuous persons might (for reasons of varying 
personal constitution or circumstance etc.) choose different courses of action in similar 
situations, a notion which surely rejects any possibility of legalism. (Of course such a 
position could lead to casuistry if one then tried to elucidate the features of the various 
agents or circumstances which would require a virtuous person to act one way or the 
other, but such an attempt need not be made at all.) 
 
Yet to answer this question satisfactorily it is necessary to ask further how virtue ethics 
is related to rules more generally, and here MacIntyre‟s comments may be helpful: rules 
should be formulated in terms of the telos for human beings rather than as abstract or 
categorical commands; and negative rules provide boundaries in which the good can be 
found.
287
 As already mentioned, this is not wholly unlike Bonhoeffer‟s insistence that 
ethical decisions are boundary issues that must not be allowed to swamp all of life, and 
that God‟s command (permission to live as humans) is for the entirety of human life, 
not just those parts which are seen as morally good or bad. From this it is possible to say 
not only that virtue ethics is not necessarily legalistic, but that in some formulations 
there may be affinities with Bonhoeffer‟s own notion of how ethics for the whole of life 
is related to rules.  
 
Thus, virtue ethics should not be considered private or legalistic. Yet can it defend itself 
against the charge of hypocrisy? In „The Love of God and the Decay of the World‟ 
when Bonhoeffer speaks of Pharisees, it is to say that they recognize only their virtues 
and vices, not the infinitely more important fact that they have fallen away from God.
288
 
So the question must be asked whether a virtue-based ethic so focuses the agent on her 
development of virtues (or ridding herself of vices) that what is essential in terms of her 
relationship to God might be lost from view. To answer this, it may be helpful to recall 
Oliver O‟Donovan‟s comments regarding the distinction between one‟s understanding 
of ethics (in his case, eudaemonism) and epistemology (specifically, how one discovers 
what indeed may lead to human flourishing). Similarly here, it is important to 
distinguish between the form of ethical thinking (virtue ethics) and the focus and 
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motivation of the agent (which need not be the acquisition of virtues).
289
 Just as 
Burnaby noted that loving because it is commanded is not actually love, it is certainly 
the case that the motive for action in a truly virtuous person cannot simply be the desire 
to be virtuous. According to St Augustine, the only virtuous motive is the desire (the 
weight or pull of love) to love God and neighbour. Thus it is possible, and in relation to 
Bonhoeffer it is important, in Christian ethics to say that the agent‟s focus is not on 
acquiring virtues or eradicating vices, but on God in Christ and the love for God and 
neighbour which follows. 
 
3.5.2: Is virtue ethics necessarily an example of humans trying to 
reach God?  
In the previous chapter (2.3.1) it became apparent that there is a potential problem 
regarding whether virtue ethics should be seen as a form of „religion‟ in the sense of the 
Barthian critique of human attempts at approaching God (instead of relying on God‟s 
gracious self-revelation and coming to humanity). If the starting point of virtue ethics is 
necessarily the question of how a person can be/become good (and thereby please God, 
or merit her salvation), then this critique may well apply. Again, O‟Donovan‟s 
comments are apposite: the quest for human happiness may not be the starting point 
most appropriate to Christian ethics, and humans cannot discover „the whole of our 
Christian duty by consulting our self-interest, even though the whole of our Christian 
duty does serve our self-interest.‟290 In looking at Augustine, Thomas and MacIntyre it 
was apparent that each of these writers did accept this legacy of classical philosophy, 
yet it is important to note that not every conception of Christian virtue ethics has this 
starting point. Moreover, even if virtue ethics is situated within a eudaemonistic 
conceptual framework, this does not necessarily result in the expectation of reaching 
God through human effort. This being so, virtue ethics is not necessarily a form of 
„religion‟ in Barth‟s sense. 
 
 
3.5.3: Is virtue ethics necessarily based on natural law?  
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The question regarding natural law is more vexed: for Bonhoeffer, natural law seems to 
have been opposed to revelation in a way which many would now find questionable.
291
 
Furthermore he seems to have assumed that St Thomas based his ethics on (this 
negative understanding of) natural law, an assumption which is problematic.
292
 For 
Thomas natural reasoning or natural law would be incomprehensible apart from 
theology, since human reasoning is at all events a gift of God and since he employed it 
in attempt to understand things of God‟s creation.  
 
In the case of Augustine‟s teaching, we have seen that at the time of writing De moribus 
ecclesiae his thought was often led by the concerns of philosophy or natural reasoning, 
and in places Christian teaching and biblical emphases were even distorted. However, 
his later works become increasingly dependent on biblical teaching and revelation, 
while still holding to the foundations of virtue ethics. Thus from the later Augustine it is 
possible to state that virtue ethics is not necessarily based on natural law. Likewise, 
Hauerwas‟ conception of an ethic of character is not grounded in natural law. Thus, 
whether or not Bonhoeffer‟s assumptions about natural law should be seen to be correct, 
his objection to it need not be a stumbling block for seeing his ethics as related to virtue 
ethics. 
 
3.5.4: How might virtue ethics relate to the question of how Christ 
takes form among us here and today? Is virtue ethics necessarily 
abstract, or a form of system, or based on an abstract catalogues of 
virtues? 
If one of Bonhoeffer‟s central emphases, concretion, is articulated in the question of 
how Christ takes form among us here and today, it is worth considering how virtue 
ethics might address this. It may be possible to construct theories involving the virtues 
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being acquired through the training of habits or being infused by God, thus leading to a 
virtuous character which might be shown to be in some way in likeness to Christ. Such 
a formulation might be possible drawing on St Augustine‟s early writing, seeing Christ 
as virtue, wisdom and truth. However, I imagine Bonhoeffer would utterly reject such a 
proposal as being abstract: it is not immediately clear how such virtues relate to the 
person of Jesus Christ, incarnate, crucified and resurrected, nor how virtue ethics so 
formulated relates to Christ‟s winning form in the believer.  
 
Yet it might be possible, still drawing on Augustine, for a virtue-based ethic to speak 
convincingly of how Christ wins form among us: that through closeness to God, God‟s 
own holiness, truth and love may so pervade the believer‟s character that she becomes 
more and more Christ-like. Glossing this further, suggesting that it is precisely Jesus 
Christ (not abstract notions of God, such as holiness and truth, but the historical person 
Bonhoeffer refers to as incarnate, crucified and risen) whom she follows and who 
transforms her, it is possible to claim that virtue ethics might say more than most 
models of ethical thinking about how Christ wins form among us. Indeed the tradition 
has long been concerned with how a person is trained in the virtues, the kinds of 
influences and commitments required for her to gain the virtues. For such an account to 
relate well to Bonhoeffer‟s ethics, a fuller account would be needed regarding the 
relationship of justification and sanctification in virtue ethics, an area which will be 
addressed in the next chapter. 
 
Concerning abstract ethics, the forms of virtue ethics expounded both by Augustine and 
Thomas would seem to be characterised often by abstractions, with Augustine referring 
to Christ as virtue and wisdom, for instance, and Thomas using Aristotelian categories. 
Nonetheless, it is also possible to suggest that even in their accounts the seeds are 
present which could grow into a less abstract form. I have already suggested that 
Augustine‟s notions of conformation to the good could be made less abstract by 
concentration on the person of Jesus Christ rather than abstract notions such as wisdom 
and virtue. In Thomas Aquinas‟s account, one could emphasize his awareness of the 
plethora of circumstances which border any ethical act: who the agent is and who any 
other people are who might be affected by an act is important in his understanding, as 
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are other questions of place, means of acting, timing, and so on. Such construals would 
not be open to the charge of being abstracted from Christ or real life.
293
 
 
Yet it may be of greater help to draw on the Hellenistic notion of philosophy as a way 
of life, not an abstract mode of thought. This could apply at least as well to a follower of 
Christ using virtue ethics: she cannot learn more about the virtues without acquiring 
them, and she cannot learn more about how Christ wins form among us without 
focusing on him. Thus I believe it is possible both to formulate virtue ethics in ways 
which are not abstract, and to live in such a way that moral enquiry is not in any way 
abstracted from Christ or everyday life. 
 
The question regarding systems overlaps in some ways with the previous question, 
given that certain forms of system are clearly abstract. We have, however, already seen 
that Augustine does not expound any system, and that Thomas‟s „system‟ is not closed, 
self-referential, or constructed to deduce answers from first principles. Thus it seems 
right to say that if this is to be called a „system‟, it not of the kind Bonhoeffer found 
objectionable. Likewise, MacIntyre‟s attempt at formulating virtue ethics in a fresh 
way, while it is wide-ranging, is not systematic, and in the later parts of his trilogy he 
was quite as forthright in his rejection of such systems as Bonhoeffer. Thus this 
question also can confidently be answered, no. 
 
The question regarding an abstract catalogue of virtues could be answered positively if 
Thomas Aquinas‟s treatment of virtue ethics were seen to be normative. There is no 
doubt that he has a „catalogue‟, the four cardinal virtues and the three theological 
virtues; and there is little doubt that each of these could be seen as abstract concepts.
294
 
Other accounts, however, are less open to this criticism. Augustine‟s redefinition of the 
cardinal virtues as forms of love would make it difficult to speak of a „catalogue‟ at all, 
and MacIntyre‟s emphasis on how we might learn virtues means that he undermines any 
perceived importance of such a catalogue. Furthermore, Hauerwas‟s emphasis on virtue 
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(or character) rather than the virtues offers an account which avoids any catalogue of 
virtues.
295
 Thus virtue ethics need not be based on an abstract catalogue of virtues. 
 
In view of all these things, virtue ethics need not be abstract, or based on a system, or 
involve an abstract catalogue of virtues. Importantly, virtue ethics may be well able to 
articulate how Christ takes form among us here and today. Thus although some care 
may be needed in how virtue ethics is articulated, it need not be antithetical to 
Bonhoeffer‟s insistence on concrete ethics. 
 
3.5.5: Does virtue ethics demand a view of human nature in general 
and human reason in particular which Bonhoeffer would perceive to 
give too little account of the Fall? Is virtue ethics opposed in some 
way to grace that one must categorize Bonhoeffer’s thought as not 
one but the other? 
It may be that Bonhoeffer‟s criticisms of St Thomas‟s theology did not fully do justice 
to Aquinas‟s understanding of human nature as fallen and in need of grace to receive the 
beatific vision. Yet this observation cannot be the only answer to the first question, 
since there are too few references in Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics to Thomas to be sure just what 
Bonhoeffer believed about his theology. Yet whether or not Bonhoeffer‟s estimation of 
Thomas‟s anthropology is right or not, virtue ethics does not necessarily demand 
Thomas‟s position. Augustine‟s emphasis on the Fall and its effects in his later works 
makes it impossible to claim that his view of human nature (and reason) would be seen 
by Bonhoeffer as giving too little attention to human nature as fallen. Thus if I am right 
in suggesting that Augustine is best seen as advocating a form of virtue ethics, the 
answer to this question is a firm „no‟. 
 
In a related matter, the question of grace, though it comes last in my list from the 
previous chapter, is by no means the least important, given that the Reformation 
assertion of sola gratia is of central importance to Bonhoeffer‟s theology as a whole. If 
it could be demonstrated that virtue ethics were in some fashion opposed to grace there 
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could be no possibility of seeing his ethics as related to virtue ethics.
296
 Certainly in 
Hellenistic forms there is no sense that humans are not utterly capable in their own 
strength of acquiring all such virtues as might be seen as needful for living a happy, 
flourishing life. Yet despite the young Augustine‟s use of this framework, even at the 
early stage when he was writing De moribus ecclesiae he underscored the need for 
grace to live virtuously.
297
 In his later writings he emphasized this more, to the point of 
seeing both love and indeed all virtues as forms of grace, while still maintaining the 
basic outlines of his earlier virtue ethics. 
 
Similarly, we have seen that Thomas Aquinas stated repeatedly that the most needful 
virtues can only be infused, not acquired through human effort, and even those which 
can be acquired through practice may also be infused. Thus both of the Christian 
writers, despite their dependence on various forms of Greek philosophy, are well aware 
of human dependence on God‟s grace at least for receiving the beatific vision, and 
perhaps for any development of virtues. 
 
3.6: Conclusion 
Having followed up, in the light of these three major treatments of virtue ethics, the 
questions which arose out of an exploration of how Bonhoeffer treated important 
themes in this tradition, it is possible to say that there is nothing which would preclude 
the possibility of seeing Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics as being in some way related to virtue 
ethics. However, for that to be possible it will be necessary to discuss the relation of 
virtue ethics to sanctification, and examine how Bonhoeffer sees the relationship 
between justification and sanctification, which will be the first task of the next chapter. 
There I shall also explore the ways in which his ethics shows affinities with virtue 
ethics, and the specific themes which seem most closely related, and finally I shall 
examine his method for addressing concrete issues to see how this relates to virtue 
ethics. 
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Chapter 4: Bonhoeffer’s Ethics as 
Virtue Ethical 
 
4.1: Introduction 
Thus far we have seen in chapter two that in Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics the notion of „virtue‟ 
is often used negatively or ambiguously (2.3.1). Yet Bonhoeffer‟s use of the term 
„virtue‟, his references to the Thomist tradition, and his allusions to classical philosophy 
and myths are all so nuanced that it would be incautious to assume therefore that 
Bonhoeffer necessarily rejected virtue ethics as it might be conceived now (2.3.1-3). 
However, such evidence internal to his Ethics is also not sufficient to speak 
unequivocally about the possibility of the presence of some correlation. 
 
Furthermore, we have seen that other commentators have been diverse in their 
assessment of Bonhoeffer‟s mode of conceiving of ethics (2.4). Nonetheless, those who 
take seriously the themes both of ethics as formation and ethics as command seem most 
faithful to Bonhoeffer‟s thought. Thus on the basis of the analyses of other 
commentators no case could be made for Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics to be seen as related to 
virtue ethics, but neither could such a case be conclusively refuted. 
 
Perhaps more importantly, we have seen in chapter three that issues raised in chapter 
two regarding the nature of virtue ethics which might have precluded any correlation 
between that and Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics were found not to be problematic: virtue ethics is 
not necessarily private, legalistic or „Pharisee-like‟; it is not an example of Barthian 
„religion‟; nor need it be based on natural law; it is not necessarily abstract; nor does it 
require a view of human nature which Bonhoeffer might think takes too little account of 
the Fall, but can emphasize the role of grace (3.5).  
 
The conclusion of these findings has been that, while no correlation has yet been shown, 
various possible objections to seeing Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics in relation to virtue ethics 
have not been substantiated.  
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In this chapter I shall first of all attend to the question which has already been raised as 
theologically necessary for virtue ethics in a Christian context, namely, how Bonhoeffer 
saw the relationship between justification and sanctification (4.2). Since virtue ethics is 
focused on the agent, and developing those qualities which enable right and good living, 
there is an obvious relationship theologically speaking to the question of sanctification. 
For if it is the case that a Christian is primarily enabled to act well in an atomistic way 
(being given grace to withstand this particular temptation, say), then virtue ethics cannot 
be the most natural form in which to think about how she lives well. However, if it is 
the case that God desires to make her holy (or, at least holier) in this life, to sanctify her, 
then this involves making her the kind of person who is able to act well, even in the face 
of this or that particular temptation. Such a theological stance would make virtue ethics 
a likely form for considering how Christians are to live.  
 
Following from the question of how Bonhoeffer sees the relation of justification and 
sanctification, I shall explore the concerns which seem to underlie the ethics 
manuscripts taken as a whole (4.3). The reason for doing this is that if there is any 
meaningful correlation between Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics and virtue ethics, this should be 
discernable in relationship to the concerns which seem to motivate his writing. 
 
I shall also ask if there are general aspects of his treatment of ethics which show 
possible relation to virtue ethics (4.4). Yet because not only general concerns are 
important to this study, I shall next look to see if there are specific themes in 
Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics which have a virtue-ethical flavour which might give real evidence 
for the existence of a correspondence between the two (4.5).  
 
Then, finally, I shall look at examples of applied ethics to see what methods can be 
discerned from his treatment of specific issues (4.6). This is of particular interest in 
showing the strength of relationship between Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics and virtue ethics. It 
would be possible, for instance, for an author to use the language of virtue ethics while 
developing concrete stances using arguments of another form. Therefore it will be 
interesting to see if Bonhoeffer goes about making his case regarding concrete issues in 
a way which is consonant with or even related to virtue ethics. 
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4.2: Justification and Sanctification 
In the previous chapter, I deferred further exploration of how virtue ethics relates to the 
question of how Christ takes form among us here and today until the nature of 
justification and sanctification in Bonhoeffer‟s thought has been explored. The reason 
for this is simply that virtue ethics in a Christian context must relate to sanctification, in 
that both presuppose the ongoing change and formation of the agent‟s actual 
character.
298
 Thus how Bonhoeffer viewed sanctification is of no small moment for this 
study. A claim made by David Fergusson holds good particularly if Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics 
is to be seen as related in some way to virtue ethics: „Attempts to articulate a 
contemporary doctrine of sanctification must surmount at least three obstacles,‟ which 
he names as charges of individualism, Pelagianism, and detachment from the concerns 
of the world.
299
 This, he claims, is because traditional accounts of growth in holiness 
have often seemed to emphasize an individual‟s private spiritual experience rather than 
the role of the community, have suffered from Reformation polemics which often 
placed sanctification in tension with justification, and have seemed to imply some 
rescue from a world presumed to be doomed.
300
 In this chapter Bonhoeffer‟s rejection 
of individualism (4.4.1) and his affirmation of humanity‟s utter dependence on grace 
(4.3.1) will both be demonstrated. His attention to the concerns of the world is 
addressed more obliquely in the following section (4.2.1).
301
 It will be seen then, that if 
Bonhoeffer does articulate a doctrine of sanctification, it will be one which avoids the 
obstacles named by Fergusson. 
 
4.2.1: Sanctification in earlier works 
In a sense, it is noteworthy that it is unproblematic to speak of Bonhoeffer‟s stance not 
only on justification but also sanctification, because it was not particularly common in 
his context to address this. Arvid Runestam claimed in 1929, „The concept of 
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discipleship is the step-child of Lutheran ethics.‟302 The word „discipleship‟ should not 
be misinterpreted as meaning something essentially different from the concept of 
sanctification. Both concepts require that the believer‟s behaviour is changed in the light 
of Christ by the working of the Holy Spirit.  
 
At least one of Bonhoeffer‟s teachers was also aware of this lack in Lutheran teaching. 
Adolf von Harnack stated,  
Luther is not responsible for the comfortable misunderstanding which arose out 
of that [the doctrine that good works are unnecessary for salvation]; but from the 
very beginning one has had to lament over moral laxity and a lack of seriousness 
regarding sanctification in the German Reformation churches. The saying, „If 
you love me, keep my commandments‟ receded inappropriately. The Pietist 
movement was the first to recognize once again its central importance. Until 
then, in opposition to the Catholic „works righteousness‟, the pendulum of 
behaviour was swung precariously on the opposite side. Yet religion is not only 
conviction, but rather conviction and deed, faith which is active in sanctification 
and love: that is what the Protestant Christians must learn more securely if they 
are not to be shamed.
303
 
 
Given this insight, one might expect that he would treat sanctification or ethics 
seriously, yet in the same book, whose title means „the essence of Christianity‟, there is 
hardly any reference to ethics at all, let alone sanctification.
304
 Yet in his defence one 
must note that other theologians categorically discounted the possibility of speaking of 
Christian ethics.
305
 
 
Thus it is indeed noteworthy that it is possible to speak of sanctification within 
Bonhoeffer‟s work from very early in his career. In his doctoral dissertation, he holds 
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justification and sanctification together in discussing ecclesiology, not expounding their 
relationship, but using them to make another point: 
Real sanctification is merely a sign of the last things. Here we are still walking 
in faith in God‟s gracious judgement on our doing. Here the centre is 
justification, not sanctification (although the former is not real without the 
beginning of the latter). That is, here we see only our sin and believe in our 
sanctity.
306
 
 
Even at this early stage in his theological development, Bonhoeffer shows an insistence 
on the intrinsic relationship between justification and sanctification, whilst holding open 
the eschatological dimension of the completion of sanctification.  
 
In his early insistence on the necessary relationship between justification and 
sanctification, he may well have been influenced by Karl Holl‟s interpretation of 
Luther. As Andreas Pangritz sates,  
Not least foundational for Bonhoeffer‟s own understanding of Luther was 
probably Holl‟s interpretation of justification as truly being made righteous, as 
found in his book on Luther: „The goal which God pursues in justification is 
only then reached when he has made the person truly righteous. Justification and 
being made righteous belong intrinsically together.‟307  
 
Whatever the source for Bonhoeffer‟s thinking, what is important is that he did hold the 
two together in his early writing.  
 
However, it is in Discipleship that he makes the unity of justification and sanctification 
most explicit. In Eberhard Bethge‟s estimation, Discipleship, written during 
Bonhoeffer‟s time as head of a seminary of the Confessing Church, was intended to 
address the question of justification and sanctification, and to recover Luther‟s teaching 
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of sola fide, sola gratia.
308
 Bonhoeffer wrote to Barth while he was working on the 
book, saying that he had been having a dialogue in his own mind with the older scholar 
about the nature of justification and sanctification in Pauline theology and in the 
interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount.
309
 Barth‟s reply was to say that he „never 
could, nor wished to deny‟ the doctrine of sanctification, but that he nevertheless had 
concerns about the concrete treatment, specifically that it might suggest its „realisation 
in some sphere which is humanity‟s own‟.310 In other words, Barth was concerned that 
an articulation of the doctrine of sanctification might place an emphasis on human 
activity rather than divine. In Godsey‟s view, Discipleship „represented Bonhoeffer‟s 
above-mentioned silent controversy with Barth over the question of the relationship 
between justification and sanctification.‟311 There can be little doubt that Bethge and 
Godsey are right about Bonhoeffer‟s intention in Discipleship to discuss justification 
and sanctification.
312
  Here he argues with forceful words against any notion of 
justification which does not include sanctification: „We have gathered like ravens 
around the carcass of cheap grace; from it we received the poison which killed the 
discipleship of Jesus among us.‟313 
 
Indeed, Bonhoeffer‟s focus in Discipleship is on the necessity of recognising the 
costliness of grace, not presuming upon a cheap grace which demands nothing of the 
believer. Christian Gremmels sees Bonhoeffer as following Luther‟s own theology in 
this, which he summarises as: „Because we have received unmeritedly our justification 
from God, therefore we can, as a result of this, do what is righteous among people.‟314  
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Gremmels notes that Bonhoeffer recognised in the years of the church struggle that 
Lutheranism had lost its heart, the connection of justification and doing what is 
righteous. „Out of the Because-Therefore came an If-Why: If I have already been 
declared righteous anyway, why should I still have to do anything?‟315 This, of course, 
is simply another way of stating the problem of cheap grace. 
 
Although Discipleship is one of Bonhoeffer‟s best-loved works and has become a 
modern classic of spirituality, there is often a discernible discomfort among scholars 
with regard to this book. One reason, apart from scorn for the popular, could well be his 
seemingly direct and non-academic style of writing with little mention of his „dialogue 
partners‟.  
 
Another possible reason for the general lack of scholarly interest in Discipleship, 
however, may relate to his comments in prison: in a letter to Bethge of 21 July 1944, he 
wrote of his earlier desire to learn to have faith by trying to live something like a holy 
life. „I probably wrote Discipleship as the end of that path. Today I see clearly the 
dangers of this book, though I stand now as then by what I wrote.‟316 As Ann Nickson 
said, many commentators overemphasize the dangers without giving due attention to the 
fact that he still stood by what he had written.
317
 They seem to suggest that in his new 
understanding, this had been an attempt to escape from the world and live a holy life in 
quasi-monastic seclusion. Yet given that Bonhoeffer still stood by what he wrote, the 
comment surely must not be read as a retraction, even if he would from his perspective 
in prison have wanted to add some caveat. Certainly, part of the change in Bonhoeffer‟s 
thought relates to living fully in the world, because after the above quote he continues, 
„Later I experienced, and I am still experiencing right up to this very hour, that it is only 
in the full this-worldliness of living that one learns to believe.‟318 Yet, I am not 
convinced that a changed perspective regarding living fully in the world is truly the 
thrust of his comments and partial revision. He goes on to say,  
When one has fully given up on making something of oneself, whether it be a 
saint, or a repentant sinner, or a churchman (a so-called priestly figure!), a 
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righteous or an unrighteous person, a sick or a healthy person – and this is what I 
call this-worldliness, namely living in the fullness of tasks, questions, successes 
and failures, experiences and perplexities – then one completely throws oneself 
into the arms of God, then one no longer takes seriously one‟s own sufferings 
but the sufferings of God in the world, then one watches with Christ in 
Gethsemane, and I think, that is faith, that is metanoia; and so one becomes a 
human being, a Christian (cf. Jer. 45!). How could one become incautious in 
success, or mad through failure, when one shares in this life in God‟s 
sufferings?
319
 
 
Bonhoeffer refers in this letter to his study in America and conversations with Jean 
Lasserre at that time, his development and work during his training of seminarians, and 
his further experience in the time of his involvement with the conspiracy and finally his 
imprisonment. His increasing sense of the Christian life as being „this-worldly‟ is 
important here, referring to it as not „the shallow and banal this-worldliness of the 
enlightened, the busy, the comfortable, or the lascivious, but the profound this-
worldliness, which is full of discipline and the constant awareness of death and 
resurrection.‟320 Yet this does not tell the whole story of what Bonhoeffer probably 
meant with regard to „dangers‟ of this book. For the conversation with Lasserre to 
which he refers is about what they wanted to do with their lives. The French pastor 
wanted to become a saint; Bonhoeffer wanted to learn to believe, and later thought he 
might do so by living a holy life. I think the greatest danger he saw in prison was that of 
trying to make something (no matter what) of oneself.
321
  
 
How, then, does this understanding of the „dangers‟ of Discipleship affect how one 
should view his account of justification and sanctification in that work? The answer to 
this question is dependent on how sanctification itself is understood. For if 
sanctification is seen in terms of the believer having to try to become something it is 
clear that Bonhoeffer had distanced himself from that by the time he was in prison.
322
 
However, another text from prison, „Thoughts for Baptism‟ would suggest that he had 
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not changed his mind on sanctification. He wrote there, „our being Christian will consist 
now in two things: in praying and in doing what is righteous before people.‟323 
Therefore, it is important to look at how he treats justification and sanctification in the 
Ethics, to see if the views he expressed there would also seem to fall under his concern 
about making something of oneself. 
 
4.2.2: Sanctification in the Ethics 
4.2.2.a: ‘Christ, Reality and the Good ’  
In the first manuscript, „Christ, Reality and the Good‟, Bonhoeffer undermines in 
important ways all ethical systems, especially those dependent on a dualistic conception 
of reality. He states,  
In the place which in other ethics is characterized by the opposition of „should 
be‟ and „is‟, of „idea‟ and „realisation‟, of „motive‟ and „deed‟, in Christian 
ethics becomes the relationship between reality and becoming real, of past and 
present, of history and event (faith), or to utter instead of terms capable of many 
interpretations the clear name of the matter itself: of Jesus Christ and the Holy 
Spirit (34).
324
  
 
Inherent in this claim is not only the rejection of dualisms found in secular ethics, but 
also any dualism between justification (as the work of Jesus Christ, completed in 
history, reality) and sanctification (as the work of the Holy Spirit, ongoing in believers 
in the present, still becoming real).
325
 Later in this manuscript, as he argues against the 
then current notion of „two kingdoms‟ (which involved a stark division between what 
was secular, in which the church could have no say, and what was sacred, which was 
largely seen to be private life and about which the church was allowed to speak) 
Bonhoeffer is happy to speak directly of sanctification. In this context he states that the 
first concern of every Christian must not be simply to „live a pious life‟ but to be a  
witness of Jesus Christ to the world. The Holy Spirit equips those, to whom he 
gives himself. That such a witness to the world can only happen in the right way, 
when it comes from a sanctified life in the church of God, is a self-evident 
precondition (50).  
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Such a usage of the word „sanctified‟ should, of course, not be overburdened by great 
claims that this passage is really about sanctification. Clearly it is not, except in terms of 
how sanctification relates to his main concern here of the church‟s need, because of who 
it is, to be reaching out to the world, for there to be visible, holy deeds that point to 
Jesus Christ.
326
 This brief reference to a sanctified life indicates in nuce important 
emphases for Bonhoeffer: sanctification is the work of the Holy Spirit, and takes place 
within the context of the Christian community.  
 
4.2.2.b: ‘Ethics as Formation ’ 
The manuscript and theme of „Ethics as Formation‟ is the one some have already 
suggested might be seen to be related to virtue ethics.
327
 One might therefore expect to 
find more sustained passages relating to sanctification. In this manuscript Bonhoeffer 
memorably depicts a variety of ethical types, only to show how each of them fails and 
must fail in the exceptional circumstances of Nazi Germany. Instead of trusting to 
reason, fanaticism, conscience, private virtuosity, or even acting in one‟s own freedom, 
all of which he likens to rusty weapons, Bonhoeffer points to the shining ones of 
simplicity and cleverness, drawing on Matthew 10:16 (64-70). After giving a 
Christological preface, he begins to unfold his theme of ethics as formation, or more 
precisely, as being conformed to Christ or as Christ winning form in the believer.  
The form of Jesus Christ wins form in the person. The person does not win his 
own independent form, but what gives him form and sustains him in the new 
form is always only the form of Jesus Christ himself. It is therefore not some 
aping imitation, nor a repetition of his form, but his own form which wins form 
in the person (83).  
 
This manuscript and its theme are important in looking at sanctification in the Ethics, 
despite the fact that there is no overt discussion of the topic. Nonetheless, it is clear that 
Bonhoeffer expects that the believer will be in some way truly and visibly changed 
through being conformed to the person of Jesus Christ, and this is surely another way of 
speaking of being sanctified.
328
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4.2.2.c: ‘Ultimate and Penultimate Things ’  
Yet if „Ethics as Formation‟ is an implicit account of sanctification, the theme of the 
ultimate and the penultimate is the context in which Bonhoeffer is explicit about 
justification and sanctification. Sadly, the relationship between his notion of the 
ultimate and the penultimate and the doctrine of justification and sanctification has not 
been apparent to all of Bonhoeffer‟s interpreters, but the following should make this 
correlation clear.
329
 He defines the ultimate (final both temporally and qualitatively) as 
the justification of the sinner by grace (137-40). The penultimate is potentially all of 
earthly life, which cannot lead to the ultimate but can either prepare for it or can place 
hindrances in the path of Christ‟s coming to justify sinners (141-2).330 There are two 
categories he considers under the penultimate, being human and being good (151).
331
  
 
Penultimate things are discussed for the sake of the ultimate, and another way of 
speaking about this pair is Vorbereitung und Einzug: preparation and entry, words he 
thought of using for the title of his book at one stage (153, note 55), which are borrowed 
from ecclesial Advent language and from Isaiah. Christ prepares his own way and his 
coming cannot be forced or prevented by human activity, but „we can oppose his 
coming in mercy‟ or we can prepare the way (154). Thus he advocates whatever 
supports humanity and goodness as being part of preparing the way for Christ‟s coming. 
„Only the coming of the Lord will bring the fulfilment of being human and being good‟ 
(157).  
 
Although Bonhoeffer begins by defining the ultimate as justification, he does not work 
through in detail how his account of ultimate and penultimate relates to justification and 
sanctification. The ultimate as justification is quite clear: it is God‟s final word, 
qualitatively different from all that might precede it (140). The temporal finality is 
important because it counters any tendency towards a „cheap grace‟ (141): since 
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justification is only ever the final word, there is no possibility of reasoning, „since I am 
saved, therefore it doesn‟t matter what I do.‟332 The qualitative finality is equally 
important because it demands that there is no continuity between the penultimate and 
justification, that nothing a person does can force (or indeed hinder) the coming of 
Christ. This is grace, and it is a sovereign act of God. Thus in one succinct definition 
Bonhoeffer safeguards justification by faith, rejecting any notion of works 
righteousness. 
This he does, however, without ceding any ground regarding the necessity of a 
sanctified life:  
Christ comes indeed, and creates his own way, whether the person is ready for it 
or not. No one can prevent his coming, but we can oppose his coming in grace. 
There are conditions of the heart and life and the world which particularly hinder 
the reception of grace, that is which make it infinitely more difficult to be able to 
believe. We say, „make difficult, hinder‟, but not „make impossible‟, and we also 
know indeed that even the straight way, the removal of hindrances cannot force 
grace…. But all of this does not release us from preparing the way for the 
coming of grace, from removing all that hinders or makes it more difficult to 
come to faith (154). 
 
And in the next paragraph he continues:  
Yet all this does not exclude the task of preparation. It is rather a task of 
immeasurable responsibility for all who know of the coming of Jesus Christ. The 
hungry need bread, the homeless shelter, those denied their rights justice, the 
lonely companionship, those lacking discipline order, the slave freedom. It 
would be blasphemy against God and neighbour to leave the hungry starving 
because precisely the one in greatest need is closest to God. For the sake of the 
love of Christ, who belongs to the hungry as well as to me, we break bread with 
them, share shelter. When the hungry do not come to faith, the guilt falls on 
those who denied them bread. To get bread for the hungry is preparation for the 
coming of grace. It is something penultimate which is happening here.  
Giving the hungry bread does not mean proclaiming the grace of God 
and righteousness, and having received bread does not mean standing in faith. 
But for the one who does it for the sake of the ultimate, this penultimate stands 
in relationship to the ultimate (155). 
 
What I hope is clear from these passages is the utter seriousness with which Bonhoeffer 
upholds the doctrine of justification by grace, by faith, and not by works, as well as the 
uncompromising insistence on works of righteousness, exemplified by feeding the 
hungry, tending to those in poverty, giving shelter to the homeless, and so on, precisely 
because of belief in justification, „for the sake of the ultimate‟. He does not use the word 
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„sanctification‟ in this context, but his reference is still in terms of „being human‟ and 
„being good‟, and both are to be defined in Christ. Moreover, it is not the outcome for 
the neighbour thus served, but the motivation of the Christian („the one who does it for 
the sake of the ultimate‟) which allows Bonhoeffer to speak of acts as having 
penultimate character. From this it should be clear that the notion of preparing the way 
is closely related, if not identical, to sanctification. It is possible therefore to see that 
Bonhoeffer did not change his position expounded in Discipleship regarding 
justification and sanctification, but nor did he speak of the latter in the terms which he 
rejected in prison, namely an attempt to make something of oneself. Furthermore, the 
theme of the ultimate and penultimate is one which Bonhoeffer referred to in later 
manuscripts as well so that it must be accorded a fairly central place in his overall 
thought in the Ethics.
333
 
 
4.2.2.d: ‘The Natural Life ’  
It is not far-fetched to claim that the manuscript „The Natural Life‟ is a prolonged 
elaboration on the two things Bonhoeffer considered to be penultimate: being human 
and being good. As such it may be read as an exposition of what kind of life may be 
seen to be open to the coming of Christ in grace (natural, rather than what is unnatural, 
i.e. closed to Christ‟s coming, 165). Intriguingly, it is precisely in this manuscript where 
Bonhoeffer is able to do what he considers to be so important: to be concrete in 
addressing the burning issues of his time and place, such as euthanasia and forced 
sterilisation. Although Bonhoeffer does not speak directly of justification and 
sanctification, he continues to use the closely related one of the penultimate, being open 
to the coming of Christ. 
 
4.2.2.e: ‘History and the Good ’  
This manuscript (which may have been intended to replace „Inheritance and Decline‟334) 
contains in both of its versions some of the central ideas of Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics, 
including his insistence on a concrete ethic based on love, responsibility and grace. 
Again, although he does not specifically speak of justification and sanctification, he 
holds the two together without compromise. The Christian acts responsibly in freedom, 
not trusting in any principles for the justification of her actions, but relying on grace 
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(220). Yet the grace required for justification does not in any way obviate the need to 
act in a way that indicates sanctification. Everyone lives in relationships which give her 
responsibility for such action, which is choosing to do God‟s will (287-8). 
 
4.2.2.f: ‘The Love of God and the Decline of the World ’  
In this manuscript, written in late 1942 and clearly under the influence of having read 
Barth‟s Church Dogmatics II/2, Bonhoeffer‟s central concern is that Christian ethics 
can be only about doing the will of God. Human knowledge of good and evil, he claims 
in an argument very close to his earlier work Creation and Fall, is a product of the Fall 
(301-2). God-given simplicity (Einfalt) as seen in Jesus creates unity with God, the 
possibility of a right understanding of things and „direct action‟, a concern of his 
addressed in Act and Being (315-22).
335
 Again it is clear that Bonhoeffer is upholding 
the doctrine of justification by grace with the need for the believer to act in accordance 
with God‟s will. His terminology is not that of justification and sanctification, but in 
this manuscript also, Bonhoeffer holds the two together theologically. 
 
From this short look at how Bonhoeffer handles the issues of justification and 
sanctification and related concepts in the Ethics, it is clear that he at all times upholds 
the doctrine of justification by grace, and is careful to treat ethics not as works 
righteousness, but also as related to grace: Christ wins form in the Christian, the 
command of God frees her for simplicity of action in accordance with God‟s will. This 
is how „Christ takes form among us here and today‟. It is clear, even if he hardly uses 
that word, that Bonhoeffer expects the believer to be sanctified as much in his writing of 
the Ethics as he explicitly did in Discipleship. Moreover, if he was concerned about 
some element of „making something of oneself‟ in Discipleship, there is no hint of that 
in the way he treats sanctification in the Ethics. From all of which it is possible to say 
not only that Bonhoeffer‟s notion of sanctification meets all of Fergusson‟s criteria, but 
also that his theological stance offers a framework in which it is possible for virtue 
ethics to be present. 
 
I now turn to a consideration of how some of Bonhoeffer‟s overarching concerns 
expressed in the Ethics manuscripts relate to virtue ethics. This is to ensure that, if some 
                                                          
335
 See e.g. DBW 2:23, 48, 126, and 158-7. See also DBW 6:384, and 404, where Bonhoeffer returns to 
these themes.  
J. Moberly The Virtue of Bonhoeffer’s Ethics 127 
relationship to virtue ethics is to be established, it can be shown to relate to the broader 
outlines of his thought and not just to isolated themes. 
 
4.3: Overall concerns of Ethics 
In my reading of these manuscripts, I have tried to identify issues which seem to 
motivate Bonhoeffer‟s work, and it is his underlying aims rather than specific themes 
which I address in this section. The concerns which seem to drive much of his work 
include: the need to develop Christian theological foundations for ethics (4.3.1), 
especially its relation to grace (4.3.1.a), to Christ (4.3.1.b), and to the Fall (4.3.1.c); the 
need for a concrete ethic for his own time and place (4.3.2); the need to articulate the 
historical setting for his ethics (4.3.3); the need to explore the relation of the church and 
the world and how that affects ethical discourse (4.3.4); and the structures of ethical life 
(4.3.5). The questions regarding each of these concerns are how well they accord with 
virtue ethics, and how well working in a virtue-ethical mode would enable these 
concerns to be met. 
 
4.3.1: Christian foundation for ethics  
One of the overarching themes in Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics is elucidating a foundation for 
Christian ethics. Several of the manuscripts, both in earlier and later periods of writing, 
are devoted to developing a fully Christian foundation for ethics. „Christ, Reality and 
the Good‟, „Ethics as Formation‟, „Ultimate and Penultimate Things‟, „The Love of God 
and the Decline of the World‟, and „The “Ethical” and the “Christian” as a Theme‟ all 
attempt to make clear how ethics can be conceived within Christian doctrine. Thus 
systematic questions related to the role of grace, the Fall, and (not unrelatedly) 
justification and sanctification, all focused on the person of Jesus Christ, are central to 
the conception of ethics Bonhoeffer was attempting to articulate. Thus it is also crucial 
in this current study to show that seeing his ethics as related to virtue ethics would do no 
injustice to his theological concerns. 
 
4.3.1.a: Grace 
One of the foundational aspects which was deeply important to Bonhoeffer and which 
recurs throughout the manuscripts is that of justification by faith and the need to 
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establish ethics in such a way as not to undermine this central doctrine. Thus he 
emphasizes throughout the manuscripts human reliance on grace. In the first 
manuscript, „Christ, Reality and the Good‟ he underscores the centrality of grace in his 
conception of ethics by his use of the unusual word, Teilbekommen, to receive a share, 
to participate by gift (38). We have already seen his insistence in „Ethics as Formation‟ 
that it is Christ who wins form in the believer (4.2.2.b), as well as his safeguarding of 
the role of grace in his discussion of the penultimate (4.2.2.c). Unsurprisingly, 
throughout the manuscripts there is a clear emphasis on ensuring that ethics does not 
become a human work apart from grace. 
 
We have seen in the previous chapter that virtue ethics can be articulated in ways which 
uphold this doctrine (3.5.4). This can be done in two ways. The first is to highlight 
infused virtues rather than acquired virtues.
336
 This path would underscore the 
believer‟s dependence on God‟s gracious action and not allow for any whiff of works 
righteousness. Yet it could be open to just the abuses which Bonhoeffer sought to 
address in Discipleship and which still concerned him in writing the Ethics, namely 
cheap grace.  
 
The second, however, is to follow Bonhoeffer in his treatment of penultimate and 
ultimate in saying that the behaviours which one might call „virtuous‟ or see as a sign of 
sanctification in the agent‟s life do not lead to justification. His discussion of the 
relation of the penultimate and the ultimate may be a genuine contribution Bonhoeffer 
has to make to Christian virtue ethics by showing how sanctification (the practice of 
true virtue) is part and parcel of salvation.  
 
4.3.1.b: Christology 
Equally unsurprising is the fact that Christology is a central part of Bonhoeffer‟s 
foundation.
337
 Thus one of the two central strands of his ethics, ethics as formation, is 
focused on Christ. Bonhoeffer does not particularly hold before the reader a portrait of 
Christ as the gospels portray the actions and teachings of Jesus, but a dogmatic 
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 See 3.2.3.e regarding Thomas‟s treatment of virtues and his notion that the theological virtues must be 
given (infused) by God, while the cardinal virtues may be acquired either by practice (through human 
effort) or infused by God. 
337
 See e.g. Thomas F. Torrance, God and Rationality (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 78; Ernst 
Feil, The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, trans. Martin Rumscheidt (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), 
84-89; Godsey, Theology, 171-2, 205; and Nickson, Freedom, 145. 
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formulation: incarnate, crucified, and risen (70-83). Within this framework, Bonhoeffer 
is able to present a theology of incarnation and the acceptability before God of what is 
human and what belongs to human earthly life (which of course links closely with his 
treatment of the natural life), while at the same time showing that what is sinful comes 
under the judgement of God and that Christ was crucified to reconcile sinners to God, 
and to bring not only new life but new creation. This is the basic Christological 
emphasis which informs Bonhoeffer‟s concept of ethics as formation. „Being conformed 
to the incarnate One means being a real human being…. Being conformed to the 
crucified One means being a person judged by God…. Being conformed to the risen 
One means being a new person before God‟ (81-2).338  
 
Again, this theological foundation for ethics is one which is compatible with virtue 
ethics, as was seen in the previous chapter (3.5.3). Christological concerns can be 
included in virtue ethics by focusing on Christ himself as the example of what human 
virtuous living means. Thus one might not only ask the question „what would Jesus do?‟ 
but also „how would Jesus do this?‟ and „for what reasons would Jesus do this?‟ and so 
on. A myriad of accounts from the gospels may inform such thinking, but Bonhoeffer‟s 
(Barthian) dogmatic approach of thinking in terms of Incarnation, Crucifixion and 
Resurrection may also be seen as a kind of shorthand way of holding various aspects in 
balance. 
 
4.3.1.c: The Fall  
Another doctrine which has a foundational role is the Fall and its consequences for all 
of human life. It forms a central motif for the manuscript „The Love of God and the 
Decline of the World‟.339 One of the most intriguing ways in which Bonhoeffer uses the 
concept of the Fall is in averring that Christian ethics must not have as its goal the 
knowledge of good and evil, which according to Genesis 3 only became available to 
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 See also DBW 6:33 regarding the source of ethics as „the reality of God in his revelation in Jesus 
Christ‟, and DBW 6:34-5 and 40-1, where Bonhoeffer defines the good in terms of participating in the 
reality of God in Christ, and thereby encountering equally the reality of God and the world in Christ. See 
also his definition of the penultimate as everything which is open to the coming of Christ in mercy, DBW 
6:151-2. 
339
 See DBW 6:301, note 1 regarding the possibility that this manuscript was written with the intention of 
making it a preface or the first chapter. 
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humanity at the cost of separation from God.
 340
 Thus Christian ethics must bring the 
foundation of all other kinds of ethics into question and critical scrutiny (301-2).
341
  
 
This is another theological emphasis which virtue ethics, as we have already seen 
(3.5.4), can honour. Analogous to the traditional viewpoint that virtue ethics 
(philosophy) is a way of life, virtue as perhaps conceived by Bonhoeffer is shown and 
shaped by Christ (who wins form in the believer). Thus what is sought is not in the first 
instance „knowledge‟, but Christ himself. A more Thomistic conception might highlight 
the role of infused prudence in giving the believer right perception and thus an 
awareness of ethics not based on the fallen knowledge of good and evil. 
 
From all this it is possible to say that virtue ethics need not be a hindrance in the 
articulation of these foundational theological concerns. Both regarding grace and the 
effects of the Fall, it seems that Bonhoeffer potentially has real strengths to offer a 
Christian account of virtue ethics. In the case of Christology, however, it may be that 
virtue ethics has particular strengths which would support Bonhoeffer‟s emphases. 
 
4.3.2: Concrete Ethics 
We have seen that one of Bonhoeffer‟s concerns in the Ethics, to provide a Christian 
theological foundation for ethics, could be supported within a virtue-ethical framework. 
Another issue which appears throughout the manuscripts is his insistence that ethics 
must be specific to his time and place, not abstract.
342
  
 
In chapter two (2.3.4.a) I offered a summary of the variety of ways and places in which 
Bonhoeffer insisted on the need for ethics to be concrete,
343
 and in the previous chapter 
(3.5.3) we saw there is no doubt that virtue ethics need not be abstract. Indeed, its 
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 In this he follows closely his argument in DBW 3:84, 114. 
341
 See also DBW 6:277. 
342
 See e.g. DBW 6:32, 39, 85-6, 87, 235, 246, and  263. Regarding the particularities of each agent‟s 
family, friends, profession, etc., see DBW 6:256-60. Regarding concrete ethics and the authorisation to 
speak ethically, see DBW 6:373 and 354-64. 
343
 There is an oddity about abstract ethics which has received little attention: Bonhoeffer frequently 
insists on its necessity, but most of the material in the manuscripts is not concrete. His early philosophical 
interest and this fact lead me to suspect that, although he saw the dangers of abstract ethics and desired to 
write specifically and concretely, this did not come naturally to him. For an example of a commentator 
missing this, see Stanley Hauerwas, Performing the Faith: Bonhoeffer and the Practice of Nonviolence, 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2004), 67. Regarding Bonhoeffer and philosophy, see chapter 2, note 
63. 
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attention to the particularities of the agent may make virtue ethics more capable of 
meeting Bonhoeffer‟s concerns for concrete ethics than many other modes. 
 
4.3.3 History 
Another of Bonhoeffer‟s concerns is directly related to his insistence that ethics must be 
related to his own time and place: history. Indeed, one might claim that it would be 
ludicrous to insist on the necessity of addressing one‟s own context if one were not 
attentive both to the current situation and to the history which led to it. Hence 
Bonhoeffer attempts to address questions of history in at least three of his manuscripts, 
„Inheritance and Decline‟, „Guilt, Justification, Renewal‟, and „History and the 
Good‟.344 It seems to me that his historical analysis is not always persuasive,345 however 
for this study the correctness of his notions is not as important as the question of what 
he was trying to achieve. In the manuscript „Inheritance and Decline‟, for example, it is 
more obvious what his goal is (namely, countering Nazi ideology) than that his 
historical claims are sound. In disputing pre-Christian, mythological foundations for 
Germany (93-4; 98-100), and in arguing for the unity of Europe precisely through 
Christianity (99-101), Bonhoeffer is arguing against prevailing Nazi claims for a 
Germanic master race, drawing on Norse gods and legends.
346
 The key to his thought in 
this manuscript is his statement, „With the loss of its unity which was created through 
the form of Jesus Christ, the West stands before nothingness‟ (118). This notion he 
fleshes out:  
Faced with the abyss of nothingness, the question of an historical heritage 
(whose reception means both processing in the present and passing on to the 
future) dies out. There is no future and no past. There is only the present 
moment, snatched from nothingness, and the desire to seize the next moment 
(119).  
 
Again, whether Bonhoeffer is correct in the etiology or not, he is certainly describing 
the reality of life first in the Weimar Republic, with the sense of loss of ties to 
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 That he shows himself to be influenced by Hegel in this area is also true, but not pertinent to this 
discussion. See Wayne Floyd, „Encounter with an Other: Immanuel Kant and G.F. Hegel in the Theology 
of Dietrich Bonhoeffer‟, in Peter Frick (ed.), Bonhoeffer’s Intellectual Formation (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2008), 83-119. 
345
 For instance, his claim that one can only speak of „historical inheritance‟ in the Christian West is one I 
would not make, DBW 6:94. Also, his insistence on the unity of the West is correct in some important 
ways, but also obscures significant differences of peoples, languages and cultures, DBW 6:100-1. 
346
 See DBW 6:94, note 5. 
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Germany‟s imperial past and, because of the drastic economic situation, the loss of 
ready assumptions about the future.
347
  
 
The least which must be said of Bonhoeffer‟s interest in history in his Ethics, is that it is 
integral to his notion of concrete ethics,
348
 as well as his understanding of the ethical 
agent, which, as has already been noted, affirms the contingent realities of particular 
relationships, ties, and setting. Thus an interpretation which seeks to do justice to his 
concerns must take this emphasis on history seriously. This seems something virtue 
ethics (at least as expounded by MacIntyre and Hauerwas) does quite easily, both 
through its focus on the agent (including all her particularities of interrelations and 
circumstances) and the assumption that virtues are developed over time and practised in 
concrete historical settings. Furthermore, taking seriously Bonhoeffer‟s notions of 
European history, it can be said that virtue ethics belongs firmly in the history and 
culture he envisaged. Finally, as MacIntyre demonstrated in After Virtue, the notion of 
virtue ethics has been variously defined and fleshed out in different cultures and times; 
thus it is clear that virtue ethics can be appropriated for other historical settings in ways 
which Bonhoeffer would deem necessary for being concrete and for a specific time and 
place. 
 
4.3.4: Relation of the church and the world 
Virtue ethics has been seen to be compatible with Bonhoeffer‟s aim to provide a 
Christian foundation for ethics, to write a concrete ethic, and to attend to his historical 
setting. Another general concern which Bonhoeffer addresses at various points in his 
manuscripts is the conceptual question of the relation of the church and the world, a 
concern which had different relevance in his context than it might have in ours. This is 
both because of  Lutheran theology and polity of „two kingdoms‟ which posited that the 
church had no remit to address questions of state or politics, and, relatedly, because of 
what was actually happening in Germany and the difficulties the churches were 
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 See DBW 6:124 regarding the partnership of the church with others in Nazi Germany. See also „Guilt, 
Justification, Renewal‟ as a reading of Germany‟s recent history and Bonhoeffer‟s hope for the future. If 
Bonhoeffer was not wholly convincing in his perception of history in „Inheritance and Decline‟, the 
acuteness of his depiction of the guilt of the church in Nazi Germany is startling. If there is any question 
of how clearly he saw his own context (and therefore how well equipped he was to do what he set out to 
do in writing an ethics for his time and place), that should be fully answered by his awareness of the then 
current situation. See also my comments on „History and the Good‟ (4.2.2.e), and the improvements there 
in his avoiding the less persuasive historical analyses and created a tighter composition. 
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 See especially DBW 6:245-6. 
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experiencing in trying to address the evils inherent in National Socialist policies. This, 
like so many other issues already discussed, has foundational character, in that 
Bonhoeffer first had to make a case for why the Church (and he as a theologian) should 
even be discussing certain questions in Christian ethics.  
 
One manuscript which treats this theme overtly is „Church and World‟, in which 
Bonhoeffer explores his experience that those in Nazi Germany who valued the goods 
of high humanism sought the proximity of the church. In doing so, he develops the 
notion that all these goods (reason, law, education, humaneness, freedom, tolerance, 
etc.) actually derive from Christ, and in seeking protection through the church, these 
people were actually seeking Christ himself, if only unwittingly (347-8).
349
 Thus, the 
relation he sees between the church and the world is not necessarily one which would be 
affirmed outside the church. 
 
Furthermore, it is instructive to look at the confession of the guilt of the church in 
„Guilt, Justification, Renewal‟, as it were, as a worked example of the relationship of 
the church and the world.  
With this confession the whole guilt of the world falls on the church, on 
Christians, and, in that it is not denied here but confessed the possibility of 
forgiveness is opened up. For the moralist it is completely incomprehensible that 
the essentially guilty person is not sought here, that the righteous atonement as 
punishment for the evil ones and as reward for the good ones is not demanded… 
but rather people are here who really take upon themselves all guilt, not in some 
heroic decision of sacrifice but simply overwhelmed by their most personal guilt 
against Christ, and who can think in this moment not about retributive justice 
against those principally guilty but only about the forgiveness of their own great 
guilt (127).  
 
The confession of guilt which follows is deeply insightful and moving as it addresses 
the passive complicity of the church in the atrocities of the Nazi regime through not 
raising its voice against the oppression, hatred, murder of innumerable innocents, „the 
weakest and most vulnerable brothers of Jesus Christ‟ (130). Such a confession is only 
possible if one presupposes the relation of the church and world advocated by 
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 This is closely related to his theme of unconscious Christianity; see DBW 8:545, 547, and 582. See 
also his question of how the church can encourage „good‟ people to turn to Christ, DBW 6:350-1; and  
DBW 8:407-8, and 455. See also „On the possibility of a word of the church to the world‟, though it was 
probably not written for his book, (DBW 6:354, note 1). Also his rejection of such church/world duality is 
of importance. See „Christ, Reality and the Good‟, especially DBW 6:42-3. 
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Bonhoeffer, which does not neatly delineate between the sacred and the secular and 
which not only allows but demands that the church have a voice in all areas of life. 
 
Much more could be said,
350
 but for this study it is enough to note that the theme of the 
relation of the church to the world is an important issue, and to ask how virtue ethics 
can address it. This could be done perhaps by focusing on the agent, who cannot be 
divided into sacred and secular compartments, thus emphasizing a holistic conception of 
life as Bonhoeffer himself does. Also, a Christian account of human flourishing 
(defining, as Bonhoeffer does, the good in Christ) may enable the relation of the church 
and the world to be appropriately articulated, since the well-being of the whole world is 
not independent from the church. 
 
4.3.5 Structures for ethical life  
The final general concern which occurs repeatedly in Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics is the notion 
of „structures‟ for ethical life. Although I think André Dumas is mistaken in seeing 
„Gestalt’ in terms of structure, there are other quite central themes which clearly are 
about structure: the responsible life, and mandates.
351
 In the subsection of the second 
version of the manuscript „History and the Good‟, headed „The Structure of the 
Responsible Life,‟ Bonhoeffer considers the dual ties both to God and neighbour as 
structuring factors: the person is responsible before God (must answer, respond to God), 
and through her relations with others she is called to act on their behalf, which 
introduces his significant theme of representation, Stellvertretung (256).
352
 Such 
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 It is worthy of some reflection that Bonhoeffer does not offer a political theology, but rather a theology 
which demands the integration of all spheres of life. 
351
 That, as Dumas claims, „form‟ is problematic because of possible confusion with Aristotelian concerns 
of form and content would seem to be unfounded in the actual context of what Bonhoeffer writes, 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Theologian of Reality, trans. Robert McAfee Brown (London: SCM Press, 1971) 
219, note 7. Clearly the translation of words from German to English, from German to French and then 
again to English is fraught with perils for the interpreter.  In some cases it certainly could be that „Gestalt’ 
(or the related verb „gestalten’) could be translated either as „form‟ or „structure‟, and these two English 
words may in some cases be synonyms. Nevertheless, Bonhoeffer‟s use of „Gestalt’ often refers to 
persons or characters from fiction and should be translated with words which have such possible 
connotations. See also Stephen Plant, „Uses of the Bible in the “Ethics” of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (PhD 
thesis, Cambridge University, 1993), 96, where he argues that „Gestalt’ should not be translated: „At the 
very least it is a tragic obfuscation of the richness of the term “Gestalt” to translate it in every instance 
with the English word “form”.‟ There are advantages and disadvantages to both options, though I believe 
„form‟ is as rich (and mostly in quite parallel ways) as „Gestalt’. My suspicion is that for native speakers 
of English the richness of „form‟ may not be apparent, simply because it is taken for granted. 
352
 Regarding the translation of Stellvertretung, see my „“Felicity to the Original Text”? The Translation 
of Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, Volume 6‟, Studies in Christian Ethics 22, no. 3 
(2009, 336-56), 351. 
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„structures‟ are determining boundaries which affect action, whether she is aware of 
them or not. These structures are God-given, as are the contingent parameters of context 
and the responsibility of others which limit a person‟s responsibility (267-9). 
 
The second „structure‟ which appears in Bonhoeffer‟s ethics is the notion of mandates. 
It is not unrelated to responsibility, in that Bonhoeffer discusses them also in a further 
new subheading of the second version of „History and the Good‟, „The place of 
responsibility‟ (297-8). This is not a full discussion of the mandates, but throughout this 
section it is clear that Bonhoeffer considers each area of life which he calls a divine 
mandate to be a sphere in which God calls a person to account regarding acting with 
responsibility for others (291-3).
353
  
 
The fact that he used the concept in early and later manuscripts and in prison seems 
more important to me than the issue of the changes in his thinking concerning their 
content, most famously the change regarding work/culture and marriage/family (cf 54, 
383 and 392).
354
  
 
Both in his discussion of the structures of responsible living and the mandates 
Bonhoeffer attempts to give his ethics a structure which is demonstrably biblical and 
which cannot take on an independence which becomes dangerous, as had the notion of 
„orders of creation‟ which had been used by others.355 Furthermore it seems important 
that Bonhoeffer was using these categories to show that all of life is the arena where the 
person is held to account for acting responsibly on behalf of others and according to 
God‟s will, and in this sense his broadening of categories is instructive. The concept of 
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 See also DBW 6:54-59, where he speaks of the mandates in relation to concretion, scripture, and the 
unity of the person who lives simultaneously under these mandates.  
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 See Love Letters from Cell 92: The Correspondence between Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Maria von 
Wedemeyer 1943-45, eds. Ruth-Alice von Bismark and Ulrich Kabitz, trans. John Brownjohn (Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 1994), 161 for an example of his continued use of the concept in prison. See also DBW 
8:290-2. 
355
 It can of course be debated how dangerous his own category of „authority‟ as one of the divine 
mandates might be. His continuing insistence on the necessity of having an „oben’ and an „unten’ 
(„above‟ and „below‟) in society may appropriately be interpreted as coming from his own bourgeois 
background. Yet it is at least possible that he was making a comment about the nature of human societies 
as they de facto are, and ruling out the possibility of an ideal of some egalitarian utopia. See DBW 7:32, 
112, and 181; and DBW 8: 23, 39, and 75. On the dangers of independent structures, see Klaus Scholder, 
Die Kirchen und das Dritte Reich Band 1: Vorgeschichte und Zeit der Illusionen 1918-1934 (Frankfurt 
am Main: Propyläen Verlag, 1977), chapter 3. See also Nigel Biggar‟s comments, The Hastening that 
Waits: Karl Barth’s Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 53-4; the editors‟ comments DBW 6:421; 
and Karl Barth, „Nein! Antwort an Emil Brunner‟,  Theologische Existenz heute 14 (1934).  
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mandates thus does double duty, fighting both faulty theology and the malaise in Nazi 
Germany which allowed average people (who probably wanted to be good and do what 
is right) to imagine that the evils around them were not their responsibility, even if 
through their work, say, they participated in them.
356
  
 
The relationship of virtue ethics to responsibility is not as straightforward as it may 
seem.
357
 It is inaccurate to speak of responsibility as a virtue, even if one may describe 
acting responsibly as virtuous. This is, first of all, because of Bonhoeffer‟s emphasis on 
the fact that everyone is responsible before God (called to respond) for all her actions: 
seeing responsibility as a virtue is a different conception. Secondly, his vision is of a 
person de facto being in positions of responsibility, rather than speaking of 
responsibility as something which she must exercise as she might, for instance, patience 
or courage. Thus I believe that responsibility must be seen as a structure of life which 
impinges on action. Notably, responsibility as Bonhoeffer discusses it is about 
interrelatedness: humans are not independent beings but creatures dependent on and 
answerable to God, and are connected in myriad ways to others. Although many 
accounts of virtue ethics may not deal directly with these issues, they are to some 
degree implicit in any Christian account. Certainly the focus of virtue ethics on the 
person entails that the variety of relationships and their demands on the agent are taken 
seriously. It is hard to imagine, for instance, that a mother be considered a virtuous 
person if she neglected or abused her children, even if she were, say, a good 
parliamentarian. Nonetheless, an interpretation of Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics related to virtue 
ethics needs to spell out what otherwise might only be implicit: the fact of human 
interrelatedness has implications for what is necessary for a person to be virtuous. 
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 Brock‟s claim that the mandates are best understood in relationship to ideas found in Psalm 119 
(seeing Torah as a dynamic way of life) is not accurate for Bonhoeffer‟s own conception, but it may make 
this theme more accessible for people today, Brian Brock, „Bonhoeffer and the Bible in Christian Ethics: 
Psalm 119, the Mandates, and Ethics as a “Way”‟, Studies in Christian Ethics 18, no. 3 (2005, 7-29), 11. 
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 Lehmkühler‟s claim that the concept of responsibility is grounded in ethics as formation will not quite 
do: the reason he gives (that Bonhoeffer had written the formation manuscript first and must therefore 
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fragmentary nature of the manuscripts and the possibility that he may still have revised or even cut the 
manuscripts we have. See Karsten Lehmkühler, „Evangelische Ethik und Einwohnung Christi‟, in 
Christian Herrman and Eberhard Hahn (eds.), Festhalten am Bekenntnis der Hoffnung: Festgabe für 
Professor Dr. Reinhard Slenczka zum 70. Geburtstag (Erlangen: Martin-Luther-Verlag, 2001, 317-32), 
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How virtue ethics relates to the mandates is perhaps simpler to consider, as the 
mandates seem to have the twin concerns of safeguarding against the dangers of 
creation orders and ensuring that all of life is understood to be the arena for ethical 
action. The problematic issues related to creation orders often stemmed from the sense 
that these areas of life were in some way autonomous and had their own rules and codes 
(Eigengesetzlichkeit) which even theologians did not dare critique. Such division of 
spheres of life does not belong within virtue ethics, though it may well recognize that 
some variance in what is virtuous may relate to context and suitability. The second issue 
of perceiving all of life as needing right behaviour and action is implicitly a part of 
virtue ethics, since it is necessarily concerned with the whole person at all times and 
contexts. Thus although the structures which Bonhoeffer outlines in his Ethics are not 
necessarily replicated in virtue ethics, I believe his concerns are actually well met, 
especially if the theological underpinnings include the understanding that the person is, 
in all her doings and being, responsible before God.
358
 
 
In summary then, the most basic concerns within Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics are easily 
addressed within virtue ethics. If such is the case, it will be important to see if there are 
particular facets of his ethics which relate well to virtue ethics, so I turn now to examine 
that. 
 
4.4: Specific aspects related to virtue ethics 
The aspects of Bonhoeffer‟s thought which seem to relate well to virtue ethics include 
his anthropology, which, as has just been seen, is foundational for his concepts of 
responsibility and representation (4.4.1), and somewhat relatedly, his holistic 
conception of human life (4.4.2). 
 
4.4.1: Bonhoeffer’s anthropology  
One feature of Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics which I believe relates better to virtue ethics than 
any other mode of ethical thought is his basic understanding of humanity.
359
 As Clifford 
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 I am not persuaded that current formulations of virtue ethics would necessarily benefit from adopting 
Bonhoeffer‟s notion of the mandates, but being explicit about the ways in which human interrelatedness 
confers responsibility for others and may demand representational action could be helpful. 
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 Though there are convergences here with relational ethics in that both presuppose a relational 
ontology. 
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Green has amply demonstrated, Bonhoeffer always sees persons in their connectedness 
with family, friends, church community (if Christians), and wider society (as shown 
here also in terms of nation, culture, and history).
360
 One issue within this broader 
category which seems particularly interesting is his notion expressed in the second 
version of „History and the Good‟ of responsibility:  
I stand simultaneously for Christ before people, and for people before Christ. 
My responsibility which I take on in the hearing of people for Christ comes 
simultaneously with my responsibility for people in the hearing of Christ. The 
responsibility for Christ before people is the responsibility for people before 
Christ and only within that the responsibility for myself before God and people. 
Called to account before people and God, I can only speak for myself [mich 
verantworten] through the testimony of Jesus Christ, who stepped in for people 
before God and before people for God (255).  
 
It is only possible, I would suggest, for a person to answer for others before Christ if she 
somehow belongs to them and they to her. Likewise, the possibility of answering for 
Christ before others depends on her being in Christ, belonging to him. In both cases it is 
clear that what is at stake is the very identity of the person, both in Christ and in 
relationship with others.  
 
Moreover, this is not a single instance on which I draw but the conception of human life 
which underlies all of the Ethics. The concept of representation (Stellvertretung) makes 
this explicit again, where Bonhoeffer reiterates his claim that the isolated individual as 
ethical agent is a fiction (257). It is fully harmonious with his assumption of human 
interrelatedness that Bonhoeffer considers that the responsibility of one person is 
limited by the responsibility of others, which prevents representational action from 
becoming the imposition of one‟s own will (268). Building on such assumptions of 
interrelation, Bonhoeffer‟s conception of the church in „The Concrete Command and 
the Divine Mandates‟ sees the church as a corporate person who can act 
representationally, and which has relationships to the other areas of human life 
considered as „mandates‟ (147-8). While any mode of ethical discourse may be 
presented in conjunction with a presupposition of the communal nature of human life, it 
seems to me that virtue ethics is one mode, along with relational ethics, which 
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 Green, Sociality. 
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necessarily focuses on the person of the agent and would most naturally take seriously 
interrelationships and particular bonds which they denote and create.
361
 
 
A second aspect of Bonhoeffer‟s conception of humanity which relates well to virtue 
ethics is a narrative sense of life.
362
 As Stephen Plant puts it, „“Ethics as Formation” 
predates what theologians have learned to speak of as “narrative theology”, but his 
Ethics at this point is strikingly suggestive of the insight of narrative theologians that 
human life is story-formed.‟363 Even if, as Plant says, Bonhoeffer‟s work predates 
current notions of narrative theology, it seems especially in „Ethics as Formation‟ that 
he sees the person as being formed by the story (even perhaps as thumb-nail sketch: 
incarnation, crucifixion, resurrection/ascension) of Jesus. He even seems to be working 
with other stories and narratives as he goes, such as Shakespearian characters and Don 
Quixote (62, 35). Also in one of the latest of the manuscripts to be written, „The 
“Ethical” and the “Christian” as a Theme‟ he speaks of the „flow of life from conception 
to the grave‟ (388), again suggestive of a narrative sense of life, or at least of a holistic 
view of human life as it occurs over time. This appears also in this manuscript as 
Bonhoeffer considers the importance of maturity (not personal maturity as a character 
trait, but the maturity he seems to assume goes hand in hand with positions of authority, 
373-4, 377-8), as well as the necessity of ongoing and developing relationships between 
the one who speaks of ethics and those who are addressed (377-8). Although he does 
not explicitly speak of a narrative quality of life (and as Plant notes, it would be 
anachronistic to expect him to), he clearly presupposes something like this. As said of 
Bonhoeffer‟s sociality, it would be possible for various modes of ethical thought to 
include the presupposition that human life and relationships grow and develop over 
time. However, this is an assumption which is often integral to virtue ethics and would 
be more difficult to incorporate in any version of ethics which views single acts 
atomistically. 
 
4.4.2: Holistic conception of human life  
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In the above discussion there has already been a hint of Bonhoeffer‟s holistic 
conception of human life, at least as it develops over time. More specifically it is 
important to see that underlying Bonhoeffer‟s understanding of ethics is the claim that 
all of life is to be lived according to God‟s will, a subject which he addresses not as 
„ethics‟ (which he sees as concerning issues at the boundaries of life) but variously as 
„the natural life‟ or as „command‟. In earlier and later manuscripts the concern remains 
constant, though the vocabulary changes, namely to consider how the totality of human 
existence is lived before God, not in continual contortions of scruples or dilemmas, but 
in God-given freedom. This is given expression first in the manuscript „Ultimate and 
Penultimate Things‟, where the penultimate is first described quite generally as all of 
earthly life (141-2), but later more specifically only insofar as the earthly life is open to 
the coming of Christ in grace to justify sinners, or „being human and being good‟ (151). 
He advocates whatever supports humanity and goodness as being part of preparing the 
way for Christ‟s coming. The challenge to most forms of ethics is to have a broad 
enough understanding both of the human person and life to accommodate such 
perspectives. Virtue ethics can do this more easily than most forms simply because its 
focal point is the whole of the person as developed in the course of a life-time, and there 
is no distinction between some aspect of life (a point of decision, a particular act) as 
ethical and some other aspect which is not. 
 
Another early manuscript, „The Natural Life‟, is in a manner of speaking a worked 
example of his attempt to address the whole of life in his ethics. His vision stretches 
from the most basic right to physical life (179-91) to issues such as bodily pleasures 
(180-2) and intellectual enjoyment (216-7), from reproduction and embryonic life (199-
212) to euthanasia (184-91) and suicide (192-9). So from the womb to death, and from 
the most basic necessities to life to leisure and pleasure, all of life is included in his 
ethical thought. In this connection what is of greatest interest is his treatment of broader 
areas of life not always considered as „ethical‟ such as the section he began on the 
natural rights of intellectual life, where his intended starting point was to deal with 
issues of judgement, action and enjoyment (216). From notes he had written in 
preparation, it would seem that his conception of judgement included „processing reality 
for one‟s own perceiving‟.364  Regarding „enjoyment‟ there are subheadings in the 
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manuscript: „playing, enjoying oneself‟. It is of some interest here that the editors of the 
critical edition suggest Bonhoeffer may have been influenced by his reading of Pieper‟s 
Temperance as regards enjoyment. His copy is marked with brackets and an 
exclamation mark in the margin where Pieper states, „That sensual enjoyment is not 
excluded from the realm of the morally good by Christian teaching about life does not 
need to be specially explained.‟365 Furthermore, this interest in enjoyment carries over 
into his prison letters where he writes,  
Who can for instance in our times still light-heartedly care for music or 
friendship, play and be joyful? Certainly not the „ethical‟ person, but only the 
Christian. Precisely because friendship belongs in the realm of this freedom („of 
the Christian person‟) it must trustfully defend itself against all the raised 
eyebrows of „ethical‟ existence – certainly without the claim of the necessity of 
a divine commandment but with the claim of the necessity of freedom!
366
  
 
In this context Bonhoeffer speaks also of the „latitude of freedom‟ (Spielraum der 
Freiheit), which again is an aspect of Bonhoeffer‟s moral and theological vision.367 
Bonhoeffer sees real theological significance in such things as art, education and 
friendship, and furthermore his theological reflections here are utterly connected to his 
ethical thinking in general and to the themes in his Ethics. So although he uses the 
language of the „ethical‟ in quite a narrow way (as he had already done in the 
manuscript „The “Ethical” and the “Christian” as a Theme‟), his moral theology has a 
wide compass indeed.  
 
For this reason I think Jean Bethke Elshtain is not right in saying, „Human life, 
Bonhoeffer insisted, was pathologically overburdened by the ethical.‟368 She quotes at 
some length from the „The “Ethical” and the “Christian” as a Theme‟ where Bonhoeffer 
cites Ecclesiastes 3 that there is a time for all things, eating, drinking, sleeping, as well 
as consciously deciding and acting, working and resting, etc. (367). Indeed, at first 
glance much of this manuscript may seem to negate the claims I have been making 
about Bonhoeffer treating the whole of human life in his Ethics, for he states here that 
the ethical must be at the borders of life, not normally of import but only in exceptional 
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cases. The middle of life is natural, everyday life, protected at the borders by the Ten 
Commandments (367-9). And yet the fact that he chooses to speak of this natural 
everyday life in his Ethics (and also in the later letter already quoted) underscores that 
his moral vision includes this „middle‟ as well as the boundaries. Later in this 
manuscript he becomes more specific: God‟s command gives a person permission to 
live as a human in freedom, enabling her to move, act and decide, giving her peace, 
trust, equanimity and joy (385-6). What is at stake is not that Bonhoeffer wants to 
suggest that certain areas be excluded from ethical thought or to claim that life is 
„pathologically overburdened by the ethical‟, but to allow that some parts of life are not 
under specific divine mandate (commandment requiring obedience). Indeed, whatever 
terminology he uses (the natural, command, creaturely existence, living as humans 
before God, the latitude of freedom) the totality of human existence is within his moral 
compass. If anything, his treatment of command at the centre of life allowing persons to 
live fully human lives before God strengthens similar concerns already addressed in the 
language of the „natural‟ or the „penultimate‟. 
 
In these manuscripts and other writings it should be clear that Bonhoeffer conceived of 
all of human life as belonging within the realm of moral, theological reflection.
369
 As 
said of other areas which accord well with virtue ethics, it is again the case that his 
concern for the totality of life may be brought into many conceptions of ethics. Yet 
again here it seems to me to relate naturally to virtue ethics in that the focus on the 
agent does not allow the possibility of considering only certain times or aspects of life 
to have ethical importance. Every part of life is lived by the agent and must be seen to 
be ethically relevant. 
 
However, it is now necessary to ask if there are aspects of Bonhoeffer‟s moral thought 
which seem in some sense to be related to virtue ethics more specifically than those 
considered already. 
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4.5: Virtue Ethical Themes in Bonhoeffer 
The most obvious theme to be treated here is, naturally, that of conformation (4.5.1). 
However, I shall also address those aspects which Bonhoeffer treats in virtue-like ways 
(4.5.2), notably simplicity and cleverness (4.5.2.a), and prudence as it is implied in the 
notion of responsibility (4.5.2.b). Finally, I shall also discuss virtue-ethical concerns 
Bonhoeffer addressed in other contexts (4.5.3). 
 
4.5.1: Conformation 
The most fundamental theme in Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics which seems to be somewhat like 
virtue ethics is, of course, „Ethics as Formation‟. Although I would reject an attempt to 
link Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics to virtue ethics based on this theme in isolation from the whole 
of his ethical thought, it must be conceded that this theme offers a strong starting point. 
As Nick Sagovsky has stated,  
Bonhoeffer discusses not only the theological ground for such action (focusing 
very much on Christology) but also such action as the outcome of the process of 
formation (Gestaltung). Bonhoeffer talks more in terms of character (cf 
Hauerwas) but his thought could be linked with the „virtue‟ ethics of MacIntyre 
and others at this point. „Responsible action‟ does not come out of nowhere. It 
comes from being „conformed to the image of Christ‟ through membership of 
the Church, reading of the Scriptures, meditation and committed action. It comes 
through the formation of a Christian „conscience‟ (a knowledge and awareness 
of both God and reality). It is this which Bonhoeffer was seeking to teach and 
develop at Finkenwalde.
370
 
 
There are issues one could critique here, including whether it is appropriate to take the 
Finkenwalde books as fleshing out what Bonhoeffer meant in the Ethics by formation. 
Certainly the categories of „Church‟, reading and meditating on scripture and committed 
action remained central in his own thought and life. The language of „conscience‟ or 
„image of Christ‟ is much more problematic, since neither represents his categories. Of 
conscience he writes in „Ethics as Formation‟ that it has not enabled people to act well:  
The innumerable honourable and tempting disguises and masks in which evil 
approaches him [sc. the person of conscience] make his conscience fearful and 
insecure until he is finally satisfied by having a soothed conscience rather than a 
good conscience, thus until he deceives his own conscience so as not to despair; 
for the man whose only security is his conscience is never capable of grasping 
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that a bad conscience is more healing and stronger than a cheated conscience 
(65).
371
  
 
What makes using the notion of „conscience‟ more problematic, however, is his 
extended treatment of it in the manuscript section „The Structure of the Responsible 
Life‟. Here he sees the conscience as a result of the Fall, because of which humans lost 
their creaturely unity with God and thereafter seek unity in themselves. As such it is 
directed not towards union with God in Christ but towards self-justification (276-8). 
Even when a person is in Christ and her conscience is freed by him, her conscience 
remains in its essence a call to unity with herself rather than God and may hinder her 
from taking on guilt when responsible action may demand it (281-2).
372
 Thus it is 
probably not helpful so speak of the formation Bonhoeffer intended in terms of the 
„formation of a Christian “conscience”‟, notwithstanding Sagovsky‟s scare quotes. This 
is not improved by Sagovsky‟s parenthetic gloss on „conscience‟ as „a knowledge and 
awareness of both God and reality‟ since Bonhoeffer‟s claim is that humans know both 
God and reality only in Christ, and in Christ the reality of God and the world are not to 
be separated (34-5, 39-41). 
 
Sagovsky‟s language of „image‟ of Christ is also problematic, though perhaps not to the 
same degree. Bonhoeffer consistently speaks of the „form‟ (Gestalt) of Christ, which 
need not necessarily differ greatly from what might be meant by „image‟ of Christ.373 
Yet to speak of the „image‟ (which would most naturally be Bild, also in biblical usage) 
of Christ may seem to import certain devotional practices and a spiritual heritage which 
Bonhoeffer was consciously avoiding. In one section he had struck out of „Ethics as 
Formation‟ he says, „Recognise in him [sc. Christ] God, who takes on to himself 
humanity. Recognise every individual and recognize the whole of humanity in him, 
yourself, your own nature, your own image‟ (70, note 25).374 In a later passage in the 
same manuscript his use of „Bild’ is once again linked not to the image of Christ but 
humanly constructed image of humanity (74). I think it unlikely that it is a mere 
coincidence that precisely in the manuscript on formation Bonhoeffer avoids any use of 
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„image‟ in relation to Christ.375 He explicitly rejects the language of the „imitation‟ of 
Christ, which is often related in thought to the „image‟: conformation to Christ „does not 
happen through striving “to become like Jesus”, as we are accustomed to expressing it, 
but rather through the form of Jesus Christ impressing itself so strongly on us that our 
form is stamped with its own [form]‟ (81). The editors rightly point out that here 
Bonhoeffer is expressly distancing himself from the notion of imitatio Christi.
376
 
However, it does seem to me a mere detail whether one uses the language of „image‟ or 
„form‟, so long as one keeps in mind Bonhoeffer‟s reservations regarding this part of the 
traditional usage of „image‟. 
 
Even though these aspects of Sagovsky‟s claim are carelessly worded, it seems to me 
that the basic claim stands: the notion of formation is more closely related to character 
and virtue ethics than any other mode of ethical thought. The most obvious reason for 
making this claim is quite simply that the manuscript „Ethics as Formation‟ (and the 
others which specifically draw on it) has as its central concern the agent and the 
development of her character. In one of his typically stark formulations, Bonhoeffer 
says,  
Being evil is worse than an evil deed. It is worse when a liar tells the truth than 
when a lover of truth tells a lie, worse when a misanthrope practises 
philanthropy than when someone who loves people is once overwhelmed by 
hatred. A lie is better than the truth told by a liar, hatred is better than an act of 
brotherly love by a misanthrope. One sin is not the same as another. They have 
different weight…. Falling away is infinitely worse than falling. The most 
shining virtues of the one who has fallen away are black as night compared to 
the darkest weakness of the faithful (62-3).
377
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In this passage Bonhoeffer is clearly marking the overall character of the agent as being 
of much greater importance than single acts, even if character might be said to be 
developed over time through many acts such that the two can hardly be separated.  
 
If virtue ethics and formation both have as their central concerns the person, it is also 
the case that the examples given are necessarily persons. Thus one might ask what a 
virtuous person would do in this or that situation, or how a virtuous person would 
perform this or that act. For Bonhoeffer the exemplar can only be Jesus Christ:  
Since however there is only one place where God and the world‟s reality are 
reconciled with one another, in which God and human have become one, 
therefore and only therefore is it possible to hold God and the world at the same 
moment in view. This place does not lie beyond reality in the realm of ideas; it 
lies in Jesus Christ, the world reconciler (68).  
 
Here follows an extended passage with „ecce homo‟ (behold the person) as its leitmotif. 
Being conformed to Christ incarnate means permission to be truly human; being 
conformed to Christ crucified means being mortal, being subject to sin, suffering and 
death; being conformed to the risen Christ means carrying the hidden glory of Christ 
within us, perceiving the shimmer of that which is coming, willingly carrying the cross 
with the indwelling Holy Spirit (80-2). Thus while one can say that just as virtue ethics 
has the „virtuous person‟ as its example, Bonhoeffer‟s formation has Christ, not in the 
form of narratives from the gospels but in credal formulae.  
 
It would be, however, too simplistic to distinguish sharply between the two, and such a 
distinction may say more about one‟s own formation than Bonhoeffer‟s intentions. 
There can be little doubt that the central focus of Christology for Bonhoeffer is who 
Christ is rather than what a person believes about Christ.
378
 Similarly, in speaking of 
biblical meditation, Bonhoeffer emphasizes the encounter there with the living God, 
rather than the gleaning of information about God.
379
 Thus, Bonhoeffer‟s dogmatic 
categories should be seen as a shorthand which calls the person of Jesus Christ to mind, 
whether in vivid scenes from the gospels or moments of personal encounter. An 
imagination formed by such meditation will see the sights of the stable and smell the 
odours of the animals when thinking of Christ incarnate. To speak of the crucifixion is 
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to see the blood dripping from the crown of thorns and hear the jeers and taunts of the 
crowds. To contemplate the resurrection is to smell the fish Jesus is cooking on the 
beach and to see Thomas in his need to touch the very wounds before he would believe. 
These and many other parts of the gospel narratives need to be embedded in these 
Christological categories. Christ as Bonhoeffer depicts him is the figure of the church‟s 
creeds, but known to his followers fleshed out in the myriad stories from all four 
gospels as well as the Acts of the Apostles.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the author of Sanctorum Communio also shows the place of 
conformation being the church (84-5). Finally Bonhoeffer focuses on how formation 
enables ethics to be concrete: Christ is always the same, but in transforming real people 
there is always an element of particularity (85-7).  
The question, how Christ wins form among us today and here, respectively how 
we are conformed to his form, includes however further difficult questions: what 
does it mean „among us‟, „today‟, „here‟? If it is impossible to determine what is 
good for all times or places, so the question is raised for which times and places 
an answer to our question can even be given…. It concerns the times and places 
which have to do with us, in which we have experience, which for us are 
realities. It concerns the times and places which direct concrete questions to us, 
which give us tasks and place responsibility on us. Thus „among us‟, „today‟ and 
„here‟ concern the area of our decisions and encounters (87-8). 
 
Thus we have crystallized in this one manuscript many of the concerns already 
identified as central to Bonhoeffer‟s thought: a concrete ethic focusing on Christ and 
based on grace. It is most clearly an ethic which looks foremost to the agent being 
formed by Christ himself and in his likeness. 
 
The question then arises whether this virtue-ethical facet is more like Hauerwas‟s ethic 
of virtue (character) or virtues. It is therefore necessary to ask if there are aspects of 
Bonhoeffer‟s ethics which function like virtues. 
 
4.5.2: Virtues 
Given that Bonhoeffer does not have extended treatments of any of the classical or 
theological virtues, to answer the question whether his ethics has any notions of 
„virtues‟ one must look at other themes he addresses. Here I shall address two, 
simplicity and cleverness (4.5.2.a), and prudence as it is implied in the concept of 
responsibility (4.5.2.b). 
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4.5.2.a: Simplicity and Cleverness  
The first characteristics which might be seen to be something like „virtues‟ in 
Bonhoeffer‟s thought are simplicity and cleverness. Though he notes the failure of an 
ethic that focuses on virtues (as he does with other forms, including those based on 
rationality, conscience, duty, and even one‟s own freedom, 64-6), he begins to flesh out 
what it means to be formed by Christ, basing his discussion on Matthew 10:16 where 
Jesus tells his disciples to be innocent as doves and wise as serpents (67-8). 
Bonhoeffer‟s words are „einfältig’ and „klug’, which mean „simple‟ and „clever‟, and I 
would suggest that the aspect of singleness inherent in „einfältig’ is important.380 The 
simple person  
belongs only to God and God‟s will. Because the simple person does not squint 
alongside God at the world, he is capable of seeing the reality of the world freely 
and without prejudice. Thus simplicity becomes wisdom. Clever is the person 
who sees reality as it is, who sees the ground [Grund, perhaps „reason‟] of 
things. Clever is therefore only the one who sees reality in God. Recognition of 
reality is not the same as knowledge of external processes, but rather the 
perception of the essence of things. Not the best-informed is the most clever. 
Precisely he is in danger of missing the essential because of the manifold. On the 
other hand, often the knowledge of an apparently lesser detail facilitates looking 
in the depths of things. Thus the wise person will seek to gain the best possible 
knowledge of processes without however becoming dependent on it. 
Recognizing the characteristic in the factual is cleverness…. The liberated view 
of God and reality as it has existence only in God unites simplicity and 
cleverness. There is no proper simplicity without cleverness and no cleverness 
without simplicity (67-8).
381
 
 
I quote this at length partly to show the importance of singleness which is built into 
Bonhoeffer‟s conception of simplicity. It is worth noting that „the manifold‟ (das 
Vielerlei) threatens to obscure the essential, just as the simple/clever person is not 
distracted by trying to „squint‟ both at God and the world.  
 
Several other, perhaps minor, things (in themselves) are worth noting. First, as seen in 
the long quote above, at the end simplicity and cleverness form a unity which is 
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articulated in much the same way Thomas explains the unity of the virtues – although 
seemingly they are separate and might occur in isolation from one another, they are only 
truly themselves and only operate fully when they are found together. So it would seem 
also with simplicity and cleverness: they are dependent on each other and bound up 
together.  
 
Secondly, they are given by God (again emphasizing grace) much as Thomas speaks of 
virtues as being infused: it is being in Christ that frees the Christian to have such 
simplicity and cleverness. When simplicity reappears in the later section „The Structure 
of the Responsible Life‟, Bonhoeffer states,  
Alone from him [Jesus Christ] there is human action which is not ground down 
by conflicts of principle but rather comes from the completed reconciliation of 
the world with God, an acting which does what is according with reality in 
soberness and simplicity, an acting in representational responsibility (266).  
 
Thirdly, returning to Bonhoeffer‟s focus on the person of Jesus Christ, simplicity is 
defined in Christ – Matthew 10:16 is interpreted „as every one of his words: only by 
himself‟ (68).382 In one of his last manuscripts, „The Love of God and the Decay of the 
World‟, Bonhoeffer writes,  
The freedom of Jesus is not the arbitrary choice of one of innumerable 
possibilities, rather it consists precisely in the complete simplicity of his acting, 
[a simplicity] for which there are never several possibilities, conflicts, 
alternatives, rather always only one. This one Jesus calls the will of God. He 
calls it his food that he does this will.
383
 This will of God is his life. He does not 
live and act from the knowledge of good and evil, but from the will of God. 
There is only one will of God. In it the Source is regained, in it freedom and 
simplicity of all doing is founded (315). 
 
Fourthly, just as Thomas‟s virtues are seen as enabling right action, simplicity (together 
with cleverness, if we take seriously what was said earlier about their unity) is seen as 
liberating and allowing new, godly life.  
In no way, however, is the new unity with the will of God, the simplicity of 
doing repealed or even just disturbed…. Submission to the will of God only 
happens in doing. In doing the will of God, the person renounces his own rights, 
his own justification; in doing he abandons himself humbly to the merciful 
Judge (329).
384
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These last two quotes have also opened up the relationship in Bonhoeffer‟s thought 
between simplicity and doing the will of God, which will be explored in greater detail in 
chapter five. What I hope is apparent here is the important point that simplicity (like the 
virtues in a Thomist construal) is not something to be considered primarily as a 
possession but to be valued as it enables right action, doing the will of God in 
Bonhoeffer‟s terms. 
 
Fifthly, it seems to me that in some senses simplicity operates like prudence in Aquinas. 
As prudence enables the virtuous person to see a situation aright (recognizing what are 
the salient features, how it is even to be described) as well as knowing what is the right 
action to take, so simplicity enables her to „see the ground [Grund, foundation or 
reason] of things‟ (67), to perceive beyond the „manifold‟ what is „essential‟ (68). It is 
precisely this simplicity which Bonhoeffer claims allows her to see God and the world 
at one and the same time in Christ, which is, of course, one of his central Christological 
points in the Ethics. Moreover, when Bonhoeffer returns to simplicity in the later 
manuscript „The Love of God and the Decay of the World‟ he brings, as was shown 
above, this concept into relationship with another of his great themes in the Ethics, 
command and the will of God. In this context the prudence-like character of simplicity 
comes again to the fore.  
The impression that the simple [einfältig] recognition of the will of God must 
take the form of intuition, the elimination of all consideration, the naïve grasping 
of the first thought or feeling which presses [on us], thus that psychological 
misunderstanding of the simplicity of the new life which has dawned in Jesus, 
receives here a fundamental correction (323).  
 
In the following passage he begins to elucidate what things might be part of the 
„consideration‟ which is part of simplicity which allows the Christian to recognize the 
will of God: heart, mind, observation, experience all have a part to play, all of which 
will need to have been transformed and conformed to the form of Christ (324).
385
 All of 
this is bound up, furthermore, with living and growing in love, which also means in the 
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reconciliation and unity with God and people (325), and is possible in the knowledge of 
„being protected, sustained and directed by the will of God‟ (326). „Therefore, it is 
neither a petulant nor a despairing but rather a humble and trusting testing, a testing in 
the freedom for the word of God which is always new in the simplicity of the always 
only one word of God‟ (326). Yet it also includes self-examination in awareness of the 
danger of self-deception (326-8). Bonhoeffer‟s perception (perhaps paradoxically) of 
the complexity of what is involved in the simplicity which can recognize God‟s will for 
her action is not unlike Thomas‟s description of the many things which go into the 
operation of prudence, the many things which may influence how a situation and right 
action are rightly to be perceived.  
 
Finally, however, there are elements of simplicity which are not like prudence. At the 
outset Bonhoeffer speaks in terms of singleness or even purity of heart. Also, the simple 
person „has God‟, and therefore she „depends on God‟s commands, judgement and 
mercy which proceed afresh daily‟. She belongs solely to God and God‟s will (67). This 
is probably best described as a picture of the Christian disciple. Yet I think it does not 
stretch the point to observe the link between discipleship and sanctification, and again 
between sanctification and virtue. The simple person is a follower of Christ, being 
sanctified (made virtuous, conformed to Christ). As such, simplicity may best be seen 
not merely as a prudent-like virtue, but as Bonhoeffer‟s concept of Christian virtue, 
which is cast in terms redolent of divine command ethics. 
 
Thus in five ways it seems to me that simplicity and cleverness operate something like 
virtues in Bonhoeffer‟s thought: there is the unity of these two concepts, as well as the 
insistence of God-givenness. They are to be understood primarily with reference to 
Jesus himself (with a virtue ethic-like focus on his person). They enable right action. 
More specifically, simplicity seems to function a bit like prudence, which itself seems 
telling, given that it is prudence which is seen to hold all the virtues together in Thomist 
thought. However, in important ways simplicity seems to be a way of speaking of 
discipleship, sanctification, or virtue itself. 
 
4.5.2.b: Prudence in Responsibility 
I have already suggested that responsibility as such is not properly aretaic in 
Bonhoeffer‟s thought; it is a given aspect of human existence based on humanity‟s 
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communal nature. What is interesting about responsibility in relationship to possible 
„virtues‟ is how it relates (like simplicity) to something very like prudence. In the 
manuscript „History and the Good‟ he claims that the responsible person must act in 
freedom, without cover from any people or principles, taking responsibility for the 
consequences, not applying any principle, but seeking „to grasp and to do what is 
necessary, “commanded” in the given situation‟ (260). She must observe, consider, 
evaluate, decide, and even consider what the likely consequences of her acts will be, 
and to test her own motives, her heart (267). Thus although responsibility itself does not 
seem to be a „virtue‟ in Bonhoeffer‟s conception of ethics, the discernment of what 
responsible action must be taken involves the whole person in ways which (as with 
simplicity and cleverness) resemble prudence in Thomist ethics.
386
 
 
4.5.3: Virtue-ethical Concerns  in Other Contexts  
Given, as many have argued, the high degree of continuity in Bonhoeffer‟s thought, it is 
important to see if there are signs of virtues or virtue-ethical thinking in his other 
writings.
387
 One of the earliest examples of which I am aware comes from Sanctorum 
Communio, where Bonhoeffer‟s notion of sin is not based on individual acts but on 
being, namely „being in Adam‟.388 In this it is not so much „sins‟ which he discusses as 
„sinfulness‟, the image of God destroyed, no longer being human as intended by God. 
Although this is at some remove from virtue ethics as such, again the emphasis on the 
person and avoidance of an atomistic view of individual acts accords well with the 
emphases of virtue ethics. 
 
Finally, there is at least a hint of virtue-ethical concerns in the outline for a book 
Bonhoeffer prepared in prison.
389
 As well as continuing to ask the question who Jesus 
Christ is for us (really) today, or maybe as a part of that, in his outline for a short book 
he hoped to write, the second part was to treat the question of what Christian faith 
essentially is. In this connection he intended to write about the encounter with Jesus 
Christ, and the  
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experience that there is here a reversal of everything of human existence in that 
Jesus is only „there for others‟. The „being-there-for-others‟ of Jesus is the 
transcendental experience! From the freedom from his self, from the „being-
there-for-others‟ even to death springs the omnipotence, omniscience and 
omnipresence. Faith is the participation in this being of Jesus.
390
  
 
Here we see again the pre-eminence accorded Christ‟s being (existence for others), and 
the emphasis on the being of the believer and church (as participating in the being of 
Christ). This has obvious resonance with Act and Being where the discussion centres on 
being in Christ (rather than being in Adam), but it also shows a fundamental focus on 
the person (whether Christ or the believer).
391
 
 
What I hope this section has shown is that there are profound affinities between 
Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics and virtue ethics, particularly as found in the theme of ethics as 
formation. Moreover, there are a variety of ways in which the notions of simplicity and 
cleverness have an aretaic function in his thought. Given that these are the only „virtues‟ 
which Bonhoeffer names, and that he seems most concerned with those aspects which 
seem similar to prudence, it may be right to agree with Sagovsky and see an ethic of 
character rather than an ethic of virtues.
392
 Beyond this, I have tried to show some 
continuity in the basic contours of the virtue ethical concern of focusing on the person 
and being of Christ and the agent.  
 
However, lest this discussion remain solely analytical or theoretical, it is important to 
ask how Bonhoeffer in fact does argue when he becomes more concrete in his ethical 
discourse. I turn my attention to that now. 
 
4.6: Mode of Ethical Discourse 
An examination of Bonhoeffer‟s way of arguing when he addresses specific issues may 
uncover a variety of things. For if his mode of discourse does not show any resemblance 
to what one might expect of virtue-ethical thought, it could be indicative either that my 
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analyses thus far have not been correct, or that Bonhoeffer himself is inconsistent.  
Either possibility would, of course, present important difficulties for the remainder of 
this study. However, if his way of handling discussion is consonant with a virtue-ethical 
approach, this would add further confirmation to what has been shown hitherto. 
 
Therefore, I will look in some detail at that portion of the Ethics where he treats 
concrete issues. First I shall attend to the setting for this, the manuscript „The Natural‟ 
(4.6.1.a). Then I shall examine his prime category of discussion, „Suum cuique‟ 
(4.6.1.b). With this groundwork laid, I shall look at what Bonhoeffer considers to be the 
most fundamental right, that to bodily life (4.6.1.c). This is the overall setting in which 
his further discussions take place, and I shall examine two topics, one of which is 
representative of how he generally argues, and the other the one real exception (4.6.1.d-
e). From what is seen in these examples, it should be possible to assess how Bonhoeffer 
makes his arguments regarding concrete issues (4.6.1.f). 
 
Because of the possibility that Bonhoeffer‟s way of handling specific questions may be 
thought to have changed during his imprisonment, I shall then look at an example from 
this later period (4.6.2). 
 
4.6.1 Ethics 
In turning now to an analysis of his mode of argument, it is necessary to be clear about 
the various ways I shall categorise his methods. My most basic categories are to 
distinguish between what is essentially a theological argument from what is not. 
Theological modes of argument may depend on belief in God or specific beliefs about 
God (in this case, most frequently that God is Creator), or they may depend explicitly 
upon belief that the Bible is authoritative, indeed revealed by God. These distinctions 
within Bonhoeffer‟s theological arguments are simple enough to see and acknowledge. 
What is more difficult is the question of how to describe his modes of argument which 
are not overtly theological. I have chosen to refer to them as „philosophical‟, though 
using this term quite loosely, for I do not mean to suggest that he might be seen to be 
following any particular school of thought in such instances, nor that his arguments 
could necessarily be seen as appropriate in a philosophical work. What I mean is that 
they are based on observations, or reasoning, or the analysis of a situation and language 
usage, and thus are open to dialogue and discourse without particular belief in God or 
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the authority of scripture. There may be many kinds of value judgements which one 
could make on the appropriateness, persuasiveness, or usefulness of the various modes 
of argument, which I will not discuss here. Instead, what I hope to highlight is simply 
how he handles the issues he discusses. 
 
Also it is important to outline the kinds of argument which may be indicative of 
differing modes of ethical thought. While Roger Crisp notes that a „pure virtue 
ethics…will suggest that the only reasons we ever have for acting or living in any way 
are grounded in the virtues‟,393 I will not claim that this is the case for Bonhoeffer. 
Rather the mode of arguing which seems related to virtue ethics will focus on the agent, 
and her motives. By contrast, I would take a deontological mode of debate to focus on 
particular laws, rules or commandments; while a utilitarian style would centre on 
outcomes; and a situationist one would focus on the circumstances and features of the 
case in question. 
 
4.6.1.a: ‘The Natural ’: The Setting for Concrete Issues  
The only extended discussion of concrete ethics in these manuscripts appears in „The 
Natural‟. Before looking in detail at the way in which Bonhoeffer argues regarding the 
specific issues he treats in this section, it is important to consider more generally the 
place and significance of this manuscript in his Ethics. Beyond the general importance 
of any context, it can hardly be without significance that Bonhoeffer only addresses 
concrete issues in this one manuscript, despite his almost constant refrain regarding the 
necessity of a concrete ethic, not an abstract one.  
 
First, I have already hinted that there could be possible significance in the fact that 
Bonhoeffer was working in the Roman Catholic monastery of Ettal when he wrote this 
manuscript, and the possible influences of his conversations with people there as well as 
his reading of Pieper and other Catholic theologians (2.3.2).
394
 At all events, Bonhoeffer 
was more open to discovering and learning from the moral theology of his Roman 
Catholic brethren than most German Protestant theologians of his day would have 
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been,
395
 even if he did not accept uncritically all he read and heard, for instance in the 
case of natural theology (167).
396
 Importantly, however, it appears that he found there a 
rich foundation for making the concrete statements for his time and place which he felt 
were most needed. 
 
Secondly, in considering the importance of the section on „the natural‟ as I consider 
how Bonhoeffer mounts his arguments when he is being concrete, it is vital to recognize 
that this lies not primarily in its being rather surprising (not least in its apparent Catholic 
influence) for a Protestant of his generation.
397
 More to the point, it is also connected to 
what was clearly a central theme to him, namely that of the „penultimate‟: 
We speak of the natural in distinction from the creaturely so as to include the 
fact of the Fall; we speak of the natural in distinction from the sinful so as to 
include the creaturely. The natural is that which, after the Fall, is directed 
towards the coming of Jesus Christ. The unnatural is that which after the Fall 
closes itself against the coming of Jesus Christ. Of course the difference between 
what is directed towards the coming of Christ and what closes itself against the 
coming of Christ is a relative one; neither can the natural force the coming of 
Christ, nor can the unnatural make this coming impossible; in both cases the 
coming is an event of grace, and only through the coming of Christ is the natural 
confirmed in its character as penultimate, and the unnatural definitively exposed 
in its character as destruction of the penultimate. Thus there remains before 
Christ a difference between the natural and the unnatural which cannot be 
removed without grave harm (165). 
 
It is, therefore, clear that Bonhoeffer did not write this section in isolation from his 
thinking in other manuscripts, and since the theme of the penultimate and the ultimate, 
as we have already seen, appears in later manuscripts as well as earlier ones, this is an 
important connection. 
 
Finally, in Bonhoeffer‟s attempt to write an account of Christian ethics which would be 
for his time and place, it is noteworthy that he addresses one of the theological issues 
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which made right discernment of that context difficult for many Protestants: the 
dynamic of divine providence and human free will. In the theological climate of 
Germany in the early twentieth century, many people believed that the success of any 
undertaking was the proof of its being ordained by God, hence the position (even of 
some who did not like Nazism) that Hitler‟s power was part of God‟s will and must be 
supported.
398
 In this context, then, Bonhoeffer gives a theological framework for saying 
that temporary success (whereby „temporary‟ may even extend over the period of a 
lifetime) does not prove that something is God‟s will. Yet if something is starkly against 
God‟s will, against what is natural, the natural itself will correct it. What is unnatural 
can only be „organized‟ and sustained through force or violence, but what is natural 
simply exists through God‟s creation and will (168-70).  
For this reason it can come to a temporary overcoming of the natural through the 
unnatural. In the long term every organization breaks apart, whereas the natural 
remains and gets its way through its own power; for life itself is on the side of 
the natural. Of course there may be grave shocks and upheavals of external 
forms of life. But so far as life sustains itself, the natural makes its own way 
(170). 
 
This, in substance, is not greatly different from his assertions in other places regarding 
how success and failure are to be seen theologically. What is interesting is the sense that 
he sees corrective influences within God‟s created order, even in the world‟s fallen 
(natural) state.
399
  
 
These points taken together suggest that the theme of the natural is firmly linked to 
some of his other central concerns. It may well have been influenced by his 
conversations and reading in Ettal, especially of Pieper, though this should not be 
unduly weighted. Additionally, it is not only in the specific issues which he addressed 
that he tried to make his ethics appropriate for his context: in this passage he is again 
trying to help people to see that Hitler‟s success did not mean that what he was doing 
was God‟s will. With these things in mind, I turn now to look at his method of arguing. 
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4.5.1.b: ‘Suum cuique ’: The Basis  
The general formulation of rights given with the natural states, in the words of 
Roman justice: suum cuique, to each his own. In this sentence is expressed 
simultaneously the diversity of the natural and the rights which belong to it, as 
well as the unity of rights protected in the diversity (174).
400
  
 
Of course, this notion of justice has classical links with virtue ethics, yet it is not 
apparent that such links are more than historical. Other forms of ethical thought, 
especially deontology, could incorporate this understanding of justice, though suum 
cuique would be in some tension with utilitarianism, since it does not recognise the 
importance of the outcomes of actions. Similarly, the notion of what is due to whom is 
not essentially situationist, but is focused on the person, albeit the one addressed by the 
agent rather than the agent. On balance, however, this concern with the nature of 
persons shows some relationship to the concerns of virtue ethics or perhaps relational 
ethics. Notwithstanding such considerations, it seems likely that Bonhoeffer was 
drawing on this notion more because it was being used by other Protestant theologians, 
rather than any influence from the classical period or even from Roman Catholic moral 
theology.
401
  
 
Whatever the provenance of his use of the notion of suum cuique may be, what is 
interesting for this study is what he does with this concept. First, as we have seen from 
the opening sentences of this section, quoted above, he sees suum cuique as a statement 
of the rights related to the natural, thus an integral part of the manuscript „The Natural 
Life‟. This he also relates to his notion of the ultimate and the penultimate:  
Where justice in the given natural is sought, there the will and gift of the Creator 
is honoured, even in the world which lies in rebellion; and it points 
simultaneously to the fulfilment of all justice when Jesus Christ through the 
Holy Spirit will give to each his own. Thus the safeguarding of this sentence 
may in an authentic sense be spoken of as a penultimate which is determined by 
the ultimate (176). 
 
In using the concept, Bonhoeffer first counters one of the assumptions at work in 
Nazism, namely that the collective (the folk, the race, the state) has rights rather than 
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the individual. „Here the individual is only a means to an end in the service of the 
society. The happiness of the society stands above the natural right of the individual‟ 
(176). He goes on to argue against social eudaemonism, the concept that seeks to 
maximise the happiness of the collective which is at the heart of utilitarianism, even if 
that might more usually be expressed in terms of the happiness of the greatest number 
(with the possibility that it is a number of individuals in question, rather than a race, 
folk, or state being considered). He continues,  
Thereby however, the natural life itself is attacked and with the destruction of 
the right of the individual, the destruction of all justice whatsoever is begun and 
thus the path towards chaos is followed. It is therefore no coincidence that the 
consequence of social eudaemonism time and again has been the destruction 
also of the rights of the society through tyranny; the right of the individual is the 
supporting power of the right of the society, just as conversely the society 
carries and protects the right of the individual. That there is a natural right of the 
individual follows from the will of God to create the individual and to give him 
eternal life (177).
 402
 
 
In this passage two things are of note. First, as regards the mode of ethical thought, is 
Bonhoeffer‟s rejection of one major strand of ethical thinking, utilitarianism, or 
consequentialism. This is interesting particularly since, as noted in chapter two, his 
ethics has been seen as belonging to one of these two strands (2.4.3.d).
403
 Secondly, and 
of greater substance for Bonhoeffer‟s aims, the discussion of suum cuique gives him 
purchase in arguing against one of the foundational hallmarks of Nazi practice (the 
emphasis on the folk, race, state, at the expense of the individual and of whole groups of 
people), allowing him to do what he considers most necessary: namely to write an ethic 
for his time and place. 
 
Bonhoeffer‟s treatment, then, of suum cuique is interesting both because of his explicit 
rejection of one of virtue ethics‟ rival forms of ethical thought, and because of its 
historical and inherent proximity to virtue ethics, even if forms of deontology could also 
use the notion. More concretely, it provides a tool for countering one of the most basic 
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tenets of Nazi ideology, namely the primacy of the collective over the individual, as 
well as the popular ideology based on Nietschze‟s notion of the will to power. 
 
4.5.1.c: ‘The Right to Bodily Life ’404 
Following what we have seen in „The Natural Life‟, and continuing to draw on the 
points made in „suum cuique‟, comes a discussion of the most basic of rights, that of 
bodily life.
405
 The most immediate thing which demands attention in this context is that 
it is here that he lays the groundwork for addressing specific ethical issues for his time 
and place. That is to say, the work he does in this section illustrates his method of 
arguing when he does what he believes is most necessary, namely writing an ethic 
which is relevant to his own context. For that reason, it is important to consider 
carefully how he proceeds at this point. Bonhoeffer‟s first point is:  
Bodily life, which we receive without our cooperation, carries within itself the 
right to its sustenance. This is not a right which we have stolen or attained for 
ourselves, rather it is in the most direct sense „born with us‟, a received right 
which exists before our will, which rests in being itself (179).  
 
Thus, his first statement about this most basic of all rights is one which is drawn from 
what is observable by anyone (to wit, that a person receives her bodily life without any 
act of her own will or participation). It is an appeal which can be made to anyone, 
regardless of faith commitment or lack thereof.  
 
Only then does he continue: „Because according to God‟s will human life on earth only 
exists as bodily life, the body has the right to preservation for the sake of the whole 
person‟ (179). Thus Bonhoeffer‟s second appeal is one which is based on faith, but of 
the most generic sort: many forms of theism might be expected to recognize God‟s will 
as being involved in the fact that humans exist bodily rather than as non-embodied 
spirits on earth.  
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He then continues with arguments which are philosophical, rather than theological:  
Because all rights are extinguished with death, the preservation of bodily life is 
the foundation of all natural rights and therefore is endowed with particular 
importance. The most basic right of the natural life is the protection of the body 
from intentional harm, exploitation and killing. That may sound very sober and 
unheroic. However, the body is not primarily there to be sacrificed, rather to be 
preserved. That then from other and higher perspectives the right and duty may 
come to sacrifice the body has as its prerequisite the original right to the 
preservation of bodily life (179). 
 
Finally, his following point is a Christian theological point:  
Bodily life is, as is life generally, simultaneously a means to an end and an end 
in itself. It is idealistic, but not Christian, to understand the body exclusively as a 
means to an end. A means is dispensed with as soon as the end is reached. That 
is in accord with the view of the body as prison of the immortal soul, which 
abandons the body for ever at death. According to Christian teaching, the body 
has a higher worth. The person is a bodily being and remains such in eternity. 
Bodiliness and being human belong indivisibly together. Thus bodiliness, which 
is willed by God as the form of existence for humans, has as its due being an end 
in itself (179-80). 
 
This passage I take to be representative of Bonhoeffer‟s ethical reasoning when he 
addresses concrete issues (as well as having importance in being the groundwork for the 
rest of his argumentation). Typically he offers a rationale which is not theological, and 
only turns to theological arguments, often of a fairly basic level, after he has made his 
point.
406
 I shall examine another instance in the following to demonstrate this. 
 
Before that, however, it is worth looking at the content of one of his claims in this 
section regarding bodily life as an end in itself, namely his treatment of bodily pleasure:  
Bodily life as an end in itself is expressed in the bodily pleasures within the 
natural life. Were the body only a means to an end, then the person would have 
no right to bodily pleasures. An expedient minimum of bodily enjoyment should 
then not be exceeded. That would have very significant implications for a 
Christian appraisal of all problems related to the bodily life, such as dwelling, 
nutrition, clothing, leisure, recreation, sexuality. However, if the body is 
recognised as an end in itself, then there is a right to bodily pleasures without the 
necessity of these being subordinated to a higher purpose (180). 
 
The reason this passage is worth considering is the fact that it (and similar passages) 
give some indication of what kind of ethics could do justice to this way of arguing. 
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Certainly a deontological ethic (including divine command ethics) could choose to 
safeguard various rights. However, consequentialist theories could hardly express this 
notion, since they are generally based explicitly on some notion of intended outcome, 
which Bonhoeffer considers inimical to the essence of pleasure (180). Even if a 
consequentialist might argue that allowing for bodily pleasures promotes overall health 
and well-being of the individual, who is then able to contribute more fully to the 
happiness of the greatest number, this is an argument for bodily pleasures, but not on 
the grounds of the body being an end in itself. Similarly, situation ethics could argue for 
the place of bodily pleasures, but not on the same grounds as Bonhoeffer. It must be 
said that virtue ethics also need not contain such thought, but unlike the others, it can 
accommodate both the substance of Bonhoeffer‟s claims, and the grounds for making 
them. If bodily existence is recognised as being a condition of being human, then there 
is every reason for virtue ethics, at least one which includes eudaemonism, to consider 
that a virtuous person will live in a way which allows for full bodily flourishing, 
including such pleasures. 
 
4.6.1.d: Typical Example: Arbitrary Killing  
Bonhoeffer‟s discussion of the right not to be killed arbitrarily offers the first concrete 
example of his method of arguing.
407
 Again, as was the case in his more general 
comments, and as is typical of his treatment of almost all other issues, his starting point 
is philosophical rather than theological.
 408
  
The body is always „my‟ body, it can never, even in marriage, belong to another 
person in the same way as to me. My body is what separates me spatially from 
other persons and sets me as a person in opposition to other persons. Touching 
my body is an intervention in my personal existence (182).  
 
In view of all this, the „first right of the natural life consists in the protection of bodily 
life from arbitrary killing‟ (183). He then defines what he means by „arbitrary‟, which 
he relates to „innocence‟, the understanding of which is surely not Christian theological 
(„all have sinned‟, Romans 5:12) but legal in nature: „However, in this context every life 
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which is not undertaking an attack upon another life and which cannot be arrested for a 
criminal deed worthy of the death penalty is innocent‟ (183).409 He discusses exceptions 
such as the killing of an enemy soldier in war, the killing of a criminal endangering 
others, and unintentional killing of civilians in warfare, again not on theological 
grounds, but on philosophical grounds (183-4). 
 
Thus, his argument largely relies on philosophy rather than theology and even using the 
legal understanding of „innocence‟, which is at variance with a Christian interpretation. 
The motivation of the agent, important in virtue ethics, is of central importance in his 
category of arbitrary killing.  
 
4.6.1.e: Atypical Example – Suicide410   
The one topic Bonhoeffer treats which does not follow this pattern of arguing from 
reason with theological considerations offered only in support is suicide. It was less 
obviously an important issue in the context of Nazi Germany than certain other issues 
he addressed, such as euthanasia, yet it is clear that for Bonhoeffer, and perhaps for 
others in the Confessing Church as well as his co-conspirators, it was one of real 
personal concern. Bonhoeffer himself worried that he might not be able to keep the 
secrets which could save the lives of his own friends and family under the pressures of 
interrogation and torture.
411
 In the initial consideration of whether and when suicide 
may be permissible, Bonhoeffer‟s reasoning is much as before, namely of a 
philosophical nature.
412
 He first notes that it is a specifically human possibility, not open 
to other animals, and not unrelated to the possibility of sacrificing one‟s life for a higher 
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purpose, and then states that the possibility of taking one‟s own life is a right which is 
conditional upon having the freedom to do so, but this represents „an incomparable 
power, which can easily lead to misuse‟ (192). The temptation (and possible misuse) he 
sees as relating to trying to be the master of one‟s own fate, escaping from failure, loss 
of honour, loss of a loved-one, etc. (192-3). As he continues to discuss at length why a 
person may be attracted to the possibility of suicide, it is clear that his arguments are not 
going to lead to an absolute condemnation. Indeed, at this point one might expect that 
his overall evaluation might be that suicide is permissible, yet the tone changes radically 
when he turns to theological considerations (much earlier and with more weight than 
when treating other issues): 
However, if it is necessary to speak of the reprehensibility of suicide, then this is 
valid not before the forum of morality or of humans, but alone before God, who 
is the creator and Lord over his life. Because there is a living God, therefore 
suicide is reprehensible as the sin of lack of faith. Yet lack of faith is not a moral 
shortcoming, rather it is capable of motives and deeds both noble and mean. 
Lack of faith, however, does not reckon with the living God. That is the sin. The 
lack of faith is the reason for which the person grasps for his own justification 
and its last possibility in suicide, because he does not believe in a divine 
justification. The lack of faith hides from the person in a fatal way the fact that 
even suicide does not release him from the hand of God, who prepared for him 
his fate (194). 
 
Thus Bonhoeffer carries on his argument via the theological conviction that God is the 
author of life and therefore has the right to determine its end. Contrary to his usual 
mode of discourse, here it is the theological considerations which are lengthy and 
clearly determine his overall stance:  
God stands up for the right to life even against the one who has become weary 
of life. He gives the person the freedom to risk his life for something greater, but 
he does not want for this freedom to turn against that life. The person should 
place his earthly life, even where it becomes agonising, completely in God‟s 
hand, from whom he received it, and should not consider releasing himself from 
it through his own means. He only falls, indeed even dying, again in God‟s 
hand, which in life had become to hard for him (196). 
 
Also unlike in his other arguments, here Bonhoeffer considers individual cases which 
might genuinely test his theological treatment. „Because suicide is a deed of loneliness, 
the final decisive motives almost always remain hidden‟ (196). Here he makes the 
distinction between killing oneself or murdering oneself, whereby killing oneself could 
actually be an act of sacrificing one‟s own life for others, a deed which Bonhoeffer sees 
as possibly valid.  
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Making a ban on suicide absolute over against the freedom of sacrificing one‟s 
life can hardly be substantiated in the face of such cases. Even the old church 
fathers considered suicide among Christians to be allowed in certain 
circumstances, for instance if chastity was threatened by violence, even if 
Augustine disagreed and made the ban on suicide absolute (197).
413
  
 
Thus he uses particular cases and common sense reasoning and even church history or 
tradition to place a caveat on the theological stance he has given. As he continues the 
argument, he uses examples to show that it might be difficult to know in individual 
cases whether the act should be considered suicide or what he takes to be a „Christian 
duty‟ to give to another the last place in a life boat, or to protect a friend from a bullet, 
even by taking that bullet oneself (198): „One‟s own decision becomes here the cause of 
one‟s own death, even if the difference remains between the direct suicide and the 
risking of life, in which life is given over to God‟ (198).  
 
The whole discussion of suicide juxtaposes arguments from reason which would seem 
often to allow or even honour suicide with arguments from theology which would 
forbid it, at least generally. This is the only discussion in which Bonhoeffer‟s position 
seems to be ambivalent. The discussion is also unique in that his arguments from reason 
do not support his theological statements, and it is significant that in such circumstances 
the theological position has the final say. Although this discussion is atypical in these 
ways, it follows the pattern of emphasizing the motives of the agent, which is important 
in virtue ethics. 
 
4.6.1.f: Assessment of Bonhoeffer’s Mode of Argument  
What, then, should be made of the way Bonhoeffer goes about making his case when he 
is dealing with issues of real moment for his own time and place? The first thing which 
is important to address is that his mode of arguing may or may not relate to how his 
own views have been formed. Thus when I say that he does not argue often from an 
explicitly theological standpoint this does not mean that his own thinking was not 
influenced by theological convictions. To the contrary, the fact that his philosophical 
arguments almost always coincide with a Christian stance may well be an indication 
that, like Milton, Bonhoeffer perhaps is trying to explain the ways of God to man, using 
arguments which those without Christian commitments might understand and find 
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persuasive. This would be further supported by the fact that in many cases the 
theological foundations present are quite basic, and not necessarily even Christian: 
namely drawing on God as creator, a premise which theists of almost any hue would 
accept. All of this is not to deny that Bonhoeffer‟s own upbringing in a kind of Christian 
humanism might not have played a role in how he chose to argue his case, but simply to 
underscore that it would be too simplistic to assume that his mode of argument must 
necessarily correspond to how his own positions were formed. 
 
It would be possible to suggest that Bonhoeffer‟s mode of argument in this section may 
have been influenced by the fact, as noted above, that he was working in the monastery 
in Ettal, having conversations with the abbot, using the library, and was working with at 
least one of Josef Pieper‟s texts. It is, of course, the normal mode for Roman Catholic 
moral theology to address not merely Catholics or Christians but all people of good will. 
In doing so, arguments are typically mounted on philosophical rather than theological 
grounds.
414
 It is impossible to be sure how much influence there might have been, but it 
seems to me, given how nuanced he is in taking up the theme of the natural but 
distancing himself in many ways from Roman Catholic positions, that even if there was 
influence, Bonhoeffer would not have used this mode of argument unless it suited his 
own purposes. I would also suggest that he would not do so against his own theological 
convictions. If he is happy to address ethical issues in ways which might be persuasive 
to non-Christians, it would at least accord with his notion that everything good is to be 
claimed and won for Christ (350-1). 
 
Hence, it is important to ask what his purposes and who his intended readers might have 
been, for it is possible that his choice of mode of discourse might have related to the 
form of argument he thought might be most persuasive. The internal evidence in the 
manuscripts otherwise would suggest that Bonhoeffer was writing a work of theological 
ethics. Yet it would seem that when he attends to specific issues of great moment in 
Nazi Germany he is not writing with academic theologians, or even necessarily 
Christians, in mind. Of course this is one of the many areas in which the fact that these 
manuscripts are unfinished fragments makes it necessary to speak only tentatively and 
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provisionally, and in such a fashion it is at least possible to construe his intended work 
not only as a concrete ethic for his time and place, but as an ethic which may speak to a 
broad readership (since at that time there would have been a relatively small number of 
people who were not theists of some sort). 
 
The relationship between his own philosophical and theological thinking is most 
severely tested by the issue of suicide, which is the one place where Bonhoeffer‟s 
theological stance is not in agreement with the arguments he puts forward from reason, 
as he claims that suicide can only be condemnable before God but not before the forum 
of morality or human judgement (194). Thus in this one case only, Bonhoeffer does not 
make a philosophical case for why his theological stance is right. Indeed, to use his own 
words written about Barth from prison, one might even say that Bonhoeffer is guilty 
here of „Offenbarungspositivismus’, a positivism of revelation. Suicide is wrong, 
Bonhoeffer says, because there is a living God, the Creator, to whom the decisions of 
life and death belong (194). Suicide is wrong because it is the human attempt at self-
justification, rather than the dependence on God for justification (195-6). Ultimately, his 
case is that suicide is wrong because God says so. „Friss Vogel oder stirb!‟ „Take it or 
leave it!‟415 Therefore, it is suggestive that when Bonhoeffer‟s theology and philosophy 
do not concur, it is theology which is decisive. This strengthens the case for assuming 
that even if Bonhoeffer argues primarily in non-theological ways, it is his theology 
which more fundamentally informs his thinking. 
 
However one may best construe the reasons for Bonhoeffer‟s mode of argument, there 
are at least some preliminary conclusions to be drawn. The first is that this way of 
discussing particular subjects does not relate to a deontological ethic, where one might 
expect more discussion of rules, or, in a Christian context, more citation of (scriptural) 
laws or commands (196-8).  
 
Secondly, his mode of argument is never consequentialist in that his concern is not the 
outcome of actions, let alone the notion of the „greatest happiness for the greatest 
number‟. In contrast with this, he is often concerned to preserve the good of the 
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individual over the perceived good of the society, as in his comments regarding 
euthanasia (187-9).  
 
Thirdly, it would seem that in many instances the factor which holds most sway (apart 
from the relationship of the Creator to the natural rights) is the motive for the action. It 
is worth noting how often Bonhoeffer refers to what is an evil as „arbitrary‟, suggesting 
that it is the lack of an adequate or acceptable rationale or motivation which causes an 
action to be wrong. So „arbitrary killing‟ is wrong, whereas there may well be 
acceptable reasons for killing (as in warfare, or killing a criminal, 183-4); similarly 
„arbitrarily robbing‟ someone‟s freedom is wrong (215-6), with the implication that 
there are appropriate times for imprisoning persons. Also, Bonhoeffer leaves open the 
question of whether abortion may be appropriate if the motive is saving the mother‟s 
life (204, his note 4). Similarly in his discussion of contraception, motive plays a large 
role in that he recognises both a need for responsibility in determining how many 
children there are in a family, and the need for spouses to have sexual communion even 
when further children are not intended (205-7). Likewise it is a matter of motive (as 
well as the pragmatic question of whether other means might be available) which 
decides whether voluntary sterilisation may be admissible (210). However, noting the 
repeated treatment of motive as an important if not decisive factor in his assessments 
does not yet make it easy to claim that Bonhoeffer is engaging in some form of virtue 
ethics. Situation ethics might also regard the motivation to be important, yet given that 
Bonhoeffer does not give any overarching criterion which would be decisive in the 
situation (such as the question of what might be the most loving thing to do), the case 
for seeing Bonhoeffer as a situation ethicist is not straight-forward. 
 
Thus from the examination of Bonhoeffer‟s method of arguing, it seems that he operates 
from a Christian theological viewpoint, but most frequently arguing philosophically, 
and overtly stating only fairly general theist positions. This, I take it, tells us more about 
his intended readership than it does about how his positions are actually formed and 
informed. That there may be a Roman Catholic influence on his mode of discourse is 
too flimsy a basis for claiming his ethics to be some form of virtue ethics, especially 
given the way casuistry had almost eclipsed virtue ethics. Nonetheless, his way of 
treating specific issues is not obviously deontological, utilitarian or situationist, and his 
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emphasis on motives may make a relationship to virtue ethics more likely than any of 
the other schools of ethical thought. 
 
4.6.2: Mode of Ethical Discourse in the Letters and Papers from 
Prison 
Even if one grants that Bonhoeffer‟s way of arguing his case when dealing with specific 
themes in the Ethics shows more affinity to virtue ethics than other forms, one may yet 
rightly ask whether there are any other examples of concrete ethics in his late writings, 
and if so how he goes about his discussion there. Certainly, given that much of his 
writing even in prison seems to have been related to his „große Arbeit‟ – his large work, 
or perhaps his magnum opus, namely on ethics – it would be surprising if there were no 
examples of concrete ethical discussion.
416
 It is all the more important to look for such 
instances because Bonhoeffer has been seen as an impulsive thinker, and it may be 
thought that Bonhoeffer might have changed his tack. As Gerhard Jacobi, a pastor and 
the president of the Confessing Church in Berlin, put it,  
Some of his spontaneous definitions he wrote down. He would have declined to 
develop from them as it were a whole theology. Even though his thoughts were 
clearly and precisely defined, they often became questionable again to him, 
especially when expressed in print or writing.
417
  
 
Thus I turn now to an instance of a specific ethical issue treated in the prison writings. 
 
The one sustained treatment of an ethical issue in this period is his essay, „What does it 
mean to tell the truth?‟418 Here his argument is that we are taught to tell the truth by our 
parents and to our parents and so „this demand applies strictly only within the family 
circle‟ (619-20). Moreover the demand to tell the truth is dependent on the role within 
the family relationships: a child cannot demand truthfulness from the parent, and the 
truthfulness from parent to child is of a different order. „The question must be asked 
whether and in what way a person is entitled to demand speech in accordance with truth 
of another‟. Speech differs according to relation of the persons speaking, thus 
communications between, for instance, husband and wife, parent and child, friends, 
teacher and pupil, authority and subject, or enemies are by nature different, and 
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therefore a different truth conveyed (620). To the possible objection that truth is not 
owed to a person but to God, Bonhoeffer counters that God is not a general principle but 
the living God, and serving him is service in the real world in which Jesus Christ 
became incarnate (620-1).  
The truthfulness of our words which is owed to God must assume a concrete 
form in the world. Our word should not be in principle but concretely in 
accordance with the truth. Something not concretely in accordance with the truth 
is, before God, not at all in accordance with the truth (621). 
 
Bonhoeffer then uses the concept of reality to explore what „telling the truth‟ might 
entail in complex circumstances.  
The real must be expressed in words. Therein consists speech in accordance with 
reality. It is always concerned with the „right word‟. Finding this is an issue of 
long, earnest and ever progressive effort on the basis of experience and 
recognition of the real. To say how something really is, i.e. to speak in 
accordance with reality, perception and thinking must direct themselves toward 
how reality is in God and through God and towards God (622).  
 
Yet Bonhoeffer considers it superficial to imagine that some circumstances require 
truthful speech while others do not.  
Every word which I ever speak stands under the demand to be true; completely 
irrespective of the truthfulness of its content, the relationship between me and 
another person which is expressed in it is true or untrue…. The individual word 
is always a part of a whole of reality which wants to be expressed. According to 
whom I address, by whom I am questioned, about what I speak my word, if it is 
to be according to the truth, it must be a different one. The word which is in 
accordance with the truth is not a quantity which in itself is constant, but is as 
alive as life itself. Where it looses itself from life and from the relationship to 
the concrete other person, where the „truth is told‟ without observing to whom I 
say it, there it has only the appearance but not the essence of truth (622-3). 
 
The one who does not make these distinctions Bonhoeffer calls a cynic. While such a 
person claims to tell the truth to everyone always in the same way, he 
wounds shame, profanes mystery, breaks trust, betrays the community in which 
he lives, and laughs arrogantly about the wasteland which he has caused, about 
the human weakness which „cannot bear the truth‟. He says that truth is 
destructive and demands its sacrifice, and he feels himself to be a god over the 
weak creatures and does not know that he serves Satan (623). 
 
Bonhoeffer then contrasts the truth which is of Satan and God‟s truth.  
There is a truth which is of Satan. Its essence is that it denies all that is real 
under the pretence of truth. It lives from hatred of the real, of the world which is 
created and loved by God. It gives the appearance of executing God‟s judgement 
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of the sinful Fall of the real. But God‟s truth judges out of love for the created, 
which Satan‟s truth judges out of envy and hatred. God‟s truth has become flesh 
in the world, is alive in the real; Satan‟s truth is the death of all that is real (623-
4). 
 
The first question to ask in this context relates to the nature of Bonhoeffer‟s argument. 
It is clear from the preceding that his discussion is not especially theological. Although 
he uses the language of „God‟ and „Satan‟ and assumes a particular relation of each to 
truth, his argument does not in fact depend upon the acceptance of this position. Rather 
his discussion hangs on certain assumptions about appropriate behaviour in various 
circumstances and the distinctiveness of various kinds of relating.  Perhaps it also 
depends upon the shared observation of „truth‟ being used in many situations as a 
weapon to wound others. At all events, this discussion falls under the broad category of 
„philosophical‟ rather than theological. 
 
Having said this, it is also important to ask what kind of ethic this is? It can hardly be 
Kantian, since he rejects the form of truth-telling which one might call a „categorical 
imperative‟ as „cynical‟ and „of Satan‟. It would seem that he is adopting some form 
which is more malleable, but how is it best understood? It might seem relativist, in that 
the truth to be told seems to be a relative one. Yet there is no appeal to what conscience 
might dictate, nor to what appears to be right to the agent. In fact, it would seem that the 
truth to be told is not so much „relative‟ as something which parents can teach their 
children in terms of what is appropriate:  
Educationally it is therefore of the greatest importance that parents somehow 
(which is not to be discussed here) make understandable to the child the 
differentiation of these spheres of life [family, school, friends, etc.] and his 
responsibilities (621). 
 
Many, as we have already seen, have argued that his ethics is situationist, and it would 
seem that he is here appealing to the specifics of situation. However, two things need to 
be highlighted. First, the aspect of the given situation which Bonhoeffer mentions over 
and over again is the relationship between the two parties in conversation, which seems 
to me to be quite particular and may relate best to other forms of ethics, especially 
virtue ethics and relational ethics. Secondly, there is no appeal to some guiding 
principle, such as asking what the most loving thing to do is.  
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What seems to be the case is that Bonhoeffer is arguing here along similar lines to those 
he advocates in the Ethics when he treats the notion of suum cuique, asking specifically 
what is owed to whom. This becomes more pronounced when he offers a specific case. 
An example: a child is asked in front of the class by his teacher whether it is true 
that his father often comes home drunk. It is true, but the child negates it. He has 
been brought into a situation by the teacher‟s question for which he is not 
prepared. Indeed he feels that an unjustified invasion in the order of the family is 
occurring which he must resist. What happens in the family does not belong [in 
discussion] before the school class. The family has its own secret which it has to 
protect. The teacher has disregarded the reality of this order. The child should 
find a way in his answer in which the orders of the family and of the school are 
equally upheld. He cannot do that yet; he lacks the experience, the perception 
and the ability for the right expression. Although the answer is untrue, in that he 
simply negates the teacher‟s question, yet it gives expression to the truth, 
nevertheless, that the family is an order sui generis in which the teacher was not 
justified to intrude. Although one can call the child‟s answer a lie, nonetheless 
this lie contains more truth, i.e. it is more in accordance with reality than if the 
child had betrayed his father‟s weakness in front of the class. The child acted 
rightly according to the measure of his perception. The blame for the lie 
rebounds solely on the teacher. An experienced person in the child‟s place could 
have, while correcting the questioner, also avoided the formal opposition to the 
truth of the answer, and thereby have found the „right word‟ in the situation 
(625). 
 
One of the things which is interesting about Bonhoeffer‟s „case study‟, if I may call it 
that, is that the aspects of the situation which seem to salient in his treatment are the 
questions of who the agent is, with whom she is dealing, what the setting is, and how 
the actions are done. It is important that the agent is a child, whose experience of life 
has not yet afforded him the understanding to be able to do what Bonhoeffer thinks 
should be done, namely correct the teacher‟s behaviour while still answering without 
the „formal‟ lie or any betrayal of the father‟s drunkenness. According to the child‟s 
ability, he has acted correctly. Yet it is not only the child‟s own capabilities which 
matter; Bonhoeffer makes much of the fact that the teacher is interfering, that the blame 
for the „lie‟ told therefore falls on him, and that although there is a relationship of 
authority which Bonhoeffer would surely assume is to be respected,
419
 a more 
experienced person would nonetheless correct the teacher‟s inappropriate questioning. 
Similarly, although Bonhoeffer does not make much of the fact, the setting of asking 
such a question before the whole class is significant, for if there might be circumstances 
in which it is appropriate for a teacher to ask about private matters (and I think in our 
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society this is much more likely to be the case), it is not in front of the whole class 
where the child may then suffer taunts or bullying from the others, and may expose the 
family to gossip. Finally, it seems important in Bonhoeffer‟s account to consider the 
motivation for how the child acts, in this case to protect his family from wrongful 
interference. What is interesting about all of these considerations is that they are all part 
of what Aquinas considers to be important aspects surrounding an act which help 
determine what is the right course to take (or how a completed action is to be judged).
420
 
Furthermore, it is clearly the case that Bonhoeffer is deeply concerned with what 
Thomas would call prudence, and what he refers to in terms of experience, perception 
(or discernment, Erkenntnis) and capability. In this case it would seem that Bonhoeffer 
praises the child‟s perception that his first loyalty is to his family and that the teacher‟s 
question is out of line, even if his experience and capability are not yet developed 
enough to allow him to handle the situation as well as might be. It seems to me that 
these features of his example are quite telling, and place his mode of reasoning again in 
the vicinity of virtue ethics. 
 
Also noteworthy is his emphasis on the development of what is required to act well. We 
have already seen that he is interested in the role parents should play in teaching their 
children to recognise what is appropriate in the different areas of their lives. Here we 
see again that Bonhoeffer assumes that the ability to act well is learned over time and 
with experience. This is, of course, one of the basic assumptions of classical virtue 
ethics, that the capacity to act well is taught, trained, disciplined, and learned over time. 
 
From all this it seems safe to say that Bonhoeffer‟s mode of arguing did not change 
greatly after he wrote his Ethics manuscripts in terms of the use of „philosophical‟ and 
theological arguments regarding concrete issues. Furthermore in this short case study 
Bonhoeffer‟s account seems to have real affinity with virtue ethics. Perhaps this is all 
the more important in this study, since this essay was not written in the monastic 
context or under direct influence of Roman Catholic moral teaching. 
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4.7: Conclusions 
What we have seen in this chapter is, first, that Bonhoeffer‟s theology has a strong place 
for the doctrine of sanctification, especially in Discipleship, which is a sustained 
treatment of justification and sanctification, issuing its stern warning against the cheap 
grace which does not recognise the necessity of being sanctified. Moreover, it is clear 
that Bonhoeffer did not revise his views as he was writing the Ethics manuscripts. Here 
he continued to work with the theme from Discipleship of conformation to Christ, or 
sanctification, as a work of Christ himself in the believer. However, he also developed 
what was to become an important theme, namely referring to justification and 
sanctification in terms of the ultimate and the penultimate, a theme which appears in 
manuscripts written in the early and late periods of writing. Furthermore, Bonhoeffer 
continued in prison to refer to things in terms of the ultimate and penultimate, which 
suggests that he did not in any way revise his thinking either in terms of the importance 
of a right understanding of the relationship of justification and sanctification, nor in 
terms of how best to express this. This emphasis on sanctification is important in 
considering how Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics is related to virtue ethics, because in a Christian 
context virtue ethics can be expressed theologically in terms of the growth in holiness or 
Christ-likeness which is sanctification. 
 
Secondly, we have seen that the overall concerns expressed in the Ethics are, at the very 
least, not inimical to virtue ethics, and in many cases seem to accord particularly well. 
The Christian foundations he is attempting to lay, with his emphasis on the Fall, grace, 
and Christology are all appropriate in Christian virtue ethics. His repeated insistence on 
the need for concrete ethics may sit no better or worse with virtue ethics than any other 
type; certainly there are construals of virtue ethics which are quite abstract. Yet, with its 
inherent focus on the agent and the specifics surrounding the act in question, there is 
already an element of particularity to virtue ethics. This makes it easy, I think, for virtue 
ethics to take his concern seriously, and perhaps such a formulation of virtue ethics 
would be the stronger for doing so. Similarly, Bonhoeffer‟s interest in the historical 
placement of his concrete ethics sits easily with virtue ethics, at least for a twenty-first 
century reader familiar with more recent formulations of virtue ethics which take 
seriously both the historical setting, and the narrative quality of human life. In the case 
of Bonhoeffer‟s treatment of the relation of the church and the world, with his stark 
J. Moberly The Virtue of Bonhoeffer’s Ethics 175 
refusal to countenance any dualism, it seems to me that virtue ethics, again, accords 
particularly well. Since it is concerned with the whole of life, rather than specific 
decisions or discrete acts treated in an atomistic way, there is less scope for 
compartmentalising or for dualistic thinking. Finally, Bonhoeffer‟s interest in structures 
for ethical life, including his treatment of responsibility and his development of the 
notion of divine mandates, is not necessarily mirrored within most accounts of virtue 
ethics. However, the interrelatedness of persons which underlies his treatment of 
responsibility is an understanding which fits well with virtue ethics, and the clear 
insistence that every part of life requires right action (virtuous living) is quite clearly 
related to virtue ethics‟ concern with living well. 
 
Thirdly, I have identified two aspects of Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics which seem to be related 
to virtue ethics. One is his understanding of human nature, which sees humans as 
communal beings, and sees life as ongoing and developing, rather than assuming people 
to be isolated or existing without past or anticipated future. Another is his holistic 
conception of human life: his moral scope is for the entirety of life, including everyday 
life. While these things are not „ethical‟ as such, they are foundational for the kind of 
ethics one can then formulate, and it seems to me that Bonhoeffer‟s anthropology and 
his treatment of the whole of life accord better with virtue ethics than with other 
approaches to ethical thought. 
 
Fourthly, there are themes within the Ethics which may be seen as virtue ethical. Most 
notable is the theme of „conformation‟ or „ethics as formation‟ with the focus on the 
agent being formed by Christ into his likeness. This has little affinity with acquiring 
virtues, but much with God‟s infusing virtues in the believer. Moreover, there are 
certain aspects which seem almost to function as virtues in Bonhoeffer‟s thought, 
namely simplicity and cleverness, and something Bonhoeffer often does not name but 
which looks very like prudence, enabling the right perception of what is required. 
Additionally, there are elements of virtue-ethical thinking which can be found in a 
number of his other works. 
 
Finally, we have seen that when Bonhoeffer does write about specific issues, when he is 
concrete, there are at least some observable influences from Roman Catholic moral 
theology, which make a certain proximity to virtue ethics seem less improbable than it 
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might do otherwise. Here he affirms the natural life and develops a Protestant 
theological position for incorporating much from Catholic thought whilst also 
correcting its rule-based manualist tendencies. His mode of argument is often 
philosophical rather than overtly theological, and when he does argue from a 
specifically theological stance, it is often of low level, even theist, nature. These factors 
suggest that Bonhoeffer hoped to be persuasive to a wide range of people, not just 
Christians, reminiscent of Roman Catholic moral teaching addressing all people of good 
will, rather than simply „the faithful‟. More important than such signs of influence, 
however, in writing about specific issues Bonhoeffer argues in ways which show real 
affinity with virtue ethics, with a focus on who the agent is as well as the circumstances 
involved and the motivation for acting. In these ways Bonhoeffer‟s concrete ethics 
seems to be in close proximity to virtue ethics, and rather harder to align with other 
forms of ethical thought. For instance it would be hard to show a link with deontology, 
in that he does not argue on the basis of obligations, rules, laws or commandments. It 
would be even harder to make a case for a connection with utilitarianism because he 
does not address the outcomes of actions, but rejects arguments based on utility. 
Similarly it would be problematic to see him as offering a form of situation ethics, given 
the fact that he rarely argues in terms of the contours of the situation, and when he does 
they only exceptionally influence his stance.
421
 Finally, although there are strong links 
with relational ethics, especially in his treatment of lying, there are many features of his 
ethics (apart from human interrelatedness), such as the agent‟s motive for her action, 
which are not necessarily a part of relational ethics. Taking all this into consideration, 
Bonhoeffer‟s way of making his case on concrete issues would place him closer to 
virtue ethics than any other mode of ethical discourse. 
 
Yet it would be rash to claim that Bonhoeffer was really expounding virtue ethics under 
another guise, or without using the term. Even if there are many elements which relate 
well to virtue ethics, and many others which seem even „virtue-ethical‟, there is still a 
large question regarding the influence of Karl Barth and his divine command ethics 
which must be addressed. To this I now turn. 
  
                                                          
421
 Thus on a ship where effective quarantine is impossible and there is an outbreak of the plague 
euthanasia may be admissible, DBW 6:191. 
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Chapter 5: Divine Command and/or 
Virtue Ethics 
 
5.1: Introduction 
Having looked at virtue ethics and related themes in Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics, it is now 
necessary to ask how virtue ethics relates to the other major strand of ethical thinking 
identified in these manuscripts, namely, divine command ethics.
422
 To do this, I shall 
first of all trace his usage of this latter motif in the Ethics (5.2). This should show 
clearly the extent of his usage of this mode of considering ethics, and thereby establish 
the need to consider the place of divine command in any proposal for understanding his 
Ethics as related to virtue ethics. 
 
Secondly, I shall engage more fully than hitherto with the proposals by Larry 
Rasmussen and Stephen Plant regarding how these two strands of ethical thinking 
within Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics might be related (5.3). This is important, since these are two 
significant commentators who have discussed divine command and conformation as the 
key motifs in Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics, yet they have different understandings of the 
relationship between them. Thus it is good to explore their understandings and consider 
the strengths and weaknesses of each proposal before continuing with my own 
examination of the issues at stake. 
 
In this examination, I shall explore issues which are treated in both of these modes of 
ethical thought (5.4). Here I hope to discover what, if any, difference is made by the 
form of his ethical thought to the concerns he addresses. This should help to clarify the 
strengths and weaknesses of Plant‟s and Rasmussen‟s respective positions. From this it 
should be possible to draw conclusions about these two strands in Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics, 
and what the role of virtue ethics is in this work (5.5). 
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5.2: Divine Command in Bonhoeffer’s Ethics  
In exploring Bonhoeffer‟s use of divine command in his Ethics, it is necessary to 
distinguish between a more general influence of Barth‟s theology on Bonhoeffer and 
specific dependence on divine command ethics. Bonhoeffer‟s use of Barthian language 
is so pervasive that an attempt to discuss all such influence would require a study 
devoted to that.
423
 Instead I am interested simply in how Bonhoeffer uses Barth‟s notion 
that God‟s command comes afresh to the Christian in a given moment. So understood, 
divine command ethics can be said to be both actualist (focused on the act in response 
to command) and particularist (focused on the concrete moment, not presuming 
continuity between what has been commanded in the past and what will be commanded 
in the present).
424
 As such, this is in strong contrast both to a deontology which assumes 
a set of stable rules and to virtue ethics, which focuses on the agent and her 
development of qualities over time which enable her to live well. 
 
For this study, then, I shall focus on key terms which may suggest the dependence on 
this form of divine command, especially „command‟ (both as noun, Gebot, and verb, 
gebieten), obedience (Gehorsamkeit, or obey, Gehorsam leisten), and references to 
God‟s will (der Wille Gottes). Clearly, the use of these words is not sufficient to assert 
that Bonhoeffer is using divine command theory in relevant passages; however, such 
language is central to this motif and should enable its usage to be highlighted. 
 
5.2.1: Divine Command Language in the Early Manuscripts  
5.2.1.a: Command 
The first thing to note here is that in the earlier manuscripts (where virtue-ethical 
aspects are frequently observable), there is little mention of „command‟. However, in 
the first passage where he treats the notion of the mandates, Bonhoeffer states,  
Not because work, authority, church is, is it divinely commanded (geboten); 
rather because it is commanded by God, therefore it is, and only so far as its 
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being – consciously or unconsciously – submits to the divine task, is it a divine 
mandate (56, his emphases).
425
  
 
Here the language of command is used as well as submission, which implies obedience 
in this case. Given that the discussion is about areas of life (as addressed by the 
mandates) this is, however, not precisely the actualist or particularist form of divine 
command ethics one might expect. 
 
Also in his discussion of „Ethics as Formation‟ Bonhoeffer introduces the language of 
command (and obedience) without necessarily depending on divine command theory:  
Ethics as formation is thus the venture to speak, neither abstractly nor 
casuistically, neither programmatically nor purely speculatively, of the form of 
Jesus Christ taking form in our world. Here concrete judgements and decisions 
must be risked. Here the decision and act can no longer be pushed off on the 
individual‟s conscience, but rather here there are concrete commands and 
directions for which obedience is demanded (89).  
 
Here too commands (and directions) are given for which obedience in required, but not 
in the manner of divine command ethics, but rather in the context of Christ winning 
form in the believer, conforming her to himself. This implies a degree of continuity of 
agency, and a focus on the agent rather than her isolated acts.  
 
Finally, and more closely related to Barth‟s conception is the first discussion of 
„simplicity and cleverness‟, where Bonhoeffer states that the simple person „is the man 
of undivided heart. Because he knows and has God, he depends on the commands [or 
commandments], on the judgement and on the mercy which proceed daily anew from 
the mouth of God‟ (67).426 Here we have not simply the language of command, but the 
Barthian notion that commands come to the Christian ever afresh from God. This surely 
is a clear instance of Bonhoeffer‟s use of this motif, not expounding it as such, but using 
it to discuss the (God-given) attributes of the person, simplicity and cleverness. 
 
From these passages it is clear that Bonhoeffer does use the language of command, 
sometimes overtly as the Barthian form of ethics, though more often simply as the motif 
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of command and obedience. This is the case even when his emphasis is most clearly on 
the formational (virtue-like) aspects of ethics, as seen when he addresses his notion of 
mandates, when he defines what appear to be something like infused virtues (simplicity 
and cleverness), and within his notion of ethics as formation.  
 
5.2.1.b: Obedience 
As with „command‟, there are also only a few references to „obedience‟ in the early 
manuscripts, one of which we have already seen. Two more occur in his discussion of 
the mandates, where he says that „marriage is not only the place of the conception but 
also the teaching of children to obey Jesus Christ‟ (58). Likewise, in discussing the 
divine mandate of authority, he states, „legislation and the power of the sword 
preserves…the world for the reality of Jesus Christ. Everyone owes obedience to this 
authority – for Christ‟s sake‟ (59). These examples show usage of the notion of 
(command and) obedience, but do not depend on Barthian divine command as such. 
 
5.2.1.c: The Will of God 
Finally, the will of God, like the notions of command and obedience, is only rarely 
mentioned in the early manuscripts. The first reference to it, however, occurs in his 
justly famous opening sentence:  
It is an incomparable imposition which must be addressed to everyone who 
wants even to look at the problem of a Christian ethic, namely the imposition to 
abandon from the outset as inappropriate to the issue both questions which lead 
him to be concerned with the ethical problem at all – „how can I become good?‟ 
and „how can I do something good?‟ – and instead to ask the question about the 
will of God (31).  
 
He picks up this theme again later in the manuscript:  
We discussed at the beginning that the question of the will of God must take the 
place of the question of one‟s being good and doing good. The will of God, 
however, is nothing other than the becoming real of the reality of Christ among 
us and in our world. The will of God is thus neither an idea which demands 
realisation first; it is much more itself already reality in the self-revelation of 
God in Jesus Christ. The will of God is however not simply identical with that 
which exists such that subjection to what exists might be its fulfilment; it is 
much more a reality which, in what exists and against what exists, wants ever 
afresh to become real…. After the appearance of Christ, ethics can only be 
concerned with one thing, namely with receiving a share of the reality of the 
fulfilled will of God. But also this receiving a share is only possible because of 
the fact that, in the fulfilment of the will of God in Christ, I myself am also 
included, and that means [I am] reconciled with God. The question of the will of 
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God does not inquire about something hidden or unfulfilled, but rather about 
what is revealed, fulfilled. However, therein remains yet a genuine question, 
whether I myself, and the world which surrounds me, am placed in this question 
by the fulfilment (60-1). 
 
From these passages it seems clear that the will of God, while not mentioned often in 
the earlier manuscripts, plays a decisive role in the first manuscript, which we have 
already seen has real affinities with virtue ethics. Furthermore, it is not simply that the 
will of God is central here to Bonhoeffer‟s conception of ethics; in speaking of the will 
of God in terms of a reality which „wants ever afresh to become real‟ Bonhoeffer 
displays some of the actualist and particularist aspects of Barth‟s account.  
 
Thus it is possible to say that in the first manuscripts, which overtly have more in 
common with virtue ethics than divine command ethics, there are relationships with 
divine command ethics which require further exploration. 
 
5.2.2: Divine Command Language in Later Manuscripts  
Tracing the language of divine command in this detail in the manuscripts written after 
Bonhoeffer had acquired Barth‟s Church Dogmatics II/2 would be more demanding, for 
the concept of command most particularly is almost omnipresent in these later 
writings.
427
 Therefore, I shall concentrate on the major themes with which it is 
connected (5.2.2.a), and further quotations referring to command will appear in 
connection with „obedience‟ (5.2.2.b) and „will of God‟ (5.2.2.c). 
 
5.2.2.a: Command 
First, we have already noted the importance of Christology in the Ethics, and divine 
command ethics is treated Christologically: God‟s command is revealed in Jesus Christ 
(383-4, 392, 397). In the final manuscript Bonhoeffer even makes direct reference to 
„the command of Jesus Christ‟ (406). Thus, as with virtue-ethical aspects of 
Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics, divine command ethics is given Bonhoeffer‟s characteristic 
Christological emphasis. 
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Similarly, command language is used in relation to Bonhoeffer‟s insistence that ethics 
must be concrete:  
While the „ethical‟ is concerned in the final analysis with defining and creating 
territory for living together [i.e. personal involvement as opposed to the role of 
observer or judge, 372-3] in the whole fullness of life, the command is 
concerned with this „living together‟ even in its concrete contents and in the 
human freedom which is enabled and within these [concrete contents] (390). 
 
Making this linkage between divine command and concrete ethics clearer is the fact that 
he planned to follow up this section with a consideration of „the concrete command of 
God‟ (391). However, it is worth considering that „command‟ in this passage does not 
necessarily refer to something actualistic or particularistic. Instead it refers to „the whole 
fullness of life‟, which is related in thought to his earlier notion of „the natural‟, and to 
his later discussion of the „latitude of freedom‟.  This example is a good reminder that 
although the later manuscripts contain much Barthian language, his talk of „command‟ 
does not always mean divine command ethics. 
 
 
5.2.2.b: Obedience 
Given the persistent usage of „command‟, one might expect to see an equally 
heightened usage of its corollary, „obedience‟. This, however, is not the case; instead 
there are relatively few passages concerned with this notion. One reason for this may be 
the fact, as just seen, that Bonhoeffer often is using „command‟ to refer to the whole of 
life, rather than to actualistic, particularistic events.  
 
However, in the context of speaking about an important theme in his Ethics, 
responsibility, in the second version of „History and the Good‟, Bonhoeffer draws on 
the notion of obedience in stark terms: „Jesus stands before God as the obedient one and 
the free one. As the obedient one he does the will of the Father in blind following of the 
law commanded him. As the free one, he affirms the will out of his most personal 
[„eigenster’] recognition‟ (288).428  
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In this passage Bonhoeffer shows the relationship between responsibility and obedience, 
and between freedom and determination: „Obedience has fettered hands; freedom is 
creative. In obedience the person keeps God‟s Decalogue; in freedom the person creates 
new decalogues (Luther)‟ (288). In this instance, „obedience‟ is centred on the person of 
Christ and stands in continuity with his Christological emphasis. However, the form it 
takes is not necessarily divine command ethics, for Bonhoeffer does not make explicit 
that the person who „creates new decalogues‟ is doing so in constant attention to the 
command of God which comes constantly afresh. 
 
Even if Bonhoeffer does not speak of obedience frequently, when he does it is often in 
stark terms:  
God‟s command is God‟s speech to the person, and specifically, in its content as 
well as in its form, [it is] concrete speech to the concrete person. God‟s 
command allows the person no room for application, for interpretation, rather 
only for obedience or disobedience (382). 
 
This idea he repeats later in the same manuscript, „The “Ethical” and the “Christian” as 
a Theme‟:  
God‟s command as that which is revealed in Jesus Christ is always a concrete 
speaking to someone, never an abstract speaking about something or someone. It 
is always an address, a claim, and that in such a comprehensive and 
simultaneously determining way that there is no longer the freedom of 
interpretation and of application, but rather only the freedom of obedience or 
disobedience (384). 
 
Thus the notion of „obedience‟ takes on an uncompromising character not seen in the 
earlier references to it. Unlike the preceding passages, however, here divine command 
ethics is surely being expounded. God‟s address is named as „command‟, obedience or 
disobedience are the only possible responses, and from the context it is reasonable to 
suggest that it is not the written command which Bonhoeffer has in mind, but the 
command which comes always newly from God to the believer. 
 
5.2.2.c: The Will of God 
Unlike the notion of „obedience‟, „God‟s will‟ is almost a leitmotif in the final 
manuscripts, and most powerfully so in the manuscript „The Love of God and the 
Decline of the Word‟, where it is of central importance. Here Jesus is shown to be the 
J. Moberly The Virtue of Bonhoeffer’s Ethics 184 
one whose very life is to do his Father‟s will (315). It is, then, in similar terms that 
Bonhoeffer describes how a Christian should live:  
The knowledge regarding Jesus is absorbed fully in his action, without any 
reflection. His own good remains hidden to the person. [It is not] only that the 
person need no longer be the judge of his good; no, he should not even desire to 
know it any longer, moreover he must no longer know it; he knows it no longer. 
So unquestioning has his doing become, so wholly dedicated and fulfilled has 
his doing become, so much is his doing no longer one possibility among many, 
rather the one, the real, the will of God, that the knowledge [of his own good] 
can no longer hinderingly intervene, that here, literally, no more time can be lost 
which would postpone, put in question, judge the doing (320, his emphases).
429
 
 
As the passage continues, he brings this theme of doing the will of God without 
awareness of one‟s own good into relationship with his earlier notion of simplicity:  
It is the liberating call to simplicity, to repentance; it is the call which 
cancels/raises [aufhebt] the old knowledge from falling away [from God] and 
gives the new knowledge of Jesus, that knowledge which is completely absorbed 
in doing the will of God (321).
430
 
 
Despite this insistence that simplicity enables one to know the will of God, Bonhoeffer 
turns the discussion to discerning it:  
One cannot discern what the will of God is out of one‟s own resources, from 
one‟s own knowledge of good and evil, but rather fully to the contrary, only he 
can do it, who has lost all of his own knowledge of good and evil and who 
therefore totally relinquishes knowing the will of God from his own resources: 
the one who already lives in unity with the will of God because the will of God 
has already effected itself in him. Discerning what God‟s will is, is only possible 
because of the knowledge of God‟s will in Jesus Christ (325). 
 
The will of God he defines as the „will of the living God‟ and as such must always be 
discerned anew (329). „However,‟ he writes, „in no case is the new unity with the will of 
God, the simplicity of doing, thereby cancelled or even only disturbed.‟ This he seeks to 
demonstrate with reference to doing (das Tun), which he distinguishes from an isolated 
deed, (die Tat): The Scriptures  
do not desire that a person‟s own deed should be placed alongside the deed of 
God – whether it be out of thanks or sacrifice – but rather [the Scriptures] place 
the person completely inside the doing of God and subordinate human doing to 
this doing of God (329). 
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Thus his emphasis here is placed firmly on the doing of God‟s will, which happens in 
God-given simplicity and not in any contradiction to the acknowledged need for 
discerning what it is. It is, however, striking that his emphasis on doing rather than on 
individual deeds implies some degree of continuity, both in divine and human actions. 
 
From these passages we see that the notion of the „will of God‟, as well as occurring 
with much greater frequency in the later manuscripts, is at least in some cases clearly 
used in ways one would expect within divine command ethics. Moreover, Bonhoeffer‟s 
treatment of it is Christ-centred and related to his concern for concrete ethics. However, 
it is also apparent that his talk of „doing‟ rather than of individual acts makes his use of 
the motive less actualistic and particularistic than might be assumed.  
 
5.2.3: Some Provisional Conclusions 
From this exploration of Bonhoeffer‟s treatment of important themes in divine 
command ethics, namely „command‟, „obedience‟, and „God‟s will‟ it is undoubtedly 
the case that all three are present in early as well as later manuscripts, though the 
emphasis on these themes  only really comes after he had read Barth‟s Church 
Dogmatics II/2. However, both in earlier and later manuscripts his use of the language 
does not always imply full adherence to the actualistic, particularistic account of divine 
command ethics one might expect.
431
  
 
Conversely, in examining evidence for virtue-ethical themes, the first manuscripts 
showed much greater affinity, and in the manuscripts from the final period of writing 
such references were rare, though these manuscripts included virtue-ethical modes of 
argument (4.5).
432
 What then are we to make of these two strands of ethical thought in 
this work?  
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inaccurate, as will be seen when I discuss the case for the integration of these themes, 5.4.5. 
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5.3: Rasmussen’s and Plant’s Interpretations 
To try to answer this question I shall begin by looking at the proposals of Larry 
Rasmussen and Stephen Plant, who offer quite different interpretations. 
 
5.3.1: Rasmussen: Conformation as More Enduring and Original  
Larry Rasmussen speaks of the major „methodological themes‟ (modes of ethical 
thought) in Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics as conformation and command. He considers both to 
have a long history in Bonhoeffer‟s thought, but finally asks if what we have are two 
„methods‟ or one. To answer his question he looks at the differences and similarities 
within these two ways of envisioning ethics. In both he sees an emphasis on concrete 
ethics as well as an „ethic of reality and realization.‟433 Moreover, he sees in both modes 
a contextual and relational ethics which „becomes increasingly “filled”‟, moving from 
atomistic to coherent ethics (109). In conformation as well as command ethics 
Bonhoeffer uses the notion of mandates, and in both the ethical is seen as „peripheral‟ 
(109). „In both, moral action is the same. Obedience to the command of God is, for 
moral content, identical with conformation to Christ‟ (109). Additionally, in both 
Rasmussen sees the direction moving from the indicative (asking „How is Christ taking 
form?‟ or „What is God commanding?‟) to the imperative (asking „What action 
conforms to Christ‟s action?‟ or „What action is in keeping with this command?‟). 
Likewise, in both, ethical discernment requires all one‟s faculties (109). „In both, the 
underlying assumption for Christian ethics is reconciliation, that is, the recovered unity 
of God and the world in Christ‟ (109). In command as well as conformation, the „point 
of departure for Christian ethics is the body of Christ‟ (109-10). Finally, in both strands 
of ethical thought Rasmussen identifies the themes of deputyship, vicarious action and 
deeds of free responsibility, where only God may judge such deeds and the agent must 
depend on grace (110). 
 
Having discussed so many areas which he sees as similarities, Rasmussen asks, „Is there 
one method or two? The more cautious answer would be that this remains an open 
question because Bonhoeffer‟s theology and ethic remain open-ended‟ (110). However, 
the  
riskier, but probably more precise, conclusion is that Bonhoeffer‟s is an ethic of 
reality and realization which finds methodological expression in two basic 
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motifs, one of which is both more original and more enduring. In the end, ethics 
as command should be regarded as a genuine motif, but a subordinate one. Both 
are authentic but ethics as formation is in better tune with Bonhoeffer‟s 
christocratic vision of humanity, nature, and history. Its „fit‟ is better. Still, it 
would be an unwarranted projection backward from Letters and Papers from 
Prison to name ethics as formation the method of Bonhoeffer‟s ethics. By his 
own testimony, his ideas were unfinished (110). 
 
What should one make of Rasmussen‟s account? First, the similarities he notes are 
largely well-founded, which means that in both modes of expression Bonhoeffer 
addresses many of the same issues and concerns. However, I have some reservations 
about speaking in terms of an „ethic of reality and realization‟, since Bonhoeffer 
explicitly rejects the notion of „realisation‟, and speaks instead consistently of 
„becoming real‟.434  
 
I have greater concerns about his statement that Bonhoeffer was engaged in contextual 
and relational ethics which moved from being atomistic to being coherent. Although his 
ethical thought is based on a relational anthropology, and he certainly intended to write 
for his context, it is not „contextual and relational ethics‟ in the normal way these terms 
are used, which would indicate a form of situation ethics. Since he speaks neither of the 
particular contours of situations nor of any guiding notions, this is not accurate. 
 
More substantively, however, I query Rasmussen‟s notion that Bonhoeffer‟s ethic 
becomes more „filled‟, moving from a more atomistic account to one which shows 
continuity. The earliest manuscripts show an emphasis on the agent and continuity, 
making this a hard claim to substantiate. It would seem Rasmussen made this claim on 
the basis on the „Ansatz theory‟, despite his awareness of Clifford Green‟s misgivings 
regarding the dating of the manuscripts.
435
 However, from the meticulous evidence used 
in the ordering of the manuscripts in DBW 6, it would be truer to say that Bonhoeffer‟s 
ethic became more, not less, atomistic with his increased dependence on divine 
command ethics.
436
 Yet I believe this claim also would not be fair, for reasons which 
will be seen later (5.4.4). 
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Another part of his proposal which seems weak is the suggestion that within both forms 
of ethics there is a move from the indicative to the imperative. This, however, is a move 
which Bonhoeffer explicitly rejects.
437
 It is also problematic in that the second set of 
questions Rasmussen offers are not Bonhoeffer‟s own questions. So even if Bonhoeffer 
does attend to the (indicative) questions of how Christ is taking form and what God is 
commanding, he does not speak in terms of discovering what human action might be in 
keeping with Christ‟s own action, or what action would be according to what God 
commands. Indeed, this latter way of speaking is one that Bonhoeffer seemingly spurns, 
since he avers that God‟s command leaves no room for interpretation or application.438 
 
One final query I would address to Rasmussen is on what basis he claims that „moral 
action is the same‟ in both, to wit that „obedience to the command of God is… identical 
with conformation to Christ‟ (109). Notionally, this must be correct: if the believer is 
conformed to Christ, whose food is to do the will of God, then action performed as a 
result of being conformed to Christ must be in accordance with God‟s will. However, 
since specific issues are only addressed in a conformation context, we have no evidence 
for this, and so the claim might be worded more guardedly. 
 
Bearing in mind these points of disagreement with Rasmussen‟s analysis, is it 
nevertheless possible to agree with his conclusions? Despite his intention of expressing 
himself cautiously on the matter, it is a strong claim indeed to assert that „ethics as 
command should be regarded as a genuine motif, but a subordinate one‟. By his own 
account, the theme of command is found in other of Bonhoeffer‟s works, though it 
seems to me that he discounts too easily the weight of command, for instance 
suggesting that there is no real use of the theme in Discipleship (96-101).
439
 Given that 
many have criticized the work for depicting Christ too often as commanding, it seems 
hard to defend this position.
440
 Even if one grants his assertion that the theme of 
command is largely borrowed from Barth, that does not give sufficient support to his 
claim that the motif is subordinate to conformation. For one thing, it would be difficult 
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to disentangle Bonhoeffer‟s theology from Barth‟s because of the latter‟s great 
influence on the German‟s thinking. Unfortunately, Rasmussen does not offer a 
rationale for how command could be subordinate, whether he means it to be understood 
as a subset of conformation, which I think would be impossible to substantiate, or 
whether perhaps he uses the word more loosely simply to suggest command is less 
important, which would require more investigation to demonstrate. For these reasons I 
hesitate to follow Rasmussen in describing conformation as „both more original and 
more enduring‟ without further examination.  
 
5.3.2: Plant: Irreducible Plurality  
I turn now to another account of conformation and command in Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics. In 
his book, Bonhoeffer, Stephen Plant looks at Bonhoeffer‟s writings and explores the 
theological themes in each, suggesting „that a trajectory can be traced from 
Bonhoeffer‟s earliest to his final writings which describe an ethics of responsibility, 
lived out in obedience to the God who acts most powerfully in “the silence of the 
cross”.‟441 In his estimation, „theological ethics are a central concern of Bonhoeffer‟s 
theology‟ (5). Treating Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics more specifically, Plant argues that 
„character‟ and „command‟ are the two „moods‟ in which Bonhoeffer did ethics (118-
24). Furthermore, just as Bonhoeffer insisted on the „both/and‟ of the individual and 
society in Sanctorum Communio, and of act and being in his habilitation dissertation, he 
resists any dichotomy between character (being) and commands (acts) in Ethics (118-9). 
In Plant‟s view, „only in… two sections is there what can be called an explicit method‟, 
namely in „Ethics as Formation‟ and „The “Ethical” and the “Christian” as a Theme‟ 
(119). These two „methods‟ Plant likens to grammatical moods: the imperative of divine 
command ethics, and the subjunctive of formation, in which the „ethicist wishes for a 
particular relation between the ethical subject and the person of Christ‟ (119-21).442 
Furthermore,  
Setting Bonhoeffer‟s command based ethics alongside his ethics as formation 
enables us to see these ethical „methods‟ as two sides of a dialectic: the one 
concerned with being in Christ (conformation to the Gestalt of Jesus), the other 
concerned to emphasize God‟s freedom to command particular things to 
particular people (God‟s freedom to act) (122). 
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These two „moods‟ of ethics Plant considers to be irreducibly plural, and this plurality is 
one of the strengths of the work.
443
 
 
Plant‟s analysis has many merits, which include his attention to all of Bonhoeffer‟s 
writings. This allows him to see the development of Bonhoeffer‟s thought and different 
themes within it over time. Plant also attends carefully to what is present in the Ethics 
manuscripts without unduly speculating on what they might have become (had 
Bonhoeffer lived to complete his book). This keeps Plant‟s reading properly grounded 
and faithful to what Bonhoeffer did write.  
 
However, the question remains whether it is best to speak of conformation and 
command as being irreducibly plural, or whether one can be said to be subordinate to 
the other.  
 
5.4: Discussion of Similar Concerns 
To explore the relation of conformation and command, I shall attend to the issues 
Bonhoeffer treats in both ethical modes. Here I think Rasmussen is correct in many of 
the similarities he cites. However, rather than listing them in a somewhat random 
fashion, I would like to group them according to methodological concerns (5.4.1), 
structures (5.4.2), and content (5.4.3). This is because it seems to me that since there are 
concerns in each of these areas which he handles both in a virtue-ethical and a divine 
command form, it is surely indicative of a potentially close relationship between the two 
modes of ethical thought.  
 
Secondly, regarding issues discussed in both modes, it will also be important to discover 
if the form of ethics being used makes any notable difference to how the issues are 
treated. This is particularly interesting, because if Bonhoeffer uses the two modes to 
express the same things it would be possible to see their relationship in one of two 
ways: either the mode of ethical thought is irrelevant, since the mode used made no 
great difference; or Rasmussen may be correct, that one mode may be subordinate to the 
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other. However, if in expressing similar concerns in the two different modes the 
outcome is different, it would then truly raise the question of whether virtue-based and 
command-based ethics are in some way parallel („irreducibly plural‟), contradictory, or 
whether they might be in some sense complementary (5.4.5). 
 
5.4.1: Methodological Concerns 
Under the heading of „methodological concerns‟ I shall look at two overarching aspects 
of ethical thought which are of momentous concern to Bonhoeffer in the earlier as well 
as the later manuscripts. The first is the need to articulate an ethic which is specific to 
his time and place, concrete ethics; the second is his concern to address the whole of life 
in his Ethics. 
 
5.4.1.a: Concrete Ethics  
The need for concrete rather than abstract ethics is discussed throughout the 
manuscripts. In „Ethics as Formation‟ Bonhoeffer writes,  
We have seen: in a Christian ethical meaning formation can only be spoken of in 
view of the form…. There is only one formation from and towards this form of 
Jesus Christ…. Christ is not the one proclaiming a system which would be good 
today, here and for all times. Christ teaches no abstract ethic which, whatever 
the price may be, must be executed. Christ was not essentially a teacher, 
lawgiver, but rather a person, a real person such as we are. Therefore he does not 
want in the first place for us to be students, representatives and defenders of a 
particular teaching, but rather persons, real persons before God. Christ does not 
love, like an ethicist, a theory about the good, but rather he loves the real person. 
He did not have, like a philosopher, an interest in the „generally valid‟, but rather 
in that which serves the concrete, real person. He is not concerned with whether 
„the maxims of acting could become the principle of a general law‟, but rather 
whether my acting now helped a neighbour to be a person before God. It does 
not say: God became an idea, a principle, a programme, something of general 
validity, a law, but rather God became human. That means that the form of 
Christ, as certainly as it is and remains one and the same, nevertheless wants to 
win form in real persons in quite different ways. Christ does not cancel human 
reality in favour of an idea which demands realising against everything real; 
rather Christ precisely brings reality into effect; he affirms it; he himself is the 
real person and thus the ground of all human reality. Conformation according to 
the form of Christ includes two things: that the form of Christ remains one and 
the same, not as a general idea, but rather as that which it uniquely is, the 
incarnate, crucified and risen God; and that precisely for the sake of the form of 
Christ the form of the real person remains preserved and that thus the real 
person may receive the form of Christ (85-6, his emphasis and quote marks).
444
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I quote this at some length because it is important in comparing this with similar 
passages from a command perspective that a full picture is presented regarding what his 
insistence on concrete ethics entails. Here it is clear that a concrete ethic addresses a 
person in the here and now (or as he was writing, for the there and then!), but it was to 
include much more than this.
445
 What exercised Bonhoeffer in this passage is the fact 
that Christ as a real person affirms each person in her individual and quite different 
reality. Concrete ethics understood as formation underscores her unique being and 
allows her also to receive Christ‟s own form. Thus in this passage we see a commitment 
not simply to a mode of concrete ethics as a method or theory, but to an understanding 
of ethics which seems intimately concerned with the particularities of the real life of the 
real person. With his emphasis on the differing ways in which Christ‟s form may be 
received, the interpretation of Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics as „contextual‟ or „situational‟ is 
understandable. Nonetheless, this is an understandable misrepresentation of what he is 
saying. Rather than the context or situation giving guidance as to what an agent should 
do, the distinguishing feature is the (character of the) agent herself. Similarly, although 
he takes account of consequences, there is no warrant for speaking in terms of 
consequentialist ethics. The sense in which the neighbour is to be helped is also integral 
to her being as a real person, namely being helped to be a person before God. From this 
passage it is possible to say that in his virtue-ethical treatment, Bonhoeffer‟s notion of 
concrete ethics has a focus on the real humanity of Christ (even while affirming his 
person in the dogmatic terms of incarnate, crucified and risen), and on the real humanity 
of the agent. Concrete, formational ethics emphasizes the agent‟s being fully human 
before God, bearing the form of Christ while remaining a unique person. 
 
In the command-based context of „The “Ethical” and the “Christian” as a Theme‟ 
Bonhoeffer addresses the problem of abstract ethical speech thus:  
A timeless and placeless ethical speaking lacks any concrete authorisation, 
which every genuine ethical speech requires. It is the youthful, arrogant, 
usurping declamation of ethical principles, which contradicts – with whatever 
subjective earnestness it may be presented – the essence of genuine ethical 
speaking, in ways which are perhaps difficult to define but are nonetheless 
clearly perceived. Although often nothing may be objected regarding the 
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correctness of the abstractions, generalisations, theories; nevertheless they are 
deficient in the specific weight of ethical statements. The words are correct but 
they do not weigh. They must finally be felt to be not helpful but chaotic (373). 
 
Here his first concern is with the authorisation for ethical speech, an issue he did not 
address in the earlier passage. Abstract ethical speech is likened to „youthful‟ and 
„arrogant‟ declamation, and as the passage continues Bonhoeffer claims that there are 
problems associated with youth in speaking ethically:  It is not appropriate,  
if a young man declaims ethical generalities before a circle of experienced and 
older people, and it leads time and again to such frustrating, surprising and 
incomprehensible situations for the young person, that his word echoes in 
emptiness while the word of an elderly person, even if it contains nothing 
substantively different, is heard and has weight (373-4). 
 
As he continues to consider how ethical speech is authorised, Bonhoeffer says, 
Ethical speech cannot be given in a vacuum, that means in abstraction, but only 
in concrete commitment. Ethical speech is thus not a system of in themselves 
correct sentences which are available to everyone at all times and all places; 
rather it is decisively tied to persons and times and places. In this determination 
the ethical suffers no loss of meaning, rather precisely in it [sc. the 
determination] lies its [sc. the ethical‟s] authorisation, its weight, while in the 
indetermination and general availability of the ethical lies its weakness, even 
impotence (374).
446
 
 
From these passages several things appear. First, Bonhoeffer addresses an issue which 
was not present in the conformation passage, namely the authorisation for ethical 
speech, an issue of some importance to him. Secondly, in thinking of ethics as 
command he addresses the question of how the command is given, who speaks to 
whom, and here he begins to address notions of „above and below‟, which remain 
present in his thought in prison.
447
 Thirdly, it is precisely in its specificity that ethical 
speech has its appropriate „weight‟ and is heard; the particulars of persons, time and 
place are all required for ethical speech to be genuine. 
 
Comparing and contrasting the long passage from „Ethics as Formation‟ with these 
excerpts several things emerge. First, it is clear that in both instances abstract ethical 
thought is rejected and concretion is demanded. Yet in the first passage concretion has 
the name and face of Jesus Christ, and the particularities of the agent come to the fore. 
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In contrast with this, in the command mode concretion appears as the facets of 
interrelationship, time and place. In itself this has a more theoretical flavour, as does his 
concern with authorisation of ethical speech. Yet I do not point this out to detract from 
these later passages in any way. Given that some of the issues remain of importance to 
Bonhoeffer in his prison writings it would be cavalier to treat them as in any way 
inferior. Nonetheless it seems right to say that the „concretion‟ of conformation (virtue-
like) ethics looks in fact more concrete than the „concretion‟ shown in command ethics. 
 
However that may be, it is clear that there is not only an overlap between conformation 
and command regarding the concrete, there is at least difference, which I believe is 
complementary rather than contradictory in his handling of the issue of concrete versus 
abstract ethics.  
 
5.4.1.b: Addressing the Whole of Life   
In the previous chapter I spoke of Bonhoeffer‟s „holistic conception of human life‟ as 
being integral to virtue ethics (4.4.2). Here I shall explore how he approached this in the 
earlier and later manuscripts. As was seen in chapter four, there are many instances in 
the earlier, virtue ethical manuscripts where Bonhoeffer‟s holistic conception is 
manifestly present. One of the chief areas where this comes to the fore is in his 
discussion of the penultimate, where all of earthly life is, at least potentially, at stake. 
Similarly, his treatment of „the natural‟ leaves no doubt that ethics must be concerned 
with every facet of human living, including the everyday aspects of human existence 
which he wants to consider neither sinful nor simply creaturely, because of the effects 
of the Fall (165). Here he claims that the fact that the natural had been ignored in 
Protestant ethics  
means a heavy substantive loss for Protestant thought because one stood more or 
less without orientation vis-à-vis the practical question of natural life. The 
meaning of the natural for the gospel became opaque, and the Protestant church 
lost the clear direction-giving word to the burning issues of natural life (163-4). 
 
This passage makes evident that at a programmatic level Bonhoeffer fully intended to 
treat the whole of life in his Ethics. What is more significant is that he not only gives a 
theological rationale for the appropriateness of doing so, he also attends to concrete 
issues in the following sections of this manuscript which address euthanasia, abortion, 
arbitrary imprisonment, and other topical issues in Nazi Germany. 
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Although many things could be said about Bonhoeffer‟s holistic conception of life as 
shown in the earlier manuscripts, what is most telling in this context is that Bonhoeffer 
was able to use these conceptions both theologically and practically. Theologically he 
was able to break fresh ground in Protestant ethics, opening up the notion of „the 
natural‟ without downplaying the effects of the Fall. Additionally he attempted to give a 
theological basis to the concept of human rights. Practically, he was able to address a 
wide range of issues which were of vital importance in his context, while also 
acknowledging that life consists of much more than the borderline decisions such issues 
may demand. 
 
In the later manuscripts there are, as noted briefly also in the previous chapter, hints of 
his intention to speak of the whole of life. Arguably, the mandates themselves are meant 
to be a framework for enabling all of life to come under the command of God, but this is 
not made explicit. Much more direct and interesting for this purpose is to consider the 
passage from „The “Ethical” and the “Christian” as a Theme‟ where he discusses the 
character Auch Einer,
448
 who finds great decisions easy, but daily living more 
problematic.  
It is the sphere of the everyday which causes substantial difficulties and which 
one must have experienced to feel in relation to it [sc. the sphere of the 
everyday] the inadequacy, inappropriateness, disproportion of the proclamation 
of general moral principles. Whether I help someone in need, step in the way of 
a animal abuser, that is no problem for „Auch Einer‟ – „that is self evident‟ – but 
to get to grips with little mundane things, for instance with a „cold‟… or with the 
thousands of intersections of the great and in-principle with the tangential, 
negligible, objectionable, annoying, that is something else (366-7). 
 
In commenting on this, Bonhoeffer notes that most ethical discourse ignores the reality 
of everyday human existence (367). Even if he does not wish to contribute to the 
„ethical phenomenon‟ which would result in a totalitarian claim (368), it is nonetheless 
clear that he does want to speak to the mundane aspects of life as well as the 
momentous issues and decisions. It is in this sense that he comes to speak of command: 
„The command of God is something different from what we have hitherto called the 
“ethical”; it encompasses the whole of life; it is not only unconditional, rather it is also 
total‟ (381). 
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Command encompasses the fullness of human life, though the „flow of life from 
conception to the grave is incomprehensible for the ethical‟ (387-8). 
The command of God allows the person to be a person before God, it allows the 
flow of life to take its course, it allows the person to eat, drink, sleep, work, 
celebrate, play without interrupting him, without questioning him continually 
whether he may then sleep, eat, work play, whether he has no more pressing 
duties (388). 
 
This, then, is Bonhoeffer‟s conception of the command which is central to the later 
manuscripts. It is this „middle and fullness of life‟ which includes the mundane and 
even tedious (such as having a cold, eating, drinking, sleeping, working, celebrating, 
playing), and stretches from birth to death. 
 
The question which now needs to be answered is how the treatments of the whole of life 
differ in the earlier and later manuscripts. As noted in the previous chapter (4.4.2), there 
are different terms in use: the penultimate and the natural in the more virtue-ethical 
manuscripts, and the command of God in the later ones. Yet one must still ask what 
difference his modes of ethical thought make to the substantive material. First, there is 
more that is ground-breaking in the conformation manuscripts, especially opening up 
the possibility of speaking of the natural in Protestant ethics, and giving a Christian 
foundation to human rights. Secondly, it is in the virtue-ethical context of discussing the 
natural that Bonhoeffer does what he so often says is most needful, namely treating the 
specific issues which were of monumental importance in his context. Thirdly, and 
perhaps paradoxically, it is in divine command mode, when treating the notion of 
„command‟, that Bonhoeffer addresses more fully the everyday joys, sorrows, 
amusements and perplexities of being human. These differences certainly do not cancel 
each other out – instead there is valuable complementarity. 
 
Thus in both areas which I have called „methodological‟, Bonhoeffer‟s concern to 
formulate concrete ethics and his treatment of all of life, there have been similarities as 
well as differences when he was working with conformation and command, and the 
differences have been complementary. 
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5.4.2: Structures of Ethical Life 
There are two ways of speaking of structures for ethical life which have relevance both 
in the virtue-ethical and divine command writings: Bonhoeffer‟s notion of mandates, 
and responsibility. I shall look at each of these now to see what difference, if any, the 
context of conformation or divine command may make. 
 
5.4.2.a: The Mandates 
The concept of „divine mandates‟ makes its first appearance in the earliest manuscript 
he wrote, „Christ, Reality and the Good‟, where he introduces the concept, saying,  
The world stands in relationship to Christ whether it knows it or not. This 
relationship to Christ becomes concrete in certain mandates of God in the world. 
Scripture calls four such things mandates: work, marriage, authority, church. 
We speak of divine mandates rather than divine orders because thereby the 
character of the divine task stands out clearly compared to that of a 
determination of being (54-5, his emphases). 
 
So this is foremost an attempt to show the relationship of these four areas of life to 
Christ.
449
 This is part of his larger argument against the „zwei-Reiche-Lehre‟ 
specifically, and against dualism more generally in this manuscript. All of this has 
particular relevance in Nazi Germany because the notion of „orders of creation‟ and the 
teaching regarding the distinction between the „two kingdoms‟ of church and world had 
left the churches little theological ground to oppose the tyranny of the regime or the 
gross heresies of the „German Christians‟.450  
 
He also shows an interrelationship between the mandates: the task of authority is to 
keep and protect a right order which allows marriage, work, and church to fulfil their 
tasks; while the  
mandate of the church extends over all people, and specifically within all other 
mandates. Just as the person is simultaneously a worker, a husband, and a 
subject [of authority], just as one mandate overlaps with another in the person, 
and just as it thereby concerns the simultaneous fulfilment of all these mandates, 
just so the ecclesial mandate reaches into all these mentioned mandates, just as, 
conversely, the Christian is at once worker, husband, subject. Every division into 
separated spheres is forbidden here. The whole person stands before the whole 
earthly and eternal reality which God in Jesus Christ has prepared for him. Only 
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in the full response to the totality of the offer and of the claim can the person 
correspond to this reality. Precisely this – that the mandates are not concerned 
with the division and tearing apart of the person but rather with the whole person 
before God, the Creator, Reconciler and Redeemer, that thus the reality in all 
diversity finally is nevertheless one, namely in the incarnate God Jesus Christ – 
precisely this is what the church has to bear witness to the world (59-60). 
 
From this passage it is possible to see that a part of his use of the mandates in this 
virtue-ethical manuscript to combat dualistic thinking is also to insist on concretion, on 
treating the person as a whole, and on addressing the whole of life in his Ethics. 
 
The other important theme with which Bonhoeffer connects the mandates in this first 
manuscript is that of responsibility (the second structure, which I shall discuss in its 
own right in the next subsection). In showing how human sinfulness (failing in the task 
God gives in the mandates) might affect the divine status of the mandates, Bonhoeffer 
writes,  
Individual offences do not grant the right to abolish, to remove what exists. 
Much more it can only be concerned here with the return to genuine sub-
ordination to the divine mandate, with the restoration of genuine responsibility 
to the divine task. This genuine responsibility consists in the orientation of the 
concrete form of the divine mandates to its source, its existence and its goal in 
Jesus Christ (56-7). 
 
Here the theme of responsibility does not yet have the full character which Bonhoeffer 
gives it later. Yet one hallmark is present, that the person is responsible (must give 
response, account) to God for certain things, in this case, the appropriate fulfilment of 
the tasks given in the areas of the mandates (covering all of life). I shall say more about 
responsibility in the next subsection, but it is worth noting here that in treating the 
mandates in a more virtue-like passage Bonhoeffer touches on this theme.
451
 
 
What we have seen is that in the first manuscript Bonhoeffer uses the structuring notion 
of the mandates to combat a form of dualism which had rendered the church in his 
context ineffective in addressing the problems of Nazi Germany. Within that context he 
also uses the mandates to express his concern that ethics should address the whole 
person and the entirety of life. And finally in this more virtue-ethical manuscript, 
Bonhoeffer begins to address another of his most important themes, responsibility. 
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I turn now to passages from the later manuscripts where Bonhoeffer treats the mandates 
in the context of a divine command ethic. The opening passage of „The Concrete 
Command and the Divine Mandates‟ gives an indication of his concerns in this 
manuscript:  
God‟s command – revealed in Jesus Christ in his unity encompassing human 
life, in his undivided claim on the person and the world through the reconciling 
love of God – encounters us in four different, and only through the command 
itself unified, forms: in the church, in marriage and family, in culture, in 
authority (392).
452
  
 
As in the virtue-ethical context, Bonhoeffer relates the mandates to his concern for 
concretion: „Not anywhere and everywhere, not in theoretical speculation and not in 
private enlightenment, not in historical powers and not in convincing ideas is God‟s 
command to be found, but rather only there where it presents itself‟ (392). This 
suggestion that God‟s command is not found „anywhere and everywhere‟ is somewhat 
disconcerting, given that the mandates as he expounds them would seem to cover all of 
life. How then could there be some „anywhere and everywhere‟ which in some way is 
not part of one or more of the mandates, or part of the broad conception of command 
seen already (388, 5.4.1.b)? Bonhoeffer does not answer this question, but one can 
surmise that he is engaged in polemical hyperbole as part of his demand that ethics be 
specific.  
 
Bonhoeffer continues by giving a definition of a mandate which involves not only 
concretion, but authorisation for ethical speech, and the notion of representational 
action. It is  
the concrete, divine task (founded in the revelation of Christ and attested to in 
Scripture); the authorisation and legitimation to execute a certain divine 
command; the granting of a divine authority to an earthly authority. Mandate is 
at the same time also to be understood as the claim, the requisition and 
formation of a certain earthly sphere by the divine command. The carrier of the 
mandate acts in representation, as a representative of the task-giver (392-3). 
 
His next concern is to distinguish more carefully between his notion of mandates and 
the more common categories of „creation orders‟, „estates‟ and „offices‟ (393). The first 
of these is found wanting because of its autonomy rather than dependence on God, the 
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 Here „marriage‟ has become „marriage and family‟, and „work‟ has become „culture‟. In both changes 
Bonhoeffer has broadened the horizons. 
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second because of the whiff of privilege, and the last because of its too secular meaning 
(393). This section is not really new, but a fleshing out of the passage from the first 
manuscript regarding the mandates. 
 
From here he defines more carefully the relationships created by these mandates as 
involving an „above‟ and a „below‟, with the carrier of the mandate acting as a 
representative of God (394).
453
 In this discussion Bonhoeffer addresses the problems 
which arise when the „above‟ is abused and the „below‟ rebels, namely that the „below‟ 
gains power and the roles are reversed. Then „there is no longer any genuine above and 
below, but rather what is above receives its authorisation and legitimation from below‟ 
(396). This means, in Bonhoeffer‟s terms, that there is no longer the appropriate 
reference to God in the human relationships which have been inverted; for instead of a 
position of authority and representation given by God and answerable to God, there is 
now a position of power which has been grasped and does not see itself as accountable 
to God.  
The relationship of above and below is in this stage of inversion and dissolution, 
and of the deepest enmity, mistrust, betrayal and envy. However, in this 
atmosphere, the purely personal abuse of being above and being below also 
flourishes in an otherwise unprecedented way…. The genuine order of above 
and below lives out of the belief in the task from „above‟, in the „Lord‟ of 
„lords‟. This belief alone banishes the demonic powers which rise from below 
(398-9).  
 
No doubt Bonhoeffer is here depicting the situation of Nazi Germany, which was not 
one of liberation of the masses by the overthrow of a ruling elite. If one sees the 
formerly ruling class as authentically living out an ethic of „noblesse oblige‟, and of 
being answerable before God for the well-being of the nation (as Bonhoeffer clearly 
did), then their overthrow by those seeking personal power without any such ethic is 
indeed an inversion of godly order.  
 
Yet Bonhoeffer is not only interested in the aspect of mandates as showing tasks given 
by God, but also in their interrelationship: 
Only in their [being] with one another, for one another and over against one 
another do the divine mandates of church, marriage and family, culture, and 
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authority bring the command of God as it is revealed in Jesus Christ to our 
attention. None of these mandates exists for itself alone or can assert the claim 
of replacing all others. The mandates are with one another or they are not divine 
mandates. In their togetherness, however, they are not isolated, separated from 
one another, but rather oriented towards one another. They are for one another 
or they are not God‟s mandates. Yet in this [being] with and for one another, the 
one is limited by the other, and this limitation is necessarily experienced within 
the [being] for one another as [being] over against one another. Where this 
[being] over against one another is no longer present, God‟s mandate is no 
longer [present] (397). 
 
Bonhoeffer‟s structural concern regarding the interrelationship of the mandates is 
interesting in at least two ways for this study. First, as seen in his treatment of the 
mandates in the virtue-ethical manuscript, is his insistence on seeing life as a whole, not 
allowing various facets to become compartmentalised. Secondly, and more importantly 
here because it is new, Bonhoeffer uses the mandates in the context of divine command 
to give the church permission to be „over against‟ authority.454 There can be little doubt 
that Bonhoeffer is pointing to the Nazi regime as not fulfilling the divine mandate of 
authority, since it can hardly be shown to work with or for the other mandates, nor to 
allow the others to be over against it. And the state certainly did try to replace at least 
the mandate of the church (through various laws, through the takeover of the provincial 
churches, and the imposition of the Reichsbischof).
455
 So the mandates in this divine 
command manuscript are a place where he sought ways of offering the church some 
leverage for prophetic proclamation against the state and even for active opposition to 
the regime. Of course, in the earlier manuscript, relying more on conceptions related to 
virtue ethics, he also tried to give the church permission to speak out against the state, 
mostly through arguing against the two-kingdom teaching. Thus, what he is doing in the 
final manuscript is not radically new, but only a new usage of the notion of the 
mandates to address a fairly basic concern. 
 
From this comparison of Bonhoeffer‟s treatment of the mandates in virtue-ethical and 
divine command contexts, it is clear that there are changes and developments which 
may or may not be related to the mode of ethical thought with which he was working. 
My suspicion is that the change of speaking about „culture‟ instead of „work‟ and about 
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J. Moberly The Virtue of Bonhoeffer’s Ethics 202 
„marriage and family‟ instead of simply about „marriage‟ is most likely to be a 
development largely unrelated to whether he was conceiving of ethics more in terms of 
conformation or command.
456
 It seems much more likely that he was broadening the 
categories so that all of life can be seen as relating directly to at least one of the 
mandates.
457
 What is more significant for this study is the fact that in both manuscripts 
Bonhoeffer either directly combats dualistic thinking, or indirectly works against the 
impotence fostered through the two-kingdom teaching. In both he is concerned to treat 
the whole of life. However, it is only in the virtue-ethical manuscript that he explicitly 
treats the person in a holistic manner.
458
 Conversely, it is only in the command-ethical 
manuscript that he paints a compelling picture of the ungodly nature of the Nazi regime 
and offers a theological rationale for active opposition. Thus, although there are some 
obvious ways in which Bonhoeffer‟s treatment of the mandates in these two 
manuscripts is similar, there are complementary differences as well. 
 
 
5.4.2.b: Responsibility 
In the previous chapter I argued that responsibility is for Bonhoeffer not a human trait 
which might be seen as a „virtue‟ in his ethics, but a kind of structure, a given of human 
relationships and interrelationships (4.3.5). Since it appears both in the manuscripts 
which rely on a more virtue-like ethic as well as in the later divine command 
manuscripts, I shall examine how he treats responsibility in both contexts.  
 
As noted above, Bonhoeffer mentions responsibility in the earliest manuscript, „Christ, 
Reality and the Good‟, when he introduces the notion of the mandates, where it is clear 
that the divinely given tasks imply responsibility (56). However, there are only few 
places where it is mentioned, and it is never given the weight and fullness it receives in 
the later manuscripts.
459
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In „Ethics as Formation‟, while arguing against abstract forms of ethics, he says that 
instead ethics is about „the times and places which direct concrete questions to us, give 
us tasks and place responsibility upon us‟ (88). Individualism, he says, is countered by 
the fact „that we are placed in a particular context of experience, responsibility and 
decision from which we cannot withdraw without abstraction‟ (88). From this it is clear 
that Bonhoeffer takes responsibility to be a given; it is not something an agent may take 
upon herself (or not), but part of the situation in which she lives. Furthermore, he links 
responsibility with concretion and sociality. 
 
In another virtue-ethical manuscript, „Ultimate and Penultimate Things‟, Bonhoeffer 
rejects a „radical‟ position in which the Christian does not concern herself with what 
happens to the world at the judgement, claiming it is none of her responsibility (144-5). 
He equally dismisses the „compromise‟ which divorces the reality of the ultimate from 
the penultimate and in which the Christian accepts responsibility for this world as it 
currently is, ignoring the judgement to come (145). This passage denotes a caveat to the 
above: responsibility is part of the (penultimate) situation in which humans live, but the 
person must always have the ultimate in view also. This means that the Christian, 
precisely in this sense of responsibility, prepares the way for the coming of Christ in 
mercy by, for example, feeding the hungry, and hospitality for the homeless. Such 
things enable the gospel to be heard:  
In the first instance the external enabling must be cared for. That can mean that 
the human first must become human again before he can be addressed in this 
way. Preparing the way for the coming Lord is not taken seriously where this 
task is not undertaken. Compassion for people and responsibility before Jesus 
Christ, who wants to come to all people, demand such action (159). 
 
Here, then, he spells out the basis of responsibility which will be foundational for all 
that is said in later manuscripts: it is for the other and to Jesus Christ. 
 
In the early, virtue-ethical manuscripts, then, responsibility is treated as a given of 
human life, part of the historical contingencies of interrelationships. The person is 
responsible before God for how she handles the tasks given her in the areas of life 
Bonhoeffer calls mandates. She is responsible before Christ for preparing the way for 
his coming in grace, and this means responsible for attending to the basic needs of her 
J. Moberly The Virtue of Bonhoeffer’s Ethics 204 
neighbours. The content, though brief, is both rich and interconnected with other 
important themes, and it lays the groundwork for the more detailed treatment given in 
later manuscripts.  
 
However, the prime locus for responsibility in Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics is the second version 
of „History and the Good‟ with its extended passages and subsections relating to 
responsibility, when he is working more obviously in a divine command mode.
460
 Much 
that is contained in this manuscript would seem to provide further content to what had 
already been said in the virtue-ethical manuscripts. Thus Bonhoeffer gives a fuller 
account of responsibility as responding to the life of Jesus Christ, and responding with 
the totality of one‟s life (254-6).  
 
More significantly, as a part of this second version of „History and the Good‟ 
Bonhoeffer has a section titled, „The Structure of Responsible Living‟. In this, he opens 
with an analysis:  
The structure of responsible living is determined through a double: through the 
bond of life to person and God, and through the freedom of one‟s own life. It is 
this bond of life to person and God which places it in the freedom of one‟s own 
life. Without this bond and without this freedom there is no responsibility. Only 
the life which has become selfless in the bond stands in the freedom of one‟s 
own living and acting. The bond carries the form of representation and of 
[acting] in accordance with reality; freedom proves itself in [counting] oneself 
responsible for living and acting, and in venture of concrete decision (256, his 
emphases).
461
 
 
This passage, then, brings together the notion of responsibility with one of the major 
themes of the early manuscripts, namely action in accordance with reality (which, of 
course, is known only in Christ).
462
 It also presupposes the anthropology witnessed in 
the early manuscripts which sees human beings as necessarily involved in 
interrelations.
463
 What is relatively new here is the concern with the „venture‟ or „risk‟ 
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(das Wagnis) of concrete decision, and the freedom of most personal (eigensten) living 
and acting. 
 
Again, parallel to the statements in the virtue-ethical manuscripts, he speaks of 
responsibility as a given, and here he explores its parameters determined through the 
person‟s creaturely finitude.  
Our responsibility is not an infinite, but rather a limited one. Within these limits, 
of course, it comprises the whole of reality; it does not ask only about a good 
will, but rather also about a good success of one‟s action, not only about the 
motive but also about the object; it tries to recognise the given whole of reality 
in its origin, essence and goal; it sees it under the divine Yes and No (267). 
 
However, the agent‟s responsibility is not only limited by her own creatureliness, but 
also by the responsibility of other agents: 
Further, it belongs to the limitation of responsible living and acting that it 
reckons on the responsibility of other encountered persons…. The responsibility 
of the father or the statesman is limited through the responsibility of the child or 
the citizen; indeed the responsibility of the father or the statesman consists 
precisely in raising awareness of and strengthening the responsibility of the one 
entrusted to him. There can never be an absolute responsibility which does not 
find its essential boundary in the responsibility of the other person (268-9). 
 
Recognising the limits of responsibility which are formed by God and other is not only 
a part but is itself the origin of responsible action (269). This material has more that is 
new than the preceding passages, although the boundaries he considers here may be said 
to be implied by what he had said about interrelationships (if there is genuine mutuality, 
then there must be an interaction between the agent‟s responsibility and that of others), 
and by the limits Bonhoeffer presupposed in considering how far humans may be said 
to „prepare the way‟ for Christ‟s coming in mercy. 
 
His further discussion also takes account of the inevitable fallibility of human decision 
and judgement, and the fact that this requires the agent to cast herself on the mercy of 
God. However, trusting in divine grace is only a part of Bonhoeffer‟s vision of what 
responsible action will entail, as is shown in material which is startlingly new. For 
Bonhoeffer claims that the contingencies of living and acting in history, in the real 
world, will require of her a readiness to take guilt upon herself. Bonhoeffer calls this 
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willingness, along with freedom, the structure of responsible acting (275).
464
 After 
depicting Jesus as the guiltless one who loves the real human too much to leave her in 
her guilt, Bonhoeffer draws the parallel with responsible human action:  
Whoever wants in responsibility to withdraw himself from taking on guilt 
detaches himself from the final reality of human existence, detaches himself 
however also from the redeeming mystery of Jesus Christ‟s guiltless carrying of 
guilt and has no share in the divine justification which rests on this event. He 
places his personal innocence above the responsibility for people, and he is blind 
to the more unholy [heillosere] guilt with which he – precisely thereby – 
burdens himself, blind also to the fact that real innocence proves itself precisely 
in that it, for the sake of the other person, enters into the community of his 
guilt.
465
 That the sinless one, the selfless loving one becomes guilty belongs 
through Jesus Christ to the essence of responsible acting (276). 
 
Naturally he offers the proviso that human acting is never sinless but rather in its 
essence poisoned by original sin, yet he is happy to speak of a „relative sinlessness‟ 
which in responsible acting is willing to take on others‟ guilt (279-80). This is certainly 
material which is new in this later manuscript, and although it poses certain difficulties 
for interpreters, the notion of incurring guilt can be said to offer Bonhoeffer and his 
fellow conspirators a theological rationale for the work they are undertaking, both the 
lies they constantly tell (280) – and Bonhoeffer knows they may have to tell such under 
interrogation
466
 – and the intended acts of assassination and overthrow of government. 
One significant aspect of this rationale is that Bonhoeffer does not seek to provide 
justification for such acts. As mentioned in the previous chapter, he does not follow 
Aristotle and Aquinas in suggesting that tyrannicide is not wrong
 
(4.6.1.d); such a 
suggestion would, in his terms, be a faithless self-justification. Nor does he follow 
Barth‟s own line that if God commands such an act, the agent can perform it with joy, 
and presumably a clear conscience.
467
 Instead he insists that the person of responsibility 
must act for the well-being of others, and trust in God‟s mercy. That an agent‟s 
conscience may baulk at incurring guilt, and having no absolute proof of the rightness 
of doing so, is a possibility Bonhoeffer considers. In such a case, she should not go 
beyond what her conscience (which is freed in Christ) may bear (281-3). Although the 
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J. Moberly The Virtue of Bonhoeffer’s Ethics 207 
element of depending on God‟s grace rather than constructing a case for the rightness of 
any particular act is not new, what is significant (because of its relevance to the plans of 
the conspirators) is the detailed discussion of incurring guilt. Bonhoeffer‟s use of divine 
command is not necessarily the important factor for this material, indeed given that it is 
a departure from Barth‟s own way of arguing it seems unlikely that it is could be.  
 
Bonhoeffer analyses the notion of responsibility further to speak of it first in its 
„correspondence‟ to freedom (283-5) and then in its relation to obedience (285-7). All 
of this presupposes the freedom of the agent, though Bonhoeffer acknowledges „a 
profound mystery of history‟, namely that precisely in acting in freedom out of her most 
personal responsibility, she may discover that her deed is ultimately God‟s deed (285). 
What Bonhoeffer calls a „mystery‟ is the interaction between divine sovereignty and 
human freedom, or the question as to how far the human agent is in some sense 
„determined‟. He does not delve into this theoretically, but offers simply the paradox 
that the „free act finally recognises itself as God‟s act, decision as guidance/providence, 
risk as divine necessity‟ (285).468 This leads Bonhoeffer to discuss the relationship 
between responsibility and freedom, showing Christ (as the example of responsibility) 
to be both the obedient one and the free one. In this context „obedience‟ certainly takes 
a divine command form, defined in terms of confirming the will of God rather than 
adhering to any fixed rules (288).
469
 This is both new and clearly linked to divine 
command ethics. 
 
In this manuscript which depends on divine command ethics, then, Bonhoeffer fleshes 
out the brief statements he had made in earlier manuscripts, both as a given in human 
relationships, and as a function of connection with God and others. Unsurprisingly, 
Bonhoeffer grounds much of what he says in the example of Jesus Christ, which he had 
not done in the earlier manuscripts but which is typical both of his overall christocentric 
approach and more specifically of the theme of conformation to Christ. Likewise, 
treating responsibility as being in accordance with reality ties the theme closely to this 
chief concern in his early manuscripts.  
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What is new in this manuscript are the notions of taking risks, representation, and 
incurring guilt. These facets of responsibility are significant in that they enable 
Bonhoeffer to address more overtly some of the genuinely difficult decisions he and 
others had to make regarding the conspiracy. It is not clear that these themes are 
necessarily connected with his greater dependence on divine command ethics, unlike his 
treatment of freedom and obedience. Given how little material there is on responsibility 
in the earlier manuscripts, it is difficult to say that the treatment is complementary; in 
the later manuscript he certainly negates nothing of what he had previously said, and 
indeed he builds upon it. Indeed, I would suggest that nothing of substance would be 
lost if one simply ignored the earlier material. Nevertheless, I hesitate to ascribe this to 
the modes of virtue and command being used. Rather it would seem that in the later 
treatment he brings together themes and concerns from the earlier manuscripts (holistic 
view of life, interrelatedness, accordance with reality, the example of Christ, 
dependence on grace) and develops them by the addition of a central concern from 
divine command ethics, namely obedience to the will of God. 
 
Regarding structures, then, it would seem that there is more genuine complementarity in 
Bonhoeffer‟s treatment of the mandates in the earlier and later manuscripts than in his 
handling of responsibility. In the case of the mandates, different aspects of Bonhoeffer‟s 
theology and concerns come to the fore: in the virtue-ethical passages there is a holistic 
concern for the agent, and her humanity and individuality are tangible; in the treatment 
based on divine command ethics there is a stark depiction of the evils of Nazism and a 
theological argument for active opposition. In Bonhoeffer‟s handling of responsibility 
he builds on the themes from the early manuscripts and develops them much further, 
using at least in places the concerns of divine command ethics. 
 
5.4.3: Content of Ethical Life  
We have seen that in issues of methodological concern which Bonhoeffer addressed in 
earlier and later manuscripts, namely the need for concretion and to attend to the whole 
of life, there were both similarities and differences which were complementary. 
Additionally we have seen that where Bonhoeffer‟s structural emphases, the mandates 
and responsibility, occur both in the virtue ethical manuscripts and those based on 
divine command ethics, the relationship is slightly more complex. There are changes, 
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developments and augmentation which cannot simply be attributed to the ethical mode 
in which he was working. Nonetheless it was possible to identify some similarities as 
well as complementary differences in his handling of the mandates, and some real 
integration of themes and concerns from both modes of ethical thought in his treatment 
of responsibility. How then are areas of overlap regarding the content of ethical life 
affected by the ethical mode in which he was working?  
 
5.4.3.a: Christ the centre 
The first aspect of the content of ethical life which appears in both modes of ethical 
thinking is the centring of ethical thought and action on the person of Jesus Christ. This 
is so elemental in Bonhoeffer‟s thought in general as well as in the Ethics that a full 
consideration of how he treats this would itself be worthy of study in its own right. For 
the purposes of this enquiry, however, it should suffice to look at the broad contours of 
how centring ethics on Christ is approached in the two different forms of ethical 
thought. Within the earlier, virtue-ethical manuscripts, Christ as the focus for ethics is 
key for understanding reality and knowing what the good is; the Christian is to be 
conformed to Christ; and ethics itself is understood in terms of preparing the way for the 
coming of Christ in mercy. Within the later, divine command-based manuscripts, Christ 
is central to Bonhoeffer‟s understanding of life, and ethics is seen as response to Christ; 
Christ is the example of responsibility, representation, and simplicity; action itself is 
related to Christ; and both love and God‟s command are revealed and known in Christ. 
These are the broad themes which I will examine for clues as to how the ethical mode 
Bonhoeffer uses might be seen to affect how he discusses Christ as the focus of ethics. 
 
As the title of the earliest manuscript, „Christ, Reality and the Good‟, suggests, one of 
the first moves Bonhoeffer makes is to define both reality and the good in relation to 
Christ. Thus, in „Christ we encounter the opportunity to participate at once both in the 
reality of God and the reality of the world, one not without the other‟ (40). This appears 
as a part of his extended argument against the dichotomies of the two-kingdom teaching 
(40-52).
470
 To understand reality, the person must fix her eyes on „the body of Jesus 
Christ himself, the Incarnate, Crucified, and Risen One‟ (52-3), and there she will 
discover God‟s acceptance of the world in his becoming human, and his judgement of 
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and love for the world expressed through the cross (53-4).
471
 Thus Bonhoeffer speaks of 
Christ specifically in terms of doctrine in defining reality in relation to him.  
 
His way of defining the good in relation to Christ is not so direct. At the beginning of 
the manuscript, Bonhoeffer throws down the gauntlet: the questions which normally 
appear at the start of ethical discourse, „How can I be good?‟ and „How can I do good?‟, 
must be abandoned as inappropriate to Christian ethics. Instead the infinitely different 
question regarding the will of God must be asked (31). Only at the end of the 
manuscript does he return to this:  
We spoke at the beginning about how the question of the will of God must take 
the place of the question about one‟s own goodness and of doing good. The will 
of God, however, is nothing other than the becoming real of the reality of Christ 
among us and in our world (60-1). 
 
Hence the cryptic relationship between the question of the good and the will of God in 
the opening passage now has another element, namely the reality of Christ. Moreover, 
the will of God has been revealed and fulfilled in Christ, and humans have access to the 
totality of reality only in Christ (61). Thus the question of the good is treated firstly in 
terms of the will of God, and then in terms of Christ. 
 
In the second virtue-ethical manuscript, „Ethics as Formation‟, Christ is again at the 
centre, this time as the form to whom the person is to be conformed. After considering 
various ways of approaching ethics and showing that each of them has failed in the 
context of Nazi Germany, Bonhoeffer sees the need „to exchange rusty weapons for 
shining‟ ones, which he calls „simplicity‟ and „cleverness‟ (67). Yet simplicity and 
cleverness would seem to be difficult to integrate; indeed this union is only possible 
because of the reality of the reconciliation of God and the world in Jesus Christ (68-9). 
Again in this manuscript, Christ is viewed in relation to the doctrines of the Incarnation, 
Crucifixion, and Resurrection (70-80).  
The one who is accepted by God, judged and raised to new life, that is Jesus 
Christ, that is, in him, the whole of humanity, that is who we are. It is alone the 
form of Jesus Christ who encounters the world victorious. From this form 
proceeds every formation of a world reconciled with God (80). 
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Yet it is not only that formation has Christ as its source and agent, Bonhoeffer also calls 
it „being pulled into the form of Jesus Christ‟ or „conformation with the only form of the 
Incarnate, Crucified and Risen One‟ (80). Being conformed to Christ in his incarnation 
means the Christian is accepted in her real humanity; being conformed to Christ the 
crucified means that she stands under God‟s judgement; being conformed to the risen 
Christ means that she too is a new person (82). The Church as the body of Christ is 
where Christ wins form, but what „is happening in it is happening as an example for and 
a representation of all people‟ (84). Yet although Christ is always the same and the 
Church is one, the form of Christ wants „to win form in the real person, and that means 
in wholly different ways‟ (85-6). Therefore it is necessary to speak concretely about 
„how Christ is winning form among us today and here‟ (87, his emphasis). This he 
elucidates only by saying that the times and places in question are those „which concern 
us, in which we have experience, which are realities to us. It concerns times and places 
which direct questions to us, give us tasks and place responsibility on us‟, „in the 
context of our decisions and encounters‟ (88).  
 
Summarising the focus on Christ in terms of formation, then, it is possible to say that 
Bonhoeffer speaks primarily in the dogmatic categories of Incarnation, Crucifixion, and 
Resurrection. Christ is the source and agent of conformation, and that form will vary in 
ways relevant to the context in which the person is placed (88). Nonetheless, 
Bonhoeffer explicitly refuses to treat the context of Germany separately from other 
Western nations, no doubt to counter the nationalistic fervour of „Grund und Boden‟ 
ideology and notions of racial supremacy.
472
 Perhaps most importantly for this study, 
for Bonhoeffer Christ is at the centre of formational (virtue-ethical) ethics, and his focus 
on Christ is a part of articulating concrete ethics which underscores the reality of grace. 
 
The third broad theme in which Bonhoeffer‟s christocentric approach is most apparent 
in the early virtue-ethical manuscripts is his notion of the penultimate, preparing the 
way for the coming of Christ in grace. Penultimate things might be „doing, suffering, 
walking, wanting, losing, getting up, asking, hoping‟; the penultimate is „a time of 
God‟s permission, waiting and preparation‟ (141-2). Yet not all of earthly life can be 
called penultimate since there are aspects of human life which could be said to put 
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hindrances in the way of Christ‟s coming to justify sinners (141-2). Rather the 
penultimate encompasses all of life that is open to and prepares the way for Christ‟s 
coming. Once again, the prime categories for understanding Christ, and which are used 
to discuss the penultimate and the ultimate, are the Incarnation, Crucifixion, and 
Resurrection. In the Incarnation God shows his love for creation (thus the penultimate 
should be taken seriously); in the Crucifixion his judgement of all flesh is pronounced 
(though this is not the destruction of creation); and the Resurrection is evidence of 
God‟s will for a new creation (which is already breaking in to earthly life) (149-50). 
Bonhoeffer speaks of two things as being penultimate, being human and being good 
(151) and only „the coming of the Lord will bring the fulfilment of being human and 
being good (157). Christ is involved both in the ultimate and in the penultimate, for 
even faith itself is made by Christ, only Christ brings the ultimate, but equally the 
penultimate „Christian living is the dawning of the ultimate in me, the life of Jesus 
Christ in me‟ (160). Moreover, whatever „is human and good that can be found in the 
fallen world belongs on the side of Jesus Christ‟ (161), and should be claimed for Christ 
as an „unconscious remnant of a previous bond to the ultimate‟ (162).  
 
From all this several things can be said about the centrality of Christ in Bonhoeffer‟s 
notion of the penultimate. First, the predominant picture of Christ is in his coming, both 
in terms of the Incarnation and the eschaton (157), and emphasis is placed throughout 
on the dogmatic formulations of Incarnation, Crucifixion, and Resurrection. The effect 
of this is that while human life is shown to be accepted and affirmed (for the sake of the 
ultimate), Christ himself is hardly pictured in his humanity.
473
 Secondly, Christ is 
nonetheless not distant, he lives in the believer, which makes Christian living (ethical 
living, sanctification) possible. Christ is seen to be sovereign, and the role of grace is 
emphasized. Thirdly, what seems most particular is the articulation of the relationship to 
Christ of „good‟ people who do not profess faith. The „unconscious remnant‟ would 
seem to be his way of understanding the good of those, perhaps especially in the 
conspiracy, who were not Christians: Christians should see them as already belonging to 
Christ while patiently helping them to come to a full profession (162). 
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Drawing together the aspects of Christ‟s centrality in these early, virtue-ethical 
manuscripts, the centrality of Christ is such that Bonhoeffer defines reality and good 
(via the will of God) in relationship to Christ. In his discussions he focuses on the 
doctrines of the Incarnation, Crucifixion, and Resurrection as the lens for viewing not 
only Christ himself, but implications for Christian living. Christ is both the agent of 
conformation, and the one to whom the believer is to be conformed. Christ is sovereign 
and active; humans rely on grace. Nonetheless, the Christian is to be active, 
representing what God is doing and intends to do in the world, engaging in activities 
which prepare for the coming of Christ in mercy. In these manuscripts there is an 
emphasis on the historical context, and, in focusing on Christ, Bonhoeffer counters 
nationalistic ideology and articulates the possibility of seeing „good‟ people as 
belonging to Christ, even if they as yet make no profession of faith. Given his overall 
agenda of writing an ethic for his time and place, these latter points are important. Now 
I turn to the question of how the centrality of Christ figures in the later manuscripts. 
 
In the later manuscripts based on divine command ethics, one of the most arresting 
aspects of Christ‟s centrality is the way in which many things are either defined in 
relation to Christ or for which Christ is the exemplar. Thus, in the second version of 
„History and the Good‟ Bonhoeffer speaks of Christ as „my life‟, drawing on John 
11:25. In this context he can say that good is not some abstraction from life, but „life as 
what it is in reality, that means in its source, its essence and its goal, thus life in the 
sense of the word: Christ is my life. Good is not a quality of life, but rather “life” itself. 
Being good means “living”‟ (252).  
 
Yet Bonhoeffer not only defines life in relation to Christ, in the same context he speaks 
of Christ as the pattern of responsibility. „Because Jesus, – the life, our life – as the 
Incarnate Son of God, lived representatively for us, all of human life is, through him, 
representational life‟ (257). Christ is the epitome of responsibility and representation 
(258).  
 
In „The Love of God and the Decay of the World‟, Christ is also shown to be the 
example of simplicity:  
The freedom of Jesus is not the arbitrary choice of one of innumerable 
possibilities, but rather it consists precisely of the complete simplicity of his 
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acting, for which there are never several possibilities, conflicts, alternatives, but 
rather there is always just the one. This one Jesus calls the will of God. He calls 
it his food to do this will. This will of God is his life. Jesus does not live and act 
out of the knowledge of good and evil, but rather out of the will of God. There is 
only one will of God. In it the source is regained, in it freedom and simplicity of 
all acting is founded (315).
 474
 
 
Thus Bonhoeffer draws together the element of simplicity from the earlier manuscripts, 
with a focus on Christ. Later in the manuscript, Bonhoeffer even defines acting itself in 
terms of Christ:
475
 
Without me you can do nothing‟ (John 15.5). This sentence is to be understood 
most strictly. There is really no doing without Jesus Christ. All of the manifold 
things which otherwise give the appearance of doing, all the innumerable duties 
are in the judgement of Jesus as if nothing had been done (330). 
 
Bonhoeffer then refers to all doing apart from Christ as „pseudo-acting‟ (Scheintun). 
This is a claim consistent with his insistence that all reality is known in Christ, and that 
all things have their source, essence and goal in him. It is not clear what status in reality 
such pseudo-actions have. Nevertheless, what is of interest here is to note the many 
things which Bonhoeffer defines in relation to Christ. 
 
Such understanding continues with love, which is not defined generally,  
perhaps in the sense of love‟s being the offering of life for another. Not this 
generality, but rather the wholly unique offering of the life of Jesus Christ for us 
is called love here. Love is inseparably connected to the name of Jesus Christ as 
the revelation of God…. Love is always he himself. Love is always God 
himself. Love is always the revelation of God in Jesus Christ (337-8). 
 
That this is not an arbitrary or unimportant term to define in relation to Christ is shown 
by the fact that the title of this manuscript is „The Love of God and the Decay of the 
World‟.  
 
Another, even more central, term in Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics which he relates to Christ is 
„command‟: „God’s command which is revealed in Jesus Christ is issued to us in the 
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church, in the family, in work, and in authority‟ (383, his emphasis).476 In „The 
Concrete Command and the Divine Mandates‟, Bonhoeffer puts it like this: 
God‟s command, which is revealed in Jesus Christ, in its undivided claim of the 
person and the world through the reconciling love of God, encounters us 
concretely in four different forms which are united only by the command itself: 
in the church, in marriage and family, in culture, in authority (392). 
 
However, so central the notion of command is for Bonhoeffer, placing it in reference to 
being revealed in Jesus Christ does not give it clear Christological contours. The 
emphasis in both manuscripts is placed on the mandates, rather than on any specific 
aspect of command which is dependent on its being revealed in Christ.  
 
Thus it is clear that in the later manuscripts Bonhoeffer defines a number of important 
concepts in relation to Christ: life, responsibility, representation, simplicity, acting, 
love, and command. Three of these are given greater depth by his claim that Christ is 
our exemplar: responsibility, representation, and simplicity. 
 
Between the more virtue-ethical and divine command-based manuscripts there is the 
obvious similarity of Bonhoeffer‟s move to understand or define many things in relation 
to Christ: reality and good in the early manuscripts, and life, responsibility, 
representation, simplicity, acting, love, and command in the later. An additional 
similarity is his reliance on the dogmatic categories of Incarnation, Crucifixion, and 
Resurrection when speaking of Christ rather than referring to particular gospel 
narratives. There is also an overlap of themes, most obviously representation. One 
interesting difference is that in the virtue-ethical manuscripts, Christ is merely the one 
who gives the command to be both simple and clever; in the divine command-based 
manuscript Christ is the example of what simplicity is. A much greater significance, 
however, lies in the fact that centring on Christ seems to do more work in the early, 
virtue-ethical manuscripts, where Bonhoeffer uses it to counter nationalism, and to give 
an account of goodness found in people who are not Christians is to be understood and 
approached.  
 
                                                          
476
 I assume that Bonhoeffer‟s reference to „work‟ rather than „culture‟ is a slip of the pen in this instance, 
likewise his reference to „family‟ rather than „marriage and family‟. 
J. Moberly The Virtue of Bonhoeffer’s Ethics 216 
Taking all this into consideration, I would first suggest that there are more similarities 
than differences in how Christ is seen to be central in the virtue-ethical and divine 
command-based manuscripts. Secondly, it would seem paradoxical that it is in a 
manuscript that relies more on divine command ethics where Bonhoeffer shows Christ 
to be the exemplar of simplicity, responsibility, and representation, since the very notion 
of being an exemplar is much closer to virtue-ethical modes of thought. For this reason, 
I am loath to account for this difference as being in any way related to the form of 
ethical thought Bonhoeffer was using. Thirdly, however, the differences which exist are 
complementary, since they do not contradict one another, nor could the material from 
either form be ignored without loss. 
 
5.4.3.b: Communion with Christ  
While the notion of communion with Christ does not have the obvious place that other 
aspects of Christology have in Bonhoeffer‟s thought, there are a number of references to 
it in virtue-ethical and divine command-based manuscripts. A telling example occurs in 
„Ethics as Formation‟, when he is speaking about what it means to be conformed to the 
risen Christ: 
The new person lives in the world like everyone else; he is distinguished often 
only in few [things/ways] from other people. He does not aim at giving himself 
prominence, but only to give Christ prominence for the sake of his brothers. 
Transformed in the form of the Risen One, he carries here only the sign of the 
cross and of judgement. In that he carries it willingly, he shows himself to be 
one who has received the Holy Spirit and who lives in incomparable love and 
communion with Jesus Christ (83). 
 
Communion with Christ occurs, then, as a result of being conformed to Christ, which, 
as we have seen, is accomplished by Christ. Hence it is also an aspect of grace. It is also 
clear that communion with Christ is something ongoing, in the midst of everyday living 
in the world, though with the Christian‟s focus on Christ for the sake of her fellow-
Christians. There is no triumphalism here: what is visible is the sign of the cross and 
judgement. Yet even while emphasizing the role of grace, it is clear that the Christian is 
to be active and to participate, to carry the sign of the cross and judgement willingly. 
This voluntary participation is what makes evident the Holy Spirit at work in her life; it 
is the proof that she lives in the „incomparable love‟ and communion with Jesus Christ. 
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In another of the virtue-ethical manuscripts, „Guilt, Justification, Renewal‟, Bonhoeffer 
returns to this topic.  
Genuine recognition of guilt does not grow up out of the experiences of 
dissolution and of decay, but rather for us, who encountered him, only out of the 
form of Christ himself. It [recognition of guilt] presupposes thus a measure of 
communion with this form. Precisely therefore it is a wonder; for how should 
the one who has fallen away from Christ still have communion with Christ, 
unless through the grace by which Christ himself holds tightly the one who has 
fallen away and preserves the communion for him? (125-6). 
 
This passage underscores the necessity of grace for anyone to have communion with 
Christ, and yet it goes further, since it opens the possibility that those who have fallen 
away from Christ may be kept in communion with him, by him. Bonhoeffer considers 
the recognition of her own guilt to be the first step in the process by which Christ 
conforms a person to himself. Although this leads on to an extended discussion of 
confession of guilt within the church, and his unforgettable confession of the sins of the 
church in Nazi Germany, it is at least possible that this is another place in which 
Bonhoeffer opens the way for understanding the goodness of those who are not 
Christians. For if a non-Christian can recognise her guilt, Bonhoeffer would see that as 
evidence that Christ has begun his work of conforming her to himself. 
 
Thus, in the two passages which treat communion with Christ in the virtue-ethical 
manuscripts, several things are worth mentioning. The first is that communion with 
Christ is dependent on grace. The second, however, is that the Christian is to be an 
active participant, willingly bearing the sign of the cross. Thirdly, and most strikingly, 
communion with Christ is not only a possibility for the believer, but for those who are 
being held by Christ and kept in his communion as the first part of his conforming them 
to himself, perhaps even before a profession of faith may have been made. 
 
Turning to the divine command-based manuscripts, in the section on „The Structure of 
Responsible Life‟ in the second version of „History and the Good‟, Bonhoeffer 
considers the nature of the conscience in the Christian.  
Where Christ, true God and true human, has become the point of unity of my 
existence (although the conscience still remains – formally – the call from my 
essential being to unity with myself) this unity, however, can no longer be 
realised in the retreat to my autonomy of living by the law, but [this unity is 
realised] rather in the communion with Jesus Christ (278-9). 
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Here Bonhoeffer‟s focus is not the grace which enables the Christian to have 
communion with Christ, though this should be presupposed; it is on how the conscience 
is transformed from being a call to unity with the self to being a call to 
unity/communion with Christ. Thus the notion of communion with Christ is being used 
by Bonhoeffer to develop a more positive understanding of the conscience than is seen 
in some other passages, and to give an account of its continuing role in the life of the 
Christian.
477
 
 
In the following section on „The Place of Responsibility‟, Bonhoeffer returns to his 
focus on grace: „In the encounter with Jesus Christ the person experiences the call of 
God, and in that the calling to life in the communion of Jesus Christ. Divine grace 
befalls the person; it lays claim to him‟ (290). Here Bonhoeffer is more explicit about 
the workings of grace: an encounter with Jesus Christ, the call of God, the calling or 
vocation to life in the communion of Jesus Christ.
478
 There is no mention in this 
instance of a call to repentance, or of the recognition of guilt, but again grace is 
emphasized. 
 
In another divine command-based manuscript, „The Concrete Command and the Divine 
Mandates‟, Bonhoeffer takes this notion a step further. Part of the church‟s mandate is 
to „bear witness to Jesus Christ as Lord and Saviour of his Church and of all the world, 
and thereby [to] call [others] into his communion‟ (403). Thus the call to life in 
communion with Christ may not, as above, be the direct call of God but a call 
pronounced by the church. This brings the concept of communion with Christ into 
harmony with Bonhoeffer‟s long-standing ecclesiological focus. Later in this 
manuscript Bonhoeffer shows an enhanced role for the church, namely that precisely in 
its communion with and following of Christ it represents the world:  
The Christian Church stands in the place in which the whole world should stand; 
in so far it serves the world representatively, it is there for the sake of the world. 
On the other hand, the world comes to its own fulfilment there where the Church 
stands…. In this double representation the church stands in the communion and 
discipleship of its Lord, who was precisely Lord in that he was there for the 
world and not for himself (408-9). 
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This passage brings together ecclesiology not only with communion with Christ, but 
also with the important theme of representation.
479
 
 
Thus in the divine command-based passages communion with Christ is, of course, 
dependent on grace. Yet here Bonhoeffer does more with it: he uses it to give an 
account of the nature and role of the conscience in the Christian; he explores how God‟s 
call comes to a person, including coming through the church‟s witness, and he suggests 
even that the church‟s communion with Christ is part of its representation of the world. 
 
Comparing and contrasting, then, Bonhoeffer‟s treatment of communion with Christ in 
the earlier passages with these later ones, the one similarity is the role of grace in 
enabling a person to live in communion with Christ. The passages depending on virtue-
like ethics bring this together with the agent‟s willing participation. Importantly, the 
second quote shows Bonhoeffer giving some account of non-Christians being in 
communion with Christ. Likewise, in the latter passages, Bonhoeffer is also concerned 
to speak of how one might come to be in communion with Christ, though here he offers 
a different pattern. Significantly, in these excerpts based on divine command ethics, 
Bonhoeffer hints at the role of the church, both in voicing God‟s call to communion 
with Christ and in being the representative for all humanity in his communion. It is not 
clear that these differences are linked to his mode of ethical discourse, but the 
differences are complementary.  
 
5.4.3.c: Simplicity (and Cleverness)  
As noted in the previous chapter, simplicity is God-given (4.5.2.a); additionally, both in 
the virtue-ethical and the divine command-based manuscripts there is at least a hint that 
it can be understood only in Christ himself (68; 315). In that context I suggested that 
simplicity (together with cleverness, since Bonhoeffer describes them as a unity) 
functions in some way analogous to a virtue, and specifically to prudence.  
Because the simple one does not squint at the world alongside God, therefore he 
is capable of seeing freely and impartially the reality of the world. Thus 
simplicity becomes cleverness. Whoever sees reality as it is, whoever sees the 
ground of things is clever. Therefore only the one who sees reality in God is 
clever (67). 
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This is the aspect of prudence which enables a person to see a situation or reality aright 
(67-9). Yet in a classical or Thomist account of virtue ethics, one would expect 
prudence to enable the virtuous person not only to perceive a situation correctly, but 
also to apprehend the right course of action. In the virtue-ethical manuscripts this 
function of prudence hardly seems present. 
 
In the divine command-based manuscripts, there is again evidence of something like 
prudence at work, namely the possibility of right judgement which comes from the 
unity with God which is given in Christ (318-9). 
 
However, it is only in discussing what it means to discern the will of God (as seen in 
5.2.2) that the fuller aspect of prudence is brought into play.  
It is the liberating call to simplicity, to repentance, it is the call which itself 
cancels [or raises, aufhebt] the old knowledge from falling away [from God] and 
gives the new knowledge of Jesus, that knowledge which is utterly absorbed in 
doing the will of God (321). 
 
Here right perception (new knowledge) is inextricably bound up in right action (doing 
the will of God). This is not vastly different from Thomas‟s account of infused 
prudence. Moreover, simplicity is the capability to do God‟s will as an actus directus,480 
a direct and unreflective action (322).  
 
As already noted, in the case of simplicity, there is a clear difference between the virtue-
ethical and the divine command-based manuscripts. In the former instances, Bonhoeffer 
focuses solely on the aspect of right perception of reality; in the latter examples there is 
a clear move towards expression of the God-given ability to apprehend the right course 
of action (as well as the ability to execute that). Since Bonhoeffer works with the same 
language in both modes of ethical thought (simplicity, or simplicity and cleverness, 
which he has said are really one), it seems to me that this is a case where there is clearly 
development of the one notion over time. It is, of course, also possible that the divine 
command ethic framework necessarily brings issues of discernment and action into 
sharper focus. Yet since it is not possible to be certain what influence the mode of 
ethical thought had on the development, it is safer merely to note that the difference 
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here is not one of complementarity or contradiction; nothing of substance regarding 
prudence would be lost if one ignored the earlier passages. 
 
5.4.4: Preliminary Conclusions: Command and/or Conformation  
It is now possible to consider the various areas of overlapping material to weigh up 
what the relationship between them is, and thus to be able to answer more surely how 
the virtue-ethical aspects of Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics relate to the divine command elements. 
In the case of Bonhoeffer‟s methodological concerns regarding concrete ethics and 
treating the whole of life, there were similarities as well as differences, and the 
differences were complementary. Regarding structures, the mandates and responsibility, 
the relationship was slightly more complex: his treatment of the mandates showed 
development over time as well as complementary differences; the notion of 
responsibility was greatly developed in the later manuscripts after only brief mentions 
in the earlier ones. So in these issues there was more evidence of development over 
time, but also complementarity in his treatments of the mandates. In looking at specific 
aspects of ethical life, centring on the person of Jesus Christ, communion with Christ, 
simplicity (and cleverness), and prudential discernment, there were varying mixtures of 
similarity, and complementary difference. In treating the centrality of Christ, there were 
more similarities than differences, though the differences were complementary. Again 
in his handling of communion with Christ there were obvious similarities, but with 
important and complementary differences: articulating an understanding of how non-
Christians may be „good‟ in the earlier manuscripts, and involving his ecclesiological 
concerns in the later ones. In the case of simplicity, however, there were obvious 
similarities as well as development in the later manuscript, which lead me to conclude 
that in this case the earlier manuscript does not contribute much substance not contained 
in the later. Thus it is possible to say that it is certainly not the case that the mode of 
ethical thought made no difference to how Bonhoeffer treated these themes; there were 
too many and important areas of divergence for this to be so. Additionally, there were 
no instances where the differences were contradictory and therefore indicative of a 
radical change of direction or thought. The differences were either seen to be the result 
of development over time, or the evidence of a complementarity engendered by the 
richness of drawing on two different modes for considering ethics. 
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In view of all this, it seems to me that Rasmussen is correct in pointing out the 
similarity of concerns across the manuscripts using conformation and divine command 
ethics. However, given the many real differences which may be related to the form of 
ethical thought in use, Plant is surely correct in his unwillingness to make one mode of 
ethical discourse subordinate to the other. Yet in distinction from them both, I would 
like to ask if there is not evidence, given all the areas where there was complementarity 
in Bonhoeffer‟s treatment of the material, to suggest some sort of integration of the two 
modes of ethical thought, rather than considering them to be irreducibly plural, or 
seeing command as subordinate to conformation.  
 
5.4.5. A Case for Integration 
One possibility of a more profound relationship between the virtue-like conformation 
ethics of the earlier manuscripts and the divine command ethics of the later ones would 
be that Bonhoeffer was in the process of a kind of dialectical integration of the two. 
Although there can be no positive proof for such a relationship, since he did not 
complete the book he intended to write and did not make explicit the relationship 
between the elements extant in the manuscripts we have, the fact that Bonhoeffer 
worked with similarly disparate notions in other works to try to achieve a synthesis 
(most obviously in Act and Being) is sufficient reason to examine whether there may be 
indications that he was intending a synthesis in this case as well.
481
  
 
Although Plant does not go so far as to suggest the possibility of the integration of the 
two „moods‟, as he calls them, for conceiving ethics, he is aware of examples of 
dialectical integration in other works. First, in discussing Act and Being, Plant notes 
Bonhoeffer‟s language of sin as „being in Adam‟, which is contrasted with that of 
„being in Christ‟. Sin, he tells us, is understood by Bonhoeffer not simply as concrete 
acts, but as being in Adam rather than being in Christ.
482
 What, then, is the relationship 
between good acts and being good? Plant tells us, for Bonhoeffer this cannot be a case 
of either/or, but of both/and: being and act impinge on one another, whether one is in 
Adam or in Christ. Yet one may not pursue one‟s own goodness; one can only seek 
                                                          
481
 See Eberhard Bethge‟s assessment that Bonhoeffer „sought to mediate between two opposing 
positions‟, though he identified these as situation ethics and normative ethics, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A 
Biography, ed. Victoria Barnett (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000), 717. 
482
 Plant, Bonhoeffer, 74. 
J. Moberly The Virtue of Bonhoeffer’s Ethics 223 
Christ.
483
 Such language has rich resonance for Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics, as we shall see 
presently. 
 
For in writing generally of Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics, Plant notes an implication for ethics 
from Act and Being, namely that „[d]eeds and character cohere in God, and through 
faith cohere also in the believer‟.484 If taken to its logical conclusion, though Plant does 
not explore the question, this should mean that in the case of conformation the attention 
to the person never obscures the question of acting well. Likewise it should mean that 
when Bonhoeffer depends more on divine command language, the emphasis on specific 
deeds should not eclipse the character of the person who is acting. 
 
In this section I examine elements within the Ethics which provide evidence for an 
integration of conformation and command: complementarity of the treatment of issues 
which appear in virtue-ethical and divine-command-based manuscripts (5.4.4.a), the 
presence of the concerns of divine command ethics in passages related to conformation 
and vice versa (5.4.4.b), and specific passages which are potentially suggestive of 
synthesis (5.4.4.c). In this discussion, the question should also be kept open whether, 
through faith, the deeds and character of the believer are seen to cohere. 
 
5.4.4.a: Complementarity 
In the previous section looking at themes and notions which Bonhoeffer treated both in 
virtue-ethical and divine command-based manuscripts, although there were a few 
passages which simply covered the same ground (using the notion of mandates to 
counter dualism; emphasizing the role of grace in communion with Christ) and some 
issues where Bonhoeffer‟s thought seems to have developed over time in ways which 
are probably unrelated to the mode of ethical thought he was employing (the mandates; 
responsibility), most passages showed complementarity between what he expressed in 
the conformation and command passages. That is to say, where there were differences 
they were in no way contradictory, but added various elements or aspects of thought 
which make for a broader and deeper account of Christian ethics than either provided on 
its own.  
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Thus conformation ethics shows concretion through bearing the name and face of Jesus 
Christ and acknowledging the unique way in which he wins form in a given agent (85-
6), but lacks the emphasis found in his command ethics on the interrelatedness of 
persons and the role played by the historical context (373-4).  
 
Similarly, conformation ethics encompasses the whole of life by taking the natural – 
human penultimate reality – seriously, and addressing thereby a variety of important 
issues („The Ultimate and the Penultimate‟, and „The Natural Life‟), but lacks the 
specificity given in the notion of „command‟ (broadly conceived) in the divine 
command-based manuscripts of everyday joys, sorrows, amusements and perplexities 
(384-5, 387-8).  
 
Likewise the mandates as discussed in the virtue-ethical manuscripts show Bonhoeffer 
treating the person explicitly in a holistic manner (59-60), while in the divine command-
based manuscripts they provide the means for giving a theological foundation for active 
resistance to the evils of the Nazi regime (397).  
 
In conformation, centring on Christ gives definition both to the good and to reality and 
allows Bonhoeffer to speak of the goodness of non-Christians (60-1; 161-2), but it is in 
the divine command-based manuscripts that he presents Christ as the exemplar of 
simplicity, responsibility, and representation (315; 257-8).  
 
Communion with Christ, through the lens of conformation, can be said to be possible 
for those who do not profess Christ (125-6), but only through the lens of command does 
Bonhoeffer explore the dynamics of how a person comes to be in communion or the 
role of the church in this process (278-9).  
 
Finally, in conformation, simplicity is seen only in terms of perceiving reality aright 
(67), whereas in command it enables one to apprehend what the right course of action is 
and to do it (321-2).  
 
In each of these areas, Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics would be notably, and in some cases 
grievously, weakened if the aspects related either to conformation or command were 
lost. The fullness of his thought is certainly dependent on the presence of both. Yet this 
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is not enough to show that he was integrating the two strands. For this, it would be 
necessary to show that there are ways in which he was bringing the two concerns 
together. 
 
5.4.4.a: Evidence of the Concerns of Divine Command in Conformation, and 
of Virtue Ethics in Divine Command 
Earlier in this chapter (5.2.1), I explored Bonhoeffer‟s use of divine command language 
in the early, virtue-ethical manuscripts. Similarly, in the previous chapter (4.5) I 
explored the use of the themes from conformation in the later, divine command-based 
manuscripts. In each case, albeit there are only few examples, they are nonetheless 
important as evidence of an integrated conception. 
 
One of the most arresting examples of divine command embedded in conformation 
ethics occurs in his opening sentence: 
It is an incomparable imposition which must be addressed to everyone who 
wants even to look at the problem of a Christian ethics, namely the imposition to 
abandon from the outset as inappropriate to the issue both questions which lead 
him to be concerned with the ethical problem at all – „how can I become good?‟ 
and „how can I do something good?‟ – and instead to ask the question about the 
will of God (31). 
 
Taken in isolation, this statement would seem to undermine the whole concept of virtue 
ethics, since he demands that the question of how a person may become good be 
abandoned. Yet this statement comes in the manuscript in which Bonhoeffer sets out to 
define not only reality but the good in Christ, and in the following manuscript will 
discuss ethics as being conformed to Christ, i.e. how one becomes good. In this context, 
then, Bonhoeffer is not negating the need to become good, or to act well, but is 
demanding that the primary question be rather about the will of God. This would 
suggest that Bonhoeffer has both divine command and conformation in his mind from 
the outset. 
 
Also telling is that when Bonhoeffer speaks of simplicity, which seems to function as a 
virtue in his conception, there is also command language: The simple person „is the man 
of undivided heart. Because he knows and has God, he depends on the commands, on 
the judgement and on the mercy which proceed daily anew from the mouth of God‟ 
(67). In this example the substance of divine command and virtue ethics are more 
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explicitly intertwined: the simple person is the one who attends fully to God and God‟s 
command. It is not grossly overstated to claim that in this conception Bonhoeffer sees 
an infused virtue as enabling the dynamics of divine command ethics to come to fruition 
in the Christian‟s life. 
 
One of the most striking passages, however, regards the very notion of conformation: 
Ethics as formation is thus the venture to speak, neither abstractly nor 
casuistically, neither programmatically nor purely speculatively, of the form of 
Jesus Christ taking form in our world. Here concrete judgements and decisions 
must be risked. Here the decision and act can no longer be pushed off on the 
individual‟s conscience, but rather here there are concrete commands and 
directions for which obedience is demanded (89). 
 
This draws together conformation and divine command in unmistakeable terms: ethics 
as formation, the form of Jesus Christ taking form in our world, by its very nature, 
involves concrete commands and obedience. In view of this, it would hardly be 
appropriate to conceive of conformation apart from divine command, or of divine 
command without seeing it in the context of Christ winning form among us here and 
now. 
 
It may perhaps be thought that such examples are too isolated to provide adequate 
evidence of divine command being interwoven in the fabric of conformation from the 
outset. If the very nature of the passages cited above and their placement in the work do 
not counter such argument, the presence of the notion of the divine mandates in the 
earliest manuscript should do so. They are not merely mentioned in passing, but are 
developed over several pages (54-60), and although their shape changes in certain ways, 
as already seen, in the divine command-related manuscripts, they retain their structural 
function in Bonhoeffer‟s thought even in prison.485 The mandates are, of course, not 
necessarily a feature of Barthian divine command ethics, since relying on the fresh 
command of God in every given moment does not depend on seeing life as related to 
different spheres where God‟s command may be heard. Indeed there are indications 
Barth himself was not sympathetic to the notion.
486
 Yet it should be apparent that the 
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very concept of „mandate‟ is substantively related to „command‟.487 The use of a 
structuring concept which presupposes that God has given certain „tasks‟ (55), and that 
humans are responsible before God for carrying these out (55-6), is inherently related to 
the command metaphor for conceiving ethics. While a task is not the same thing as a 
commandment, it does presuppose the same sort of relationship, namely one in which 
the giver of the task or commandment holds such authority that fulfilment of the task, 
obedience, may be taken for granted. Mandates, then, are conceptually related closely to 
divine command, and its presence in the earliest manuscript must be seen at least as 
evidence that Bonhoeffer had both the virtue-ethical conformation and divine command 
in mind as he began his work. To show whether this continued to be the case it is 
necessary to review whether and how elements of conformation are present in the divine 
command-related manuscripts. 
 
In the previous chapter (4.5) I examined a number of themes which have a virtue-ethical 
aspect, including conformation, simplicity and cleverness, and responsibility in relation 
to prudence. The notion of conformation, which I considered in chapter four to have the 
strongest and most obvious connection with virtue ethics, appears only in one place in 
the later manuscripts: 
How does this testing „what the will of God be‟ proceed? Decisive here is the 
prerequisite that there is this testing only because of a „metamorphosis‟, a 
complete inner change of the form hitherto because of a „renewal‟ of the mind 
(Rom. 12.2), because of living as children of the light (Eph. 5.9). This 
„metamorphosis‟ can only be concerned with the overcoming of the form of the 
person who has fallen away, Adam, and with the conformation to the form of the 
new person, Christ (324). 
 
In this passage conformation is the prerequisite for proving what God‟s will is. I shall 
return to this passage in the next section, since it draws together in important ways the 
notion of conformation with one of the key aspects of divine command ethics. 
 
Likewise, the most obvious candidate for consideration as a „virtue‟, simplicity, 
reappears in the same manuscript, „The Love of God and the Decay of the World‟. It is 
manifestly the case that in his treatment of simplicity in this later manuscript, some 
themes closely related to divine command appear, namely perceiving God‟s will and 
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doing it. Nevertheless, it is also evident that although simplicity still has the character of 
an infused virtue (321). Moreover, it is only in this manuscript, and not „Ethics as 
Formation‟, that Bonhoeffer identifies Jesus Christ himself as the exemplar of the 
simple person: 
The freedom of Jesus is not the arbitrary choice of one of innumerable 
possibilities, rather it consists precisely in the complete simplicity of his acting, 
[a simplicity] for which there are never several possibilities, conflicts, 
alternatives, rather always only one (315).
488
 
 
The whole passage from which this is taken focuses on Jesus as displaying what it 
means to be a simple person and to act in simplicity. Here Bonhoeffer is implicitly 
working with a more virtue-based conception of ethics, namely looking to a virtuous 
(or, in this case, the virtuous) person to discover who we are to be – in this case, simple 
persons. This is the same move Bonhoeffer makes when speaking of Jesus as the 
responsible one (288) and the one who lives representationally (275-6), which 
underscores that this is a prime mode of thinking ethically for Bonhoeffer, even while 
using the language of divine command. 
 
Similarly, although I consider responsibility to have a structural role in Bonhoeffer‟s 
ethical thought rather than functioning as a virtue, it does seem to depend on what might 
elsewhere be called prudence.
489
 In „The Structure of the Responsible Life‟ he writes of 
responsibility that a good will, likelihood of success, good motives, and a good object 
are all needed. „Because it is not about the implementation of some limitless principle, 
therefore one must, in the given situation, observe, consider, evaluate, decide – all 
within the limitations of human knowledge generally‟ (267). Bonhoeffer does not name 
prudence (or indeed simplicity), but it is clear that something like prudence must be at 
work in this conception of responsibility, which of course is one of his most important 
themes. 
 
These instances of the presence of virtue-ethical elements still present in manuscripts 
dominated by divine command language, taken together with themes from the 
conformation manuscripts which persist in the command ones (such as the penultimate 
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and the ultimate), and aspects of his overall conception which relate well to virtue ethics 
as seen in chapter four (such as his anthropology, his holistic conception of human life, 
and his sense of narrative and history), provide adequate warrant to claim that the vision 
of ethics described as (virtue-ethical) conformation is to some degree still present in the 
divine command-related manuscripts. To discover if there are hints as to how 
conformation and divine command are related I turn to specific texts which refer to 
both. 
 
5.4.4.c: Passages which Suggest  an Integration of Command and 
Conformation 
Perhaps the first indication of a projected integration occurs in the manuscript „Ethics as 
Formation‟: 
Only the one who is able here to combine simplicity and cleverness with one 
another is able to endure [bestehen]. But what is simplicity? what is cleverness? 
How can the two become one? Simple is the one who in the inversion, confusion 
and twisting of all terms keeps only the plain truth of God in view, who is not a 
„dipsychos‟, a man of two souls (James 1[.8]), but rather the man of undivided 
heart. Because he knows and has God, he depends on the commands, on the 
judgement and on the mercy which proceed daily anew from the mouth of God. 
Not fettered by principles, rather bound by love for God, he has become free 
from the problems and conflicts of ethical decision. They no longer oppress him. 
He belongs wholly, only to God and God‟s will (67). 
 
I have already suggested that simplicity and cleverness fulfil a virtue-like role in that 
they are human dispositions (infused rather than acquired) which enable right action. 
Yet in this virtue-ethical passage, the virtuous person is defined in terms related to 
divine command: she is dependent on God‟s commands, God‟s will, and the judgement 
and mercy which come ever afresh from God. There can be no doubt that Bonhoeffer 
has, at least in this passage, integrated virtue-ethical elements with aspects of Barthian 
divine command ethics to create something distinctive. 
 
Another place in which such a creative union may be seen comes later in the same 
manuscript: 
Ethics as formation is thus the venture to speak, neither abstractly nor 
casuistically, neither programmatically nor purely speculatively, of the form of 
Jesus Christ taking form in our world. Here concrete judgements and decisions 
must be risked. Here the decision and act can no longer be pushed off on the 
individual‟s conscience, but rather here there are concrete commands and 
directions for which obedience is demanded (89). 
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Again in this instance there is a conjunction of the two strands. Ethics as formation, as 
has already been seen, is in some senses related to virtue ethics. Yet in Bonhoeffer‟s 
conception, speaking of ethics as formation necessarily entails concrete commands 
requiring obedience. In the first passage it is possible to see a logical union of simplicity 
as prudence and divine command ethics: divine command requires some account of 
how God‟s will is discerned, and simplicity may be said to fill this need. In such a case, 
the „virtue‟ of simplicity would be secondary to the divine command as the primary 
mode of conceiving ethics. In this second passage, however, it is not immediately 
possible to see an internal link between what is necessary for ethics as formation to be 
coherent and concrete commands. For instance, it is thinkable for an ethic based on 
formation so to emphasize the variety of ways in which Christ‟s form shapes different 
persons that it would be difficult to articulate any (but the most general) command 
applicable to all. Or, it would be possible to emphasize that the person is so conformed 
to Christ that she herself wills what God wills, obviating the need for commands and 
obedience. In context, however, Bonhoeffer‟s concern is with articulating a concrete, 
rather than abstract, ethic, and it would seem that the connection between formation and 
commands in this passage is related to how he conceives of a concrete ethic: one in 
which specific commands are given and obedience is demanded. Yet even if the 
connection made is not one of logical necessity, what is important for this study is that 
for Bonhoeffer the connection is there and is compelling.  
  
These two pointers to the possibility of an intended integration of conformation and 
command in the virtue-ethical manuscripts have their counterparts, also only few, in the 
divine command-based manuscripts.  
 
An intimation of virtue ethics in the latter manuscripts has already been mentioned: his 
repeated depiction of Jesus as the model of faithful living. Christ is the paradigm for 
what it means to live in responsibility and representation (257-8). He is the exemplar of 
the simple person (315). He is love (337-8). Of course reference to a virtuous person is 
a move to be expected within virtue ethics. The presence of such material in the 
manuscripts dominated by divine command language, however, is suggestive of the two 
modes of thought being brought together. 
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One final hint of an intended integration occurs in the manuscript „The Love of God and 
the Decay of the World‟: 
How does this testing „what the will of God be‟ proceed? Decisive here is the 
prerequisite that there is this testing only because of a „metamorphosis‟, a 
complete inner change of the form hitherto because of a „renewal‟ of the mind 
(Rom. 12.2), because of living as children of the light (Eph. 5.9). This 
„metamorphosis‟ can only be concerned with the overcoming of the form of the 
person who has fallen away, Adam, and with the conformation to the form of the 
new person, Christ. That emerges clearly from other biblical uses of these terms. 
The new form, in whose strength alone the testing of the will of God is possible, 
has left the old person (who in falling away from God was striving for the 
knowledge of good and evil) behind. It is the form of the child of God, who in 
unity with the will of the Father lives in conformation to the only true Son of 
God (324-5). 
 
We have already seen that the „virtue‟ of simplicity is at work in allowing a Christian to 
discern the will of God. In this passage it is the notion of being conformed to Christ 
which is brought into closer relationship with „testing‟ the will of God. The categories 
for understanding conformation are subtly changed in that Bonhoeffer does not speak 
explicitly in terms of Christ‟s action, his „winning form‟, (and the believer‟s passivity). 
Yet there is still the concern to speak of the Fall in terms of falling away from God (as 
he did in the conformation manuscript „Inheritance and Decline‟), and of desiring to 
gain the knowledge of good and evil. In this case, however, conformation does not play 
a secondary role to the will of God as simplicity did. Such a secondary role may, of 
course, be seen in the fact that it is Christ‟s form in the believer which allows her to 
discern God‟s will. Nonetheless, it would seem that it is God‟s will that she should be 
conformed to Christ. Thus the two are brought dialectically such that neither can be said 
to be subordinate to the other. 
 
Although there are relatively few passages which refer to the themes of conformation 
and command together, yet there are hints in the virtue-ethical and divine command-
related manuscripts that Bonhoeffer was working with both notions in his mind from the 
beginning. Additionally, there is at least some indication that both simplicity and 
conformation are used in a supporting role for perceiving, testing, and doing the will of 
God, but equally that conformation to Christ is God‟s will. From this it is possible to 
suggest that the integration Bonhoeffer intended might well have envisaged a dialectic 
in which simplicity and conformation are instrumental in a conception of ethics based 
on the will of God, which in turn is to be discussed in terms of conformation to Christ. 
J. Moberly The Virtue of Bonhoeffer’s Ethics 232 
 
At this point it is possible to return to the question of whether it can be truly said that in 
Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics the deeds and character of the believer cohere through faith.490 As 
seen in chapter four (4.4.2), it is in conformation mode in „The Natural‟ that Bonhoeffer 
addresses concrete issues in the most sustained manner. Likewise in „The Ultimate and 
Penultimate‟ he speaks of specific acts which prepare the way for the Lord‟s coming in 
grace (154-6). These are both wide-ranging ways in which it can be claimed that in 
conformation ethics the focus on character does not obscure deeds. Similarly there are 
ways in which in divine command the emphasis on deeds does not eclipse the person, 
such as the fact that interrelationships between persons are brought out more explicitly 
in the later manuscripts, as are everyday, contingent realities of life. More striking, 
however, is the fact that it is in speaking of ethics from a divine command perspective 
that he offers the depiction of Christ as the exemplar of what it means to be simple, to 
be responsible, and to live representationally. It could be argued that in doing so 
Bonhoeffer was not so much employing a mode of reasoning from virtue ethics as 
working out in practice his christocentric theology. However, the point can equally be 
made, and I believe it is true, that the centrality of Christ in all Bonhoeffer‟s thought 
essentially necessitates perceiving ethics in terms which approximate virtue ethics. 
However one interprets this form of reasoning, it is certainly the case that an emphasis 
on deeds does not eclipse the person. Thus Plant is right to say that because in 
Bonhoeffer‟s conception character and deeds cohere in God, through faith (or, being 
conformed to Christ) they cohere also in the Christian. This very fact contributes to my 
conviction that character-based conformation and the deed-focused divine command 
ethics are not, as Plant says, irreducibly plural, but are being brought into a new and 
distinctive union in which neither is merely subordinate to the other. 
 
5.5: Tentative conclusions 
At the end of the previous chapter, it was possible to state firmly that there are virtue-
ethical elements of Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics. Here, however, it is necessary to be more 
cautious, since there is not enough explicit material to be sure of how those elements 
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relate to the parts of Bonhoeffer‟s writings which depend more on divine command 
ethics. 
 
Yet, however tentatively, it is necessary to proceed: it is right to attempt a more precise 
articulation of the relationship between conformation and divine command. From the 
fact that Bonhoeffer uses divine command language even in the most explicitly 
conformation-oriented material, and the fact that elements of conformation are present 
in the later manuscripts, it seems appropriate to conclude that he worked with both of 
these modes of conceiving of ethics throughout. In examining passages which bring 
virtue and divine command ethics together, it seemed in some examples that the 
overarching vision of ethics is framed in terms of the will of God, and that virtue-ethical 
aspects play a supporting role. Thus the „virtue‟ of simplicity enables the Christian to 
perceive reality correctly and to discern the will of God, while being conformed to 
Christ is the sine qua non for testing the will of God.  
 
However, in other ways it seemed that the two modes of conceiving ethics were used 
dialectically: conformation enables the believer to discern the will of God; and the will 
of God is that she be conformed to Christ. Similarly, the opening sentence of the first 
manuscript with its „incomparable imposition‟ of abandoning the questions of how one 
might be or do good and asking rather about the will of God (31)
491
 places the question 
of being good (virtue ethics, as it were) as well as doing good (command based ethics) 
in a secondary position to the will of God. In discussing this passage earlier (5.4.4.a), I 
assumed that the reference to „the will of God‟ is related to divine command, but I 
would like to revisit this passage and its completion at the end of the manuscript to ask 
if there truly is a link to divine command implied. When he returns to the theme, he 
states: 
We discussed at the beginning that the question of the will of God must take the 
place of the question of one‟s being good and doing good. The will of God, 
however, is nothing other than the becoming real of the reality of Christ among 
us and in our world. The will of God is thus neither an idea which demands 
realisation first; it is much more itself already reality in the self-revelation of 
God in Jesus Christ…. After the appearance of Christ, ethics can only be 
concerned with one thing, namely with receiving a share of the reality of the 
fulfilled will of God. But also this receiving a share is only possible because of 
the fact that, in the fulfilment of the will of God in Christ, I myself am also 
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included, and that means [I am] reconciled with God. The question of the will of 
God does not inquire about something hidden or unfulfilled, but rather about 
what is revealed, fulfilled. However, therein remains yet a genuine question, 
whether I myself, and the world which surrounds me, am placed in this question 
by the fulfilment. 
The will of God, as it was revealed and fulfilled in Jesus Christ, 
encompasses the whole of reality. Access to this whole, without allowing 
oneself to be torn apart by the manifold [things], exists only in faith in Jesus 
Christ „in whom the whole fullness of the Godhead dwells‟ (Col. 2.9, 1.19), 
„through whom all is reconciled, whether on earth or in heaven‟ (Col. 1.20), 
whose body, namely the church, is the fullness of him who fulfils all in all (Eph. 
1.23). Faith in this Jesus Christ is the only source of all good (60-7). 
 
The will of God, as discussed here, is surely something much broader than the question 
of what God wills in any particular instance, what God commands. It is the reality that 
Jesus has already reconciled the whole world to God. Thus it is not something to be 
discerned and then done, as fulfilling God‟s command might be. It is rather a cosmic 
reality which puts the question to each person whether she and the world around her 
receive a share of this reality through faith in Jesus Christ. Of course this grand vision 
of the will of God could be used within divine command ethics, just as it could be given 
as the basis for ethics in a variety of forms. It is, however, not indicative that 
Bonhoeffer was using divine command ethics as his prime category, with virtue only in 
a subordinate role. Instead, in these passages, Bonhoeffer places both an ethic based on 
being good (virtue) and an ethic based on doing good (command) in service of this 
overarching notion of God‟s will as nothing less than the reconciliation of all things in 
Christ.  
 
For such reasons, I believe that Rasmussen is not right in suggesting that command is in 
any way subordinate to conformation. Equally, I disagree with Plant‟s assessment of 
conformation and command as irreducibly plural; while the two strands are identifiable 
and not to be simply conflated, their relationship can be described as one of dialectical 
union pointing to all reality reconciled to God in Christ. Indeed, it seems likely that 
Bonhoeffer was consciously bringing together two different modes of conceiving ethics 
to try to articulate a concrete ethic for his context, honouring the strengths of each and 
using them to counterbalance the weaknesses inherent in the other, but using them both 
in service of a more cosmic vision of ethics in terms of the reconciliation of all things to 
God in Christ. 
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In the next and final chapter I shall explore how Bonhoeffer‟s integration of virtue-
ethical conformation and divine command ethics may be of import and use in our own 
context. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.1: Summary 
6.1.1: Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Before asking what can be learned from this study of virtue ethical aspects of 
Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics, it is good to return to the backdrop described in the first chapter. 
There we saw a stage which was divided sharply in two halves. The Roman Catholic 
half depicted justification both in terms of the remission of sins and sanctification, and 
eternal life was portrayed as a gift of grace as well as a reward for meritorious works. 
The Lutheran side of the stage showed justification as God‟s declaration that a sinner is 
righteous without reference to her works, and eternal life was displayed solely as given 
by grace; no works could be seen to be meritorious. Furthermore, the Lutheran and 
Roman Catholic sides diverged over how humans might know what is good, or how 
able they might be to will what is good. The ensuing accusations of the two parties left 
the two sides of the stage utterly divided, with considerable consequences for ethical 
discourse. The strengths of the Roman Catholic side may be said to lie in the fact that 
the rationale for moral theology was integral to its most basic theological convictions. 
Of course there were weaknesses in that language of „merit‟ and growth in grace were 
open to abuse, and the reliance on the manuals in the confessional led to a form of 
legalism. The strengths on the Lutheran side lay on the primacy of grace, and assurance 
of salvation. The greatest weakness was that there was no theological rationale for how 
ethics is related to justification by faith, by grace. 
 
This is the setting for considering how Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics relates to virtue ethics. I turn 
now to a summary of what has been seen of this relation in the preceding chapters. In 
doing so, I hope to see how Bonhoeffer‟s use of both virtue-ethical and command-based 
ethics might affect the scenery just described. 
 
6.1.2: Chapter 2 - Bonhoeffer and ‘Virtue Ethics’  
One would quite naturally assume that as a Lutheran theologian in the first half of the 
twentieth century, Bonhoeffer would keep firmly on the Protestant side of the stage. 
Quite apart from the anachronism of suggesting that anyone at that time might have 
regarded herself as a „virtue ethicist‟, even if her centre of moral thought came from 
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classical philosophy or Thomism, it is not plausible to imagine that Bonhoeffer 
considered himself to be an exponent of what we would now call „virtue ethics‟. Indeed, 
as was seen, there are many prima facie reasons to suppose that he might have disliked 
the enterprise of expounding virtue ethics. One example of this is his use of the word 
„Tugend’ („virtue‟), which was almost always with negative, if not derisive, 
connotations. 
 
Similarly, at first glance it would seem that Bonhoeffer‟s perception of Thomas Aquinas 
was largely negative. Since Thomism and classical philosophy are the prime contexts in 
which virtue ethics were expounded, Bonhoeffer‟s largely negative assumptions and 
statements regarding Thomas suggest, at least initially, that Bonhoeffer would have 
rejected any suggestion that he was a virtue ethicist, and would not have ventured to the 
side of the stage set for the Roman Catholic position on justification. Instead, these 
indications would seem to confirm the initial assumption that he would remain 
decidedly on the Protestant side of the stage. 
 
However, in some places it seems that Bonhoeffer rejects all the prime categories and 
forms of ethical thought, making it difficult to place him on the stage at all. Nor was the 
question of the mode of Bonhoeffer‟s ethical thought clarified by looking at what other 
commentators have concluded, since there is no widespread agreement regarding this.  
 
Furthermore, internal evidence showed, that whatever form his ethics may be said to 
take, he was concerned particularly that ethics be concrete rather than abstract, that 
ethics must focus on Jesus Christ, and that reliance on grace should in no way be 
undermined. Therefore, it became important to explore the nature of virtue ethics in a 
Christian context to see how it might meet not only these concerns, but also the negative 
associations which were implied in several passages where Bonhoeffer spoke of virtue 
(Tugend), such as hypocrisy, being private, and attending too little to fallen human 
nature. In a sense, this could be seen as asking a complementary question: could virtue 
ethics wander across the stage to the Protestant side? 
 
6.1.3: Chapter 3 – What is Christian Virtue Ethics? 
Virtue ethics has been conceived in a variety of ways within Christian thought. Thus it 
was important to look at some differing forms which have been influential or 
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representative of major strands within the tradition. The first I considered was 
Augustine, whose early work on ethics, De moribus ecclesiae catholicae, treated the 
moral life within a eudaemonist framework, with God as the supreme good for humans. 
Within that construct, Augustine used the language of the virtues, though redefined as 
forms of love. As he matured as a theologian, many of the themes most prominent in his 
conception of ethics retain their fundamental significance: the teleological framework, 
virtues as forms of love, and the role of knowledge and human happiness. The most 
important change which affects his conception of ethics is related to how he perceived 
the human will. As a result of the Fall, human action cannot be described as being free 
or autonomous, but is seen as motivated by wrong, sinful desires. Only through grace is 
the will freed to desire and choose the good, and to will something is to be actuated by 
love. Thus, in later writings he makes human dependence on grace more explicit and 
central than it had been when writing De moribus ecclesiae.
 
What we have, then, is a 
distinctively Christian form of virtue ethics which emphasizes the role of grace and 
which could move across the stage to the Protestant side. 
 
The second example of Christian virtue ethics I examined was that of Thomas Aquinas, 
whose approach brings together virtue ethics from Aristotle and Christian theology. 
Like Augustine, he uses a form of eudaemonism which focuses on the beatific vision of 
God; thus both see human flourishing ultimately in eschatological terms. He is content 
to borrow classical philosophy‟s cardinal virtues, even in their acquired form, though he 
supplements these both with their infused counterparts and with the theological virtues 
of faith, hope and love, which must be infused. Importantly, these virtues are only 
directed towards the supernatural end (seeing God face to face and enjoying him for 
ever) if they exist with love, which is received from God. Therefore it is right to stress 
that Thomas does have a clear recognition of the role of grace, even if many 
commentators (perhaps including Bonhoeffer) fail to note it. Thus although 
theologically it is possible (and in recent years this has happened) for Thomas‟s ethics 
to cross to the Protestant side of the stage, it seems unlikely that it is a model 
Bonhoeffer would have found appealing. 
 
The third account I considered is Alasdair MacIntyre‟s After Virtue, along with other 
contemporary writers who focus on the character of the agent, on the particularities not 
only of contingent circumstances but of personal make-up, history and interrelations, on 
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the role of community, and on the sense of meaning embedded in a narrative 
perspective of life. The specifics of current accounts differ in many ways, yet what they 
have in common is the insistence that the formation of the agent in habits of virtues is of 
inestimable importance for living well. 
 
Acknowledging the differences between Augustine‟s teleological virtue ethic involving 
virtues as forms of love, and Thomas‟ combination of Aristotelian cardinal virtues with 
the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love, and the variety of articulations currently 
abounding, I offered some criteria which I believe must be met if it is to be meaningful 
to speak of an account as being „virtue ethical‟ in a Christian context. Some 
eschatological teleological foundation is important, such as Augustine‟s notion of God 
as the supreme good, or Thomas‟s beatific vision. An account of human flourishing 
(and the necessity of grace to achieve this) is also essential. Furthermore, it is important 
to consider how the transformation of the person may be understood to be part and 
parcel of her salvation. Beyond these more formal considerations, to speak of „virtue 
ethics‟ there should be an emphasis on the person, her character and the formation of 
her character, as well as a focus on aretaic notions of what are good or excellent traits. 
In the evaluation of behaviours, a virtue ethic will attend to issues which pertain to the 
agent, such as her motives. Yet more important than evaluation for virtue ethics is the 
notion of growth in virtue, or the process of being sanctified.  
 
This look at Christian virtue ethics was necessary to counter the prima facie reasons 
seen for supposing that virtue ethics belongs on the Roman Catholic side of the stage, 
and that Bonhoeffer could not have been engaged in virtue ethics. In this examination 
virtue ethics has shown itself to be capable of moving across both sides of the stage. 
With these matters clarified, it was possible to turn to reasons for seeing some 
relationship of Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics to virtue ethics.  
 
6.1.4: Chapter 4 – Bonhoeffer’s Ethics  as Virtue Ethical 
As seen above, a Christian virtue ethic requires an account of the relationship of 
justification and sanctification to give some notion of how our final end is (and is not) 
related to how we live, or to put it differently, how we are to become who we eternally 
are and shall be.  
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In Bonhoeffer‟s early work, and especially in Discipleship, it is clear that he develops 
the doctrine of sanctification essentially in union with that of justification. In the Ethics 
he rejects any dualism between the work of Jesus Christ (justification) and the Holy 
Spirit (sanctification), and devotes a manuscript to the relationship between them. 
Obviously, this emphasis on sanctification is not sufficient warrant to see Bonhoeffer as 
engaging in virtue ethics.  
 
However, in looking at major themes and concerns in his Ethics it was apparent that 
they could well be part of an account of virtue ethics, though none necessitated seeing 
his ethics as a type of virtue ethics. Nevertheless, certain aspects do have a particularly 
close relationship to virtue ethics, such as Bonhoeffer‟s anthropology which emphasizes 
the identity of the Christian both as being in Christ and in relationships of representation 
with others, „narrative‟ and holistic aspects to his treatment of the person, and perhaps 
especially his moral vision for the everyday „middle‟ of life.  
 
Yet most importantly, it is possible to identify one of Bonhoeffer‟s two prime categories 
for discussing ethics as being distinctly related to virtue ethics: namely, ethics as 
conformation. Here we have emphasis on the agent, and her development not in relation 
to any abstract account of the virtues or some nominal virtuous person, but in relation to 
the person of Jesus Christ. Moreover there are elements of Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics which 
seem to function as or to depend on the presence of virtues, to wit simplicity (and 
cleverness) and some unspecified notion of prudence which is necessary to make sense 
of his notion of responsibility. Thus it is surely possible to claim that there are virtue-
ethical aspects of Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics.  
 
Furthermore, an examination of his method of handling concrete issues showed some 
real affinities with virtue ethics in its emphasis on the agent and her motives, as well as 
in arguing from reason rather than an overtly theological perspective, even if his 
position was formed by and consonant with Christian teaching. From all this it is 
possible to say that, like certain forms of virtue ethics, Bonhoeffer is able to move 
across the whole stage. 
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6.1.5: Chapter 5 – Virtue and Command in Bonhoeffer’s Ethics 
Yet to claim anything more than that there are virtue-ethical elements in his Ethics and 
affinities with virtue ethics in his treatment of specific issues, it is necessary to see how 
this virtue-ethical strand of his thought relates to the other major strand in his Ethics, 
Barthian divine command ethics. Both strands are present in the earlier, virtue-ethical 
and later, divine command-related manuscripts, though the weight of emphasis shifts 
from the virtue-ethical to command. An examination of issues or concerns treated both 
in virtue-ethical terms and in command language revealed not only similarities but also 
complementary differences, such that it would be inappropriate to conflate the two or to 
identify one strand as more important. Strikingly, Bonhoeffer uses virtue-ethical ideas 
and themes when he is working with command, and command language when he is 
treating conformation, and there are indications that he had both strands in mind 
throughout his writing.  
 
Although there are only a few passages which bring the two strands together explicitly, 
they are important indicators of how the two modes of considering ethics might be 
related. In one instance it would seem that the simple (or virtuous) person is to be 
described in terms related to divine command: she depends on God‟s commands, and on 
the justice and mercy which proceed anew daily from God.  Similarly, ethics as 
formation, although in many ways closely related to virtue ethics, is discussed in terms 
of concrete commands for which obedience is required. As a corollary, when 
Bonhoeffer is working most obviously with divine command language, he uses a mode 
of argument from virtue ethics most frequently, namely showing the ideal agent (Jesus) 
as the example for ethical behaviour. Finally, the „virtue‟ of simplicity is at work in 
discerning or testing the will of God, and yet it is God‟s will that the believer be 
conformed to Christ.  
 
Therefore, although his work was left unfinished and it is therefore impossible to make 
definitive claims, it seems to me that Bonhoeffer was engaged in an attempt to bring 
together two different modes of envisaging ethics into a dialectical synthesis in which 
the virtue-ethical aspects of simplicity and conformation are instrumental for doing the 
will of God, which in turn is to be understood in relation to conformation to Christ. It is 
possible, then, to claim that Bonhoeffer is bringing together Thomist virtue ethics and 
Barthian divine command ethics, in a distinctive ethic for his own context. Here, in 
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Christ, the deeds and character of the believer cohere. Virtue and command both serve 
his broader picture of the will of God, namely the reality that Jesus has reconciled all 
things to God, and that ethics as a whole focuses on the question of whether each person 
and the world around her receive a share of this reality through faith in Jesus Christ. 
 
In this dialectical synthesis, Bonhoeffer is clearly striding with confidence across both 
parts of the stage. He embraces the unity of justification and sanctification which had 
been presented on the Roman Catholic side, without losing the insistence (shown on the 
Protestant side) on grace as the only way a person may be justified.  
 
Although I hope this study may be of interest simply in illuminating the contours of 
Bonhoeffer‟s thought, it is worth considering in what ways my findings may be useful 
in our much changed context today. 
 
6.2: What Bonhoeffer Can Teach us Regarding Virtue Ethics 
Since the publication of MacIntyre‟s After Virtue, the need has become apparent for 
ethics to address issues concerning the agent, to recognise her as a contingent person in 
a plethora of relationships and roles, with a past and with hopes for the future, and with 
a sense of continuity of past, present and future, and with characteristics, whether of 
besetting sins or shining virtues. Within Christian ethics at least three different trends 
have been identified: the focus on witness-bearing communities of virtue; the attempt to 
converse with secular culture using philosophical and social-scientific methods; and the 
endeavour to connect with debates regarding human life among psychologists and 
educators.
492
 More latterly, another trend seems to have emerged using virtue ethics to 
treat the specific moral issues related to particular professional fields, such a medical 
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 See Lee H. Yearley, „Recent Works on Virtue‟, Religious Studies Review 16, no. 1 (1990, 1-9), 3-4.  
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ethics.
493
 Although all of these concerns are of interest, it is the more theological 
situation which is pertinent in this study.
494
 
 
Within theological ethics, there is great diversity of opinion as to the place and value of 
the treatment of virtue. The number of moral theologians who accord virtue a central 
place has been growing in recent decades. Yet there remains a large number of Christian 
ethicists who view character traits or growth in virtue as, at best, of secondary value in 
support of other ways of conceiving of ethics. In considering how Bonhoeffer‟s use of 
virtue-ethical elements might be of benefit in our current and much-changed context, it 
may be helpful to look at one current exponent of virtue ethics, David Cunningham, and 
one ethicist who is decidedly more reserved in his assessment, Oliver O‟Donovan. Both 
represent the Anglican tradition, yet their manner of approaching virtue ethics presents a 
sharp contrast. However, I believe that Bonhoeffer‟s combination of virtue ethics and 
divine command has a distinctive contribution to make for both stances, in ways related 
to the stage backdrop sketched above.
495
  
 
6.2.1: Virtue Ethics and Grace 
The first contribution I believe Bonhoeffer brings is his clear emphasis on the role of 
grace which he carries as he treads to the Roman Catholic side of the stage. While it 
would be quite wrong to perpetuate a sort of Protestant myth which wants to dismiss 
virtue ethics as „works righteousness‟, it is still the case that accounts of virtue ethics 
can often be so concerned with how a person acquires virtues
496
 or how they are formed 
within certain kinds of communities
497
 or more technical discussions,
498
 such as whether 
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there is a unity of the virtues or not, that God‟s active role and the person‟s grateful 
reception may be underemphasized.
499
  
 
This lack of an emphasis on grace is evident the case in Cunningham‟s recent work, 
Christian Ethics: The End of the Law.
500
  
 
This engaging, clear and wise textbook for undergraduates is based firmly on Christian 
virtue ethics, as Cunningham makes clear in the introduction. In setting out possible 
approaches to ethics he begins by mentioning the possibility of focusing on duty, and 
offers a brief outline of Immanuel Kant‟s ethics. He then refers to the utilitarian 
conceptions of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, as well as Joseph Fletcher‟s 
situation ethics.  
While these perspectives continue to have their champions, they do not (in the 
humble opinion of the author of this book) truly provide what we seek in 
understanding what Christian ethics should be…. I want to suggest that their 
faults are not just a result of the specific assumptions of each system. Rather, the 
inadequacies of these standard approaches to ethics result from the fact that, 
when it comes to ethical judgments, rules and principles are extremely difficult 
to formulate and to apply with any degree of specificity and consistency (7).  
 
These forms of ethics based on principle are thus rejected. Similarly, Cunningham 
refuses to countenance an ethic based on rules (9-11). Instead, he claims, Jesus  
emphasized a theme that was not at all new to his culture, but may have too 
often been neglected. His theme was that ethical behaviour depends, not just on 
whether or not one has obeyed the relevant laws, but on the attitude and 
disposition with which a person acts (12, citing Matthew 5.21-22, 27-28). 
 
With carefully chosen passages from scripture Cunningham then shows Paul‟s writings 
affirming the end (both as completion and goal) of the law in Jesus (12-3, citing 
especially Romans 10.4). At this point Cunningham states his intention to treat ethics 
based on the person of Jesus Christ, an undertaking which he recognises raises a 
number of questions about knowledge about Jesus, cultural differences between 
Palestine 2000 years ago and Western countries now, and so on (13-5). Later he 
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 I do not mean to suggest, however, that it is only among Catholic moral theologians that Bonhoeffer‟s 
emphasis on grace within virtue ethics may be of benefit. This is part of my reason for focusing on 
Cunningham (as an Anglican) in this discussion. 
500
 David S. Cunningham, Christian Ethics: The End of the Law (London: Routledge, 2008). References 
to this are in brackets in the text. 
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explores developing character as a means of preventing wrong-doing, and attends to 
aspects of contemporary virtue ethics familiar from MacIntyre and Hauerwas, namely 
narrative, activities and practices, and community (chapter 1). 
 
Appealing as much of this is, there is a notable paucity on sin and grace. Indeed, it 
seems as if there is even embarrassment about the concept of sin. Thus in speaking 
about the epistle to the Romans, Cunningham speaks of challenges to the modern reader 
occasioned by „a number of assumptions that are different from ours‟. He does not 
elaborate on the notion of sin in this context, but in the next paragraph says,  
Although Paul‟s account of sin leads some readers to feel put off or excessively 
chastised, his account of God‟s grace leads him to end this first half of the letter 
with what might be described as the most gloriously positive and hopeful 
sentence in the Bible: „For I am convinced that neither death, nor life, nor 
angels, nor rulers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor powers, nor height, 
nor depth, nor anything else in all creation, will be able to separate us from the 
love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord‟ (83, quoting Romans 8:39). 
 
I imagine the author is trying to offer an attractive account of Christian faith for the 
modern undergraduate, yet it is disconcerting how little attention he pays to sin and 
human dependence on grace.
501
 What I find most telling here is that Cunningham does 
not seem to make the connection which should be obvious in Romans: for a lively sense 
of God‟s grace and mercy which enabled Paul to write „the most gloriously positive and 
hopeful sentence in the Bible‟, a deep conviction of sin and human need for grace is 
required. It is redemption in Christ which brings about God‟s purposes not only for 
humans but for the whole of creation, as Paul writes earlier in the same chapter (verses 
18-22). The notion of grace is central to articulating God‟s will as described here by 
Paul and echoed in Bonhoeffer‟s overarching statement regarding the reality of the 
reconciliation of all things in Christ Jesus.
502
 
 
The second part of Cunningham‟s book (based loosely the Eucharistic liturgy) contains 
a chapter which one might expect to remedy the situation, „Forgiveness, Reconciliation, 
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and Nonviolence‟, and he does indeed take the reality of the fallen world and of human 
fallen nature seriously. Yet there is only a short paragraph which emphasizes God‟s 
mercy and forgiveness (not using the word „grace‟) before he moves on to the 
expectation that Christians are likewise to be a forgiving people (130-1). It is also 
significant that in treating the theological virtues he does not include Thomas‟s 
understanding that they must be infused, or grace in any other form; they are „among 
the most worthy virtues to which Christians could hope to aspire‟ (160-1).503 The 
virtues more generally he considers to be habits which „should be cultivated in order to 
pursue a happy life, a fulfilled and fulfilling life‟ (163). Only later does he consider 
these virtues as related to the very character of God, when he states, „Christians 
understand the virtues to be those dispositions that God has by nature, and in which 
human beings can participate by grace (167, his emphases).‟ Yet here again he moves 
quickly to the element of human reception and participation: „people can allow the 
virtues to be cultivated in their lives and, thereby, to form their moral outlook. In doing 
so, they allow God to bring their own lives into alignment with the divine character 
(167).‟ In a later passage he again moves swiftly from God‟s work in us to human 
participation: „In other words, although Christians believe God is the supreme cultivator 
of the virtues in human lives, they also recognize that they are capable (nevertheless) of 
resisting God‟s work‟ (170). Similarly, in speaking of the redemption, Cunningham 
subtly emphasizes the person of Christ and our imitation of him over the work of Christ 
(177). These comments are not intended to detract from his overall account, but simply 
to underscore that Cunningham does not emphasize the role of grace, nor the 
relationship between the doctrines of justification and sanctification. Such a construal 
could perhaps fit on the half of the stage decorated for post-Tridentine Catholic 
theology, and elicit similar complaints from the opposite side. 
 
In Bonhoeffer‟s conception, however, the reader is constantly reminded both of her 
need for grace, and of God‟s action for her and on her behalf. The notion that Christ 
himself wins form in the believer is a sharp corrective to a virtue ethics which 
underplays the role of grace. The Christian is conformed to Christ by Christ, not by her 
imitation of him. Christ wins form in her. Nonetheless, Bonhoeffer never succumbs to a 
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„cheap grace‟ which makes no demands of the believer; strong challenges to holy living 
are enunciated. 
 
6.2.2: Virtue Ethics and Eudaemonism  
The second aspect of Bonhoeffer‟s account which may be of benefit (especially for 
Protestants) is the articulation of virtue ethics not in a framework that is focused on 
what it means for human beings to flourish but rather within the context of asking how 
we participate in the reality that Christ has reconciled all things to God. Oliver 
O‟Donovan rightly points out the potentially problematic aspect of eudaemonism‟s 
accent on self-love.
504
 Yet he is also surely correct in pointing out the need for 
distinguishing between moral theology and „epistemological efficiency‟, for, as he says, 
it is not the case that we could discover „the whole of our Christian duty by consulting 
our self-interest, even though the whole of our Christian duty does serve our self-
interest.‟505 Irrespective of this defence, a Christian virtue ethic which is not set in a 
eudaemonist framework but rather one which focuses on the cosmic reality of the 
reconciliation of all things to God in Christ would avoid the potentially problematic 
aspect of focusing on human happiness, and simultaneously obviate the need for 
separating moral theology from epistemological efficiency. Bonhoeffer‟s focus on 
participation in this reality could be said to show the Christian both what is required of 
her (living in a way which shows her reconciliation to God through being conformed to 
Christ) and that the starting point of ethics is in God‟s action rather than human 
happiness. Moving from an overarching concern with what constitutes human 
flourishing to what is this broad conception of reality places Christian revelation at the 
outset of ethical discourse, which is perhaps an important change if virtue ethics is to be 
seen as a compelling form of moral theology in at least some quarters.
506
 
 
6.2.3: The Role of Virtue  
However, even though O‟Donovan was happy to defend Augustine‟s use of 
eudaemonism (despite its taint of self-love), it is clear from his later Resurrection and 
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the Moral Order that he has other deep reservations about virtue ethics.
507
 O‟Donovan 
claims that attention to character can only be of use in evaluating a proposed or 
completed act from the position of the observer; the agent‟s awareness of her own 
character cannot helpfully enter into her deliberations of what she should do (chapter 
10). In this discussion he rejects the common virtue-ethical question of what, say, the 
courageous, or compassionate thing to do would be as inappropriately prejudging which 
virtue is most required in the situation, and unduly limiting the range of choices the 
agent may make (216). Since this is not a mode of discernment Bonhoeffer employs, his 
account may appeal to O‟Donovan more than some.508 
 
Another possible form of virtue-ethical deliberation is also excluded in O‟Donovan‟s 
treatment, namely attention to motivation and intention (215).
509
 While he may well be 
right that motives are more useful in a third-person evaluation than the agent‟s own 
deliberations, it seems to me that he misses another facet of how intentions inform 
considerations of what should be done. For intentions may express the goal the agent 
hopes to achieve through her actions, and the deliberations may be those of practical 
reasoning to determine the best method of achieving it. However, when Bonhoeffer 
focuses on intentions or motivations, it is in the context of evaluating proposed actions, 
so it may again be that his form of virtue may overcome some of O‟Donovan‟s 
concerns. 
 
Yet more important than this omission in considering the ways in which virtue ethics 
may be involved in the agent‟s deliberations are two other prime ways which 
O‟Donovan does not discuss. The first is the way in which all aspects of the person‟s 
life are necessarily shaped by who she is. Thus a Christian, being formed more and 
more in the likeness of Christ will be shaped not only in the plethora of activities she 
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 The first he voices relates to the role of grace, which has already been discussed. See O‟Donovan, 
Resurrection and the Moral Order: An Outline for Evangelical Ethics, (Leicester: Apollos, 1986), 17-8, 
where he speaks of a kind of Pelagianism in Maximus‟s account, and 89. Further references appear in 
brackets in the main text. 
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 I do not, however, think O‟Donovan is necessarily right. Hauerwas‟s view that the virtuous agent 
appropriately limits her range of possibilities by not considering certain options strikes me as having 
great merit, „Toward an Ethics of Character‟, in Vision and Virtue: Essays in Christian Ethical Reflection 
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 56. Similarly, Thomas‟s treatment of (infused) 
prudence enabling the person to perceive the situation aright is important (ST I-II. 57.5, 6), and 
O‟Donovan does not mention this. 
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 He speaks of „intention‟, though it is clear from his discussion that he means this in terms of 
„motivation‟ rather than a goal the agent hopes to achieve. 
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undertakes but also in her thoughts, plans, hopes, and goals, and may or may not even 
be aware of how she has been formed and shaped. This is not a matter of her reflection 
on her character, or her choice to create or perpetuate a certain character, both of which 
possibilities O‟Donovan rightly rejects (213-5), as does Bonhoeffer (DBW 6:81). This is 
simply a fact that who a person is will determine, at least in part, how she perceives a 
situation, which possible courses of action spring to her mind, and which she will 
consider to be best. Bonhoeffer speaks of this in terms of simplicity, which is given by 
God, and in terms of how Christ wins form in the believer. 
 
The second way in which virtue ethics may naturally inform ethical decision-making is 
through reference to a virtuous person, asking what a virtuous person would do in this 
situation. For many agents this need not take the form of conscious consideration. 
Instead it may be that admiration and desire to be like a particular virtuous person 
affects a person‟s choices and actions without reflection at the time. I could imagine that 
if O‟Donovan had considered such a possibility it is one he might have rejected also as 
inappropriately limiting the agent‟s range of choices. And if the reference is to a 
virtuous person (who despite all virtues is necessarily still sinful and not perfect in her 
virtue), such an objection may be correct. However, Bonhoeffer‟s way of using this 
mode of virtue-ethical consideration is to speak of Jesus himself as the example of 
simplicity, responsible action, representation, and so on. Although he does not advocate 
a facile attempt to know what Jesus would do, which of course is fraught with dangers, 
it is clear that Jesus Christ is the person to whom the believer looks to know what it 
means to live in obedience to God‟s will and in the freedom of acting in simplicity.  
 
In both these ways, Bonhoeffer‟s use of virtue-ethical motifs may counter O‟Donovan‟s 
statement that notions of character can only inform the evaluation of an act, but not the 
decision of how to act. Nevertheless, it is clear in some passages that Bonhoeffer is 
happy to accord to virtue an instrumental role (simplicity enables the believer to discern 
the will of God), and this may also be helpful. 
 
Thus, I think it is right to say that reading Bonhoeffer‟s Ethics in the light of his 
distinctive combination of virtue and command in service of the reality that all things 
have been reconciled to God in Christ would be helpful in our current debates. This is 
so in at least three ways. First, his emphasis on grace shows that a focus on virtue-
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ethical concerns need not have a Pelagian feel. Secondly, attending to virtue (and 
command) without a eudaemonistic framework avoids the possibility of seeing virtue 
ethics as a form of (problematic) self-love. Thirdly, and finally, the variety of ways in 
which he uses virtue-ethical argumentation may enable the role of virtue within 
Christian ethics more generally to be reviewed. 
 
Following the coming of Christ, ethics can only be concerned with one thing, 
namely with receiving a share of the reality of the fulfilled will of God. 
However, even this receiving a share is only possible on the basis of the fact that 
I myself also am already included in the fulfilment of the will of God in Christ, 
and that means [that I] am reconciled with God. The question of the will of God 
does not ask about what is concealed, unfulfilled, but rather about what is 
revealed, fulfilled. It remains, however, nonetheless a real question, in that I 
myself, and the world around me, am placed in this question through the 
revelation, through the fulfilment (DBW 6:61). 
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